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During the Civil War, Confederate wartime legislation, chiefly conscription, 
exemption, and impressments statutes, raised fundamental constitutional issues.  
These actions by the national government became a prolific source of litigation in 
many southern states.  Yet, in the absence of a national Confederate Supreme Court, 
it fell to state supreme courts and state jurists to resolve these challenges to the 
national government’s exercise of constitutional war powers and to enunciate key 
constitutional principles and explain the tenets of Confederate political philosophy.
As a result, southern state supreme courts became the primary venues in which 
national constitutional issues were adjudicated.
The constitutional purposes and goals of the Confederacy were 
national- rather than state-oriented and provided for limited but effective 
national government, a truly federal union in which state and national 
governments were to both operate effectively and energetically, and within the 
national government, the powers of the national government were to be 
separated to promote efficiency and prevent usurpation.
In these cases, state supreme courts enunciated key Confederate 
constitutional doctrines and principles namely, limited government or 
constitutionalism, federalism, the separation of powers, and national purposes.  
State jurists established that the Confederate Constitution was a substantive
and purposeful constitutive consisting of conservative principles and 
innovative forms and features. Operating as a de facto supreme court, these
state supreme courts considered scores of wartime decisions.  Consistently, 
across jurisdictions, these justices rejected states’ rights as the political 
philosophy of the Confederacy, they upheld the exercise of constitutional
Confederate war powers within a carefully articulated doctrine of federalism, 
they limited national government within its delegated authority without 
handicapping its capabilities to fulfill its duties, and maintained a strict 
separation of government powers between the three national branches.
State supreme court cases have been largely ignored by Civil War scholars.  
However, these decisions reveal the substantive and normative nature of 
constitutional principles in the Confederacy.  The specific holdings in these cases 
contradict earlier historiographical understandings of the Confederacy as a loose 
confederation of states with each acting independently.
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and her brothers and sisters to come.
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“A Light Which Reveals Its True Meanings”
On February 18, 1861, on the steps of the Alabama state capitol in Montgomery, 
Jefferson Davis was inaugurated as Provisional President of the Confederate States of 
America.  As he approached the capitol, crowds reportedly numbering up to ten 
thousand cheered loudly for him and he was, at times, showered with flowers by the 
ladies of Montgomery.  It was a day filled with pomp and ceremony; leading his 
inaugural procession were the colorful Columbus Guards, wearing their “beautiful 
uniform of sky-blue pants and bright red coats [and] carrying a banner with the Georgia 
Coat of Arms.”1  In his inaugural address, Davis paused to reflect upon the substantive 
nature of Confederate constitutionalism and, in direct reference to the recently 
completed Provisional Constitution, he declared, “We have changed the constituent 
parts, but not the system of our Government. The Constitution formed by our fathers is 
that of these Confederate States, in their exposition of it, and in the judicial construction 
it has received [italics added], we have a light which reveals its true meaning.”2  Here, 
Davis claimed legitimacy for the new republic, in constitutional terms, by explaining an 
historical connection and consistency between the newly drafted Constitution of the 
Confederate States of America and the normative political tradition and principles of 
1 T.R.R. Cobb to Marion Cobb, February 18, 1861, T.R.R. Cobb Papers, 
University of Georgia, Athens, GA. Howell Cobb Papers, University of Georgia, 
Athens, GA.  See also Weekly Mail, March 22, 1861, op cit. in Albert N. Fitts, “The 
Confederate Convention: The Constitutional Debate, “The Alabama Review (July 
1949):189-210, 204.
2 Davis was speaking of the Provisional Constitution, approved February 8th, 
1861. The Permanent Constitution was approved three weeks later on March 11th, 
1861.
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framers of the Constitution of 1787.
In addition to the claim of constitutional legitimacy for the Confederate 
Constitution, Davis underscored the critical role of the judiciary in explicating the 
national constitutive principles of the Confederacy, reminding his listeners that judicial 
review had been the means by which Americans had been able to understand fully the 
Constitution of 1787.  So too, by design and by operation during the war, judicial 
review would become the means to explicate fully the nature of the Confederate 
Constitution, especially under the pressure of wartime measures and the assertion of 
national government war powers.  The Confederacy’s conscription and exemption 
acts—the first such legislation in American history—as well as suspensions of the writ 
of habeas corpus and military impressments raised fundamental constitutional issues.3
These became a prolific source of litigation in many states throughout the Confederate 
South, raising for the courts the dual challenge of adjudicating local or state legal claims 
and enunciating national  constitutional principles and doctrines.4
3 Richard F. Bensel refers to these wartime measures as “the most significant 
state power-enhancing measures ever adopted by the Confederate state” in Yankee 
Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in America, 1859-1877 (New York, 
NY: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 135.
4 Though there were many cases which raised legal and constitutional issues 
concerning conscription, exemption, and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, only 
one case in Georgia challenged the impressment legislation directly. Curtis Arthur 
Amlund, Federalism in the Southern Confederacy (Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 
1966), 88.  There were two impressments statutes, the first passed on March 26, 1863, 
which allowed for the military’s seizure of necessary stores, “An Act to Regulate 
Impressments,” Chapt. X, in James M. Matthews, ed., The Statutes at Large of the 
Confederate States of America, Passed at the Third Session of the First Congress; 1863. 
Carefully Collated with the Originals at Richmond. Public Laws of the Confederate 
States of America, Passed at the Third Session of the First Congress; 1863. Private 
Laws of the Confederate States of America, Passed at the Third Session of the First 
Congress; 1863. (Richmond, VA: R.M. Smith, 1863), 102-104. This was followed by a 
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Yet, in the absence of a national Confederate Supreme Court, it fell to state
jurists to resolve these challenges to the national government’s exercise of 
constitutional war powers, to articulate the tenets (and limits) of Confederate political 
philosophy, and to define and maintain the Confederate constitutional order.5  The 
“constitutional order” refers to an understanding of, reverence for, and adherence to 
constitutive principles by members of a political community.  With significant 
implications during the war, it also includes a concern for the authority and stability of 
institutions and processes provided for in the constitutive document, especially the 
allocation of governmental power and authority, issues which were raised regularly and 
directly in wartime litigation.
Defining the Confederate “constitutional order” was a significant responsibility 
for state supreme courts for they faced the challenge of rendering authentic judicial 
review on national constitutional matters simultaneous with an additional challenge to 
second act passed on February 16, 1864 which provided procedures for establishing “fair 
and just” compensation and an appeals process, see “An Act to amend ‘An act to regulate 
impressments,’ approved March twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and sixty-three, and to 
repeal an act amendatory thereof, approved April twenty-seventh, eighteen hundred and 
sixty-three,” Chapt. XLIII, in The Statutes at Large of the Confederate States of 
America, Passed at the Fourth Session of the First Congress; 1863-4. Carefully 
Collated with the Originals at Richmond. Public Laws of the Confederate States of 
America, Passed at the Fourth Session of the First Congress; 1863-4. Private Laws of 
the Confederate States of America, Passed at the Fourth Session of the First Congress; 
1863-4 (Richmond, VA: R.M. Smith, 1864), 192-193.  J.G. DeRoulhac Hamilton, “The 
State Courts and the Confederate Constitution,” The Journal of Southern History, vol. 4 
(November 1938):425-448, 432.
5 “Order” in nineteenth century America referred to “a condition in which the 
people were convinced that those institutions were secure that stabilized the protean 
nature of their society, restrained the potential for conflict in an environment that 
encouraged avarice, harmonized the diversity of opinions and influences fostered by a 
free society, and gave them a voice in determining their future.” Phillip S. Paludan, 
“The American Civil War Considered as a Crisis in Law and Order,” American 
Historical Review (1972): 1013-1034, 1014.
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remove themselves from the influence of political and local issues that had long shaped 
state jurisprudence and jurisprudential traditions.  In a series of cases prompted by 
wartime measures, southern state supreme courts became the primary venues in which 
national constitutional issues were adjudicated.  Though some constitutional cases were 
decided by Confederate District Courts, most were heard in state supreme courts, with 
the result that the Confederate Constitution received its only “definitive judicial 
interpretation” during the war by southern state supreme court justices.6 In these judicial 
interpretations of the Confederate Constitution, we may find a “light which reveals its
[italics added] true meaning” and gain insight into the “principles and purposes of those 
who established the Confederate Government.”7
In order to understand the principles and purposes that made up Confederate 
political philosophy and constitutionalism, this dissertation will examine wartime 
decisions by state supreme courts in which they enunciated key Confederate 
constitutional doctrines and principles—namely, limited government or constitutionalism, 
federalism, the separation of powers, and national purposes.  The methodology to be 
employed is distinctive from other studies of Confederate constitutionalism because of its 
focus upon state supreme court decisions as a means to uncover a more substantive and 
revealing doctrinal development of Confederate constitutional principles and political 
6 Hamilton, “The State Courts and the Confederate Constitution,” 425.
7 J.L.M. Curry, The Southern States of the American Union Considered in their 
Relations to the Constitution of the United States and to the Resulting Union (New 
York, NY: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1894), 91.
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theory.8  Individual cases are analyzed and synthesized into a comprehensive account on 
each of these four principal constitutional doctrines.9  Though these cases have been often 
ignored or discounted by historians of the Confederacy, it is in these decisions that one 
finds the most extensive and detailed construction of the principles and doctrines of 
Confederate constitutional government.10
8 Cases need to be understood in context of constitutionalism and constitutive 
and political principles and ideas in which they were formed. William Jeffrey, Jr., “The 
Constitution: ‘A Firm National Government,’” in Robert Goldwin and William A. 
Schambra, eds., How Federal Is the Constitution?, (Washington, DC: American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1987): 16-37, 16.
9 The availability of wartime cases is problematic. In some southern jurisdictions 
decisions were never published while in others, decisions were destroyed by advancing 
Union forces, as in Mississippi, leaving unknown the outcome of wartime cases in some 
states. The Louisiana court was removed from New Orleans in 1862 and subsequent 
cases heard by the court have never been printed.  Following the war, seventy-three of the 
wartime decisions of the court were de-published.  William Robinson, Justice in Grey, 
and A History of the Judicial System of the Confederate States of America (New York, 
NY: Russell and Russell, 1941; reprint ed., Philadelphia, PA: National Publishing 
Company, 1968), 635-639.  For many jurisdictions, an informed examination of 
newspaper accounts may result in obtaining additional information about unreported 
decisions while in Texas, Charles Robards, former clerk of the court, provided a 
synopsis of wartime cases and revealed that there were eighteen wartime habeas corpus 
cases that were never reported in the state’s official court reporters.  These unreported 
cases are difficult to locate and research but provide a broader understanding of 
doctrinal development on the state supreme courts and the nature of the legal and 
constitutional order in the Confederacy. Charles L. Robards, Synopses of the Decisions 
of the Supreme Court of the State of Texas (Austin, TX: Brown and Foster, 1865).
10 Mark Neely argued that Confederate constitutionalism was a “myth,” based 
upon his analysis of Confederate habeas corpus cases and his contention that the 
Confederacy failed to protect the individual liberties of its citizens.  His analysis of 
Confederate constitutional principles was limited to Confederate habeas corpus cases 
and only one state, North Carolina, for which he drew heavily from Jennifer Van Zant, 
“Confederate Conscription and the North Carolina Supreme Court, The North Carolina 
Historical Review, vol. 72, no. 1 (1995):54-75. Mark E. Neely, Jr., Southern Rights: 
Political Prisoners and the Myth of Confederate Constitutionalism (Charlottesville, VA: 
The University Press of Virginia, 1999). J.G. DeRoulhac Hamilton singled out few cases 
as being important and considered the rest of the corpus of state court cases as 
“unimportant” in “State Courts and the Constitution,” 435, footnote 44, 434-437. Curtis 
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National Constitutional Issues Adjudicated by State Courts
These state supreme court cases, as a whole, are important to understanding the 
nature of Confederate political philosophy, particularly because it was state jurists and 
not national politicians that enunciated the purpose of the Confederacy and its essential 
constitutional doctrines of limited government, federalism, and the separation of 
powers.  In 1861 and 1862, though, it was unclear how state supreme court justices 
would interpret the Confederate Constitution or whether these state jurists, many of 
whom had participated in the secession of their states from the Union, might assert the 
supremacy of their states over Confederate authority.  Equally uncertain was whether 
the state supreme courts might succumb to state government pressures or interests to 
control military forces raised within the state by asserting a doctrine of concurrent war 
powers as a constitutive principle to nullify national conscription, exemption, or 
impressment legislation.11 No one could predict what political or wartime pressures and 
interests might influence these justices.  It was unclear whether these men would 
enforce limitations on the national government or, as Northern invasion threatened their 
Amlund devoted a whole chapter to the courts in the South, but examined state courts 
only generally and mentioned only two cases by name; Amlund, Federalism in the 
Southern Confederacy, 80-93.  Frank Owsley mentioned state court cases only a few 
times and generally so; Frank L. Owsley, States Rights in the Confederacy (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 1925).
11 According to Paul Finkelman, there were four general applications of “states’ 
rights”: the assertion of “independent or state concurrent power,” “the denial of 
interstate cooperation and comity,” “state noncooperation with…or nullification of 
federal law,” and secession. Paul Finkelman, “States’ Rights North and South in 
Antebellum America,” in An Uncertain Tradition: Constitutionalism in the History of 
the South, ed. Kermit L. Hall and James W. Ely, Jr. (Athens, GA: The University of 
Georgia Press, 1989), 126. Three of these--state concurrent power and noncooperation 
with and nullification of federal law—would be refuted by southern state supreme court 
jurists in enunciating the principles and provisions of the Confederate Constitution.
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constituencies, whether they would permit an unlimited and consolidated government to 
emerge to address the exigencies of war.  Equally uncertain was whether southern state 
supreme court justices could or would decide wartime cases with substantial uniformity 
in view of the diversity of social, educational, and political backgrounds in their states 
and the differences within their state legal traditions.
In 1861, when Davis delivered his inaugural address, there was little to indicate 
that state supreme court justices would be able to maintain their political objectivity on 
national issues and resist being influenced by state politics.  Courts operated within 
intensely political environments, often under significant influence from localized state 
politics, and had to balance the influences of “political sectionalism and legal 
nationalism” in their unique roles as “guardians of constitutional principles.”12  It was 
highly possible that state interests and local politics together would make state supreme 
court justices more inclined to favor the interests of their states rather than those of the 
national government.13 These state jurists, important figures in distinctly state 
institutions, could have proclaimed wartime legislation such as conscription and 
impressment as unconstitutional and asserted the primacy of state sovereignty and the 
12 Timothy Huebner, The Southern Judicial Tradition: State Judges and 
Sectional Distinctiveness, 1790-1890 (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1999), 
1, 2, 4, 6-7. There was a tradition of “persistent localism” in southern constitutionalism 
which purported that “local democracy offers the best opportunity to secure a 
responsible political order more sensitive to individual ambition and worth than a 
federal government, distant and out of sight” and this persistent localism resulted in the 
emergence of an oligarchic system rather than a democratic system. Hall and Ely, “The 
South and the American Constitution,” in An Uncertain Tradition, 6-7, 10.
13 This “paradox” of government that provided for both centralized national 
government and state sovereignty was a component in antebellum southern 
constitutionalism.  Ironically, there was a “legacy of ambivalence” or a “tradition of 
uncertainty” in the South in which southerners sought to be a part of the constitutional 
system but also removed from it, see Ibid.
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supremacy of state government over national government.  However, in their unique and 
critical role as enunciators of Confederate fundamental law, state courts balanced state 
and national interests within a text-oriented framework of Confederate 
constitutionalism.14
With remarkable consistency, these state justices formed a de facto Confederate 
Supreme Court, rendered judicial review of the Confederate Constitution’s provisions, 
articulated the goals and values of the Confederate political community, and when in 
accord with the nation’s constitution, the national government’s exercise of war powers 
and the constitutionality of the wartime acts.15 In their wartime decisions, state court 
justices were compelled to analyze the text of the Confederate Constitution, to discern 
its key constitutive principles (limited government, federalism, the separation of 
14 George Rable studied the Confederacy and its “revolution against politics” as 
a substantive development where “assumptions, values, and beliefs” should be 
considered as foundational and constitutive to the Confederacy's political culture and 
inherent in the political crises which Confederate leaders had to face, even though 
historians have largely ignored or “not thoroughly evaluated the complex interaction of 
state and ‘national’ politics in the Confederacy.” There was “the constant tug between 
political ideology and political practice that formed the basis for conflict and 
exacerbated differences between often ambitious and highly individualistic political 
leaders.” Confederate political culture “was not simply created, it evolved in an 
atmosphere of crisis and conflict.” George C. Rable, The Confederate Republic: A 
Revolution Against Politics (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 
1-3.
15 There were general patterns of interpretation across the Confederacy, with 
southern state supreme courts generally sustaining the decisions and actions of the 
Confederate government while deemphasizing states’ rights. Sidney Brummer
concluded that this is one reason why there was not a more effective effort to establish 
the national supreme court; see Brummer, “Judicial Interpretation of the Confederate 
Constitution,” 133.  However, J.G. deRoulhac Hamilton was more definitive on the 
issue of uniform interpretation, concluding “that so much uniformity of construction 
was finally attained and the Confederate government so generally upheld” that “the 
Confederate States derived no benefit from the absence of a national supreme tribunal.”
Hamilton, “State Courts and the Confederate Constitution,” 448.
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powers, and national purpose), and to define the crucial relationship between the states 
and the Confederacy.16 Unlike Confederate or state politicians, for whom the vagaries of 
politics could lead to calculated indecision or self-interested politicking, state supreme 
court justices were compelled to resolve legal and constitutional issues quickly and 
consistent with established national constitutional doctrines.  State supreme court justices 
could not know whether the Confederate “revolution” would succeed, yet they had to 
render decisions that could be upheld, as a matter of law, even after Confederate 
independence.  Consequently, their decisions were more likely to reflect constitutive 
principles and ideas rather than political or military exigencies.
Law and Constitutive Principles
The legal opinions handed down by these state supreme courts offer an 
important understanding of the Confederate constitutional order because law
operationalized important ideas and principles that were constitutive of the Confederate 
nation and its constitutional order.17  Law was a means to measure the legitimacy of 
16 According to Albert Moore, the absence of a strong Confederate court system 
was a negative development and Confederate laws were “twisted, warped, applied with 
indifference or partiality, and in some instances flaunted by the State courts.” Albert 
Burton Moore, Conscription and Conflict in the Confederacy (New York, NY: Hillary 
House Publishers, Ltd., 1963), 189.
17 Fundamental law operates not only to provide a “framework of government” 
for a particular political community but also to restrict legislative power.  In the 
American tradition, the fundamental law of the nation is comprised of the “standards of 
reason, virtue, and justice that were the final cause of the political life” revealed in a 
written document that would also be enforceable.  Yet, the fundamental law may also 
include unwritten and constitutive ideas, principles, and values of the political 
community such as a national consensus on the nature of the Union. Herman Belz, A 
Living Constitution or Fundamental Law? American Constitutionalism in Historical 
Perspective, (New York, NY: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), 3-7.
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force exercised within the constitutional order and, as the instrument of review for the 
exercise of secular power, the mechanism to impose constitutionalism or the structural 
limitations upon government power.18  There are few legal and constitutional studies of 
the Confederacy and, of these, few are comprehensive and substantive legal or 
constitutional analyses of these cases or of the workings of the courts.19 Few of the 
major studies of Confederate politics and constitutionalism consider the tremendous 
importance of state court constitutional opinions on the development of Confederate
constitutional doctrines.20
Yet, in order to fully understand the key constitutional principles and 
developments within the Confederacy, it is necessary to study and understand the legal 
issues raised in wartime cases, arguments presented before the court, the courts’ 
18 Ibid, 518; Paludan, “The American Civil War Considered as a Crisis in Law 
and Order,” 1013, 1021.
19 State supreme courts in Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina, and Texas handed 
down more decisions on wartime measures than other state jurisdictions.  Fewer 
constitutional law decisions were handed down by the courts in Virginia, Florida, 
Mississippi, and South Carolina.  Arkansas's court issued no constitutional law decision 
addressing conscription or exemption.  No court loyal to the Confederacy was established 
in Kentucky or Missouri. The court in Louisiana reported cases only from its January to 
June, 1861 and November, 1861 to February, 1862 terms. Robinson, Justice in Grey, 635-
639.
20 Amlund’s work on Confederate federalism relies almost solely upon secondary 
sources and the Official Records of the War of the Rebellion.  Though a critical issue in 
state supreme court cases, Amlund largely ignored the importance of these state courts 
enunciating constitutional doctrines.  Sidney Brummer acknowledged that “in the short 
period of time during which the Confederate States existed, we see its constitutional law 
developing” and that this development mirrored the significant legal and constitutional 
developments that occurred in the United States immediately following the Revolution.  
However, Brummer limited his analysis of cases to the last eighteen months of the war and 
concluded that they were a sign of “the growing opposition to the Davis administration.” 
Brummer, “Judicial Interpretation of the Confederate Constitution,” 131.
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decisions, and their role in the enunciation of Confederate constitutional doctrines.21
These state supreme court decisions, comprising the most substantive corpus of 
Confederate constitutional adjudication, help to determine the legitimacy of claims that 
the Confederacy was a constitutional revolution and reform effort and that Confederate 
constitutional philosophy and practices were distinctly within the American 
constitutional tradition.22
Although the tradition of constitutional jurisprudence in the United States 
provides for the adjudication of relevant issues by federal district and appellate courts, 
including a national Supreme Court, the Confederate experience was markedly 
different.  No national Confederate court was formed because the Confederate Congress 
could never agree on the membership of the Confederate Supreme Court.  At its first 
session in March of 1861, the Confederate Provisional Constitution passed enabling 
legislation for the court, the Judiciary Act of March 16, 1861.23 The legislation defined
21 The value of these cases has largely been discounted or ignored. Hamilton
stated that the only important constitutional cases in Texas were Ex Parte Coupland, 26 
Tex. 397 (1862); Ex Parte Turman, 26 Tex. 708 (1863); and Ex Parte Meyer, 27 Tex. 715 
(1864) in “State Courts and the Constitution,” footnote number 44, page 435 and 
generally, 434-437.  Other works in which state court decisions are discussed include 
Moore, Conscription and Conflict in the Confederacy; J.G. deRoulhac Hamilton, The 
North Carolina Courts and the Confederacy," North Carolina Historical Review 4, No. 
4 (October 1927):366-403; Memory Mitchell, Legal Aspects of Conscription and 
Exemption in North Carolina, 1861-1865 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1965); Neely, Southern Rights.
22 Donald Nieman, “Republicanism, the Confederate Constitution, and the 
American Constitutional Tradition,” in Hall and Ely, Uncertain Tradition, 202.
23 This arose under Article 3, sec. 1, para. 3 of the Provisional Constitution.  The 
enabling legislation was “An Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the Confederate 
States of America,” Chapt. LXI, in R.M. Matthews, ed., The Statutes at Large of the 
Provisional Government of the Confederate States of America, from the Institution of 
the Government, February 8, 1861, to its Termination, February 18, 1862, Inclusive; 
Arranged in Chronological Order. Together with the Constitution for the Provisional 
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the role of the Confederate Supreme Court and its relationship with the state supreme 
courts and provided in section 45, national appellate jurisdiction over the state courts.
Opposition to this section resulted from the fear that such jurisdiction would centralize 
the national and state court systems as had been done in the early national period on the 
U.S. Supreme Court under John Marshall.  However, sessions of the court were 
precluded until the government could be established under a Permanent Constitution.24
This act was later suspended until the ratification of the Permanent Constitution.25
Throughout the war, several bills were presented before the Confederate Congress for the 
Government, and the Permanent Constitution of the Confederate States, and the 
Treaties Concluded by the Confederate States with Indian Tribes (Richmond, VA: R.M. 
Smith, 1864), 75-87.
24 Resolution No. 82 in Acts and Resolutions of the First Session of the 
Provisional Congress of the Confederate States (Richmond, VA: Enquirer Book and 
Job Press, 1861), 128; Hamilton, “State Courts and Confederate Constitution,” 426; 
Journal of the Congress of the Confederate States of America, vol. I (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1904), 136-137.  Marshal L. DeRosa, The Confederate 
Constitution of 1861: An Inquiry into American Constitutionalism (Columbia, MO: 
University of Missouri Press, 1991), 105. The drafters of the Confederate Constitution 
had attempted to resolve the issue almost two weeks earlier, on March 7, when an 
amendment had been offered, removing cases originating in state courts from the 
jurisdiction of the Confederate high court. On March 8, 1862, Confederate Senator 
Thomas J. Semmes of Louisiana introduced a bill to repeal these two sections of the 
March 16, 1861 act.  Several days later, on March 11, 1862, he reported out from the 
Senate Judiciary Committee another bill to organize the court but on March 26, moved 
for its postponement. In September it was postponed again; see Journal of the Congress 
of the Confederate States of America, I, 369.
25 Though the Confederate Supreme Court had been created on paper with the 
initial enabling legislation on March 16, 1861, the court was prevented from convening 
by a subsequent bill which mandated that the court first be organized under the 
Permanent Confederate Constitution, almost a year later, on February 18, 1862.  “An 
Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the Confederate States of America,” Chapt. LXI, 
Statutes at Large of the Provisional Government of the Confederate States of America, 
from the Institution of the Government, February 8, 1861, to its Termination, February 
18, 1862, Inclusive, 75-87.
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establishment of the national Supreme Court but were never passed.26
The failure to create a Confederate Supreme Court caused great concern 
amongst Confederate political leaders who feared that the absence of an authoritative 
voice on constitutional issues might lead to usurpations of the judicial function by the 
executive or legislative branches.  In January of 1863, one year after the Permanent 
Constitution had been approved, Attorney-General Thomas H. Watts urged the 
Confederate Congress to organize a national court, reminding them that the organization 
of the national government was yet incomplete without all three branches of 
government fully formed and functioning: “when the framers of our Constitution 
divided all the delegated powers into the three great departments, Legislative, Executive 
and Judicial, they never contemplated the system fully organized until each of the 
departments should be provided with a head.”  Watts further admonished Congress, 
reminding them that “uniformity in the construction of statutes, the preservation of 
constitutional landmarks, and justice to the property and person of the citizen, all call 
for the establishment of the Supreme Court, the head of the Judicial Department of the 
Government.”27
Doctrinal uniformity in constitutional decisions was critical and its importance 
for articulating national constitutive principles that would guide political action was 
26 In April of 1862, the Confederate House introduced an organization bill, but 
nothing was ever produced, even after a September 1862 resolution was passed ordering 
the House Judiciary Committee to produce an organization bill; see Sidney D. 
Brummer, “The Judicial Interpretation of the Confederate Constitution,” in Studies in 
Southern History and Politics (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1914), 107; 
Acts and Resolutions of the Third Session of the Provisional Congress, 6-7; Robinson, 
Justice in Grey, 420-34, 474-91; Bensel, Yankee Leviathan, 132.
27 Report of the Attorney General (Richmond, VA: 1863), January 1, 1863; 
Hamilton, “State Courts and Constitution,” 427.
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even raised by state politicians.  Governor Zebulon Vance of North Carolina pointed out 
that the lack of a national supreme court to address constitutional issues created difficult 
delays for state and Confederate authorities.  Quite possibly, important constitutional 
questions would have to be resolved in each state before the enforcement of national laws 
could be legitimated and enforced in that state.  In a letter to Secretary of War Seddon in 
February of 1864 Vance said “however unfortunate it maybe to the efficient and equal 
working of the Government that the laws of Congress are at the mercy, so to speak, of the 
various judges of the various states, I submit that it is not possible to avoid it, in the 
absence of the Supreme Court of the Confederacy, to give harmony and uniformity of 
construction.”28 But, because political differences between states’ rights advocates and 
pro-Confederate nationalists made impossible any agreement on the jurisdictional 
relationship between the Confederate District Courts in each state and the respective 
state courts, the creation of the high court was consistently defeated.29 The issue of the 
jurisdictional relationship between the Confederate Supreme Court and the state courts 
continued to play such a significant role that, by war’s end, the national court was still 
28 Zebulon B. Vance to James A Seddon, February 29, 1864, Official Records of 
the War of the Rebellion, series IV, volume III, 176.
29 The monumental issues affecting the states and their citizens could not be 
settled by a national court, but only by state courts which were independent from 
federal interference and supreme in their jurisdictions. Charles E. George, “The 
Supreme Court of the Confederate States of America,” Virginia Law Register, New 
Series 6 (December 1920), 595-596.  Under the Confederate Constitution and the 
Confederate Judiciary Act of March 13, 1861, the Confederate courts were given much 
broader jurisdiction for judicial review than that provided to federal courts under the 
Judiciary Act of 1789. Fitts, “The Confederate Constitution: The Constitutional 
Debate,” 201.
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waiting to be formed.30  Yet, even though the Congress failed to organize a national 
supreme court, state supreme courts continued until the end of the war to render 
decisions and with considerable consistency across jurisdictions.
It was because of, not in opposition to constitutional principles that the court 
failed to be formed.  Concerns over limiting government and preventing the national 
court from expanding its own powers beyond the Constitution were substantive 
concerns for the framers.  Influential states’ rights political leaders voiced their fear and 
paranoia that a strong national supreme court, resembling the Supreme Court of John 
Marshall, might usurp power and remove important limitations on government power and 
authority.  They worried that such a national government might consolidate political 
power, in a manner resembling that of the antebellum Washington government, and 
subjugate the interest of the states to those of the national government.31 The Confederate 
framers “resolved this problem by providing easy access to the ultimate source of 
sovereign authority, the electorate” and provided the national court with “a temporary 
vote, subject to appeal to two-thirds of the states, meeting in convention upon call of 
any three states.32  The result was that “the hierarchy of laws remained, flowing 
30 See Amlund, Federalism in the Southern Confederacy, chapter 7.
31 Moore, Conscription and Conflict, 165.  There were significant political and 
personal reasons, too. For example, Henry S. Foote of Tennessee had proclaimed on the 
floor of the Confederate House that he would not support any effort to organize the 
Supreme Court if Judah P. Benjamin was to have any influence over the naming of the 
justices while J.W. DuBose had attributed the House refusal to pass an organization bill 
was due to the fear that John A. Campbell would be appointed the Confederate court’s 
Chief Justice. J.W. DuBose, Life and Times of William L. Yancey (Birmingham, AL: 
Roberts and Son, 1892; reprint, New York, NY: Peter Smith, 1942), 713 and Hamilton, 
“State Courts and Constitution,” 430.
32 Confederate Constitution, Article 5, Section 1, part 1.
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naturally from the federal system, but the tyranny of courts over law and government 
was destroyed by providing ready appeal to the sovereign power.”33
There was significant support in Congress for the formation of the court, including 
Senator Benjamin H. Hill of Georgia who clearly saw a need to create a strong judiciary 
department, and fellow Georgian T.R.R. Cobb, who believed that a national court, 
comprised of the District Court Judges sitting en banc, would be formed under the 
Permanent Constitution with Joseph Henry Lumpkin of Georgia (Cobb’s father-in-law) 
as the new Chief Justice.34  Confederate political leaders such as Louis T. Wigfall, 
William L. Yancey, Robert Toombs, Rhett, Edward Pollard and Senator Clement C. Clay 
feared that the creation of a Confederate States Supreme Court would promote an extreme 
nationalist understanding of the Constitution and only serve to centralize the Confederate 
Government.35  J.L.M. Curry feared that a powerful central government might not be 
33 Fitts, “The Confederate Convention: The Constitutional Debate,” 206.
34 T.R.R. Cobb to Marion Cobb, February 9, 1861, T.R.R. Cobb Papers, 
University of Georgia, Athens, GA.
35 DeRosa, The Confederate Constitution of 1861, 105; Bensel, Yankee 
Leviathan, 124; Journal of the Confederate Constitutional Convention, contained in 
Journal of the Congress of the Confederate States of America, 880-81; Charles R. Lee, 
Jr., The Confederate Constitutions (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina
Press, 1963), 108; Journal of the Congress of the Confederate States of America, 1861-
1865, 3:20, 32, 36, 38, 42, 44-48, 50, 53, 56, 64, 66, 106, 146, 172, 174, 176-177.  In 
response to this bill, William Yancey of Alabama said “when we decide that the state 
courts are of inferior dignity to this Court, we have sapped the main pillar of the 
Confederacy.”  Acts and Resolutions of the Provisional Congress of the Confederate 
States, No. 82, Section 45, 128; see also DeRosa, Confederate Constitution of 1861, 
107.  In support of the establishment of a Confederate Supreme Court and in opposition 
to a bill by Senator Clement C. Clay of Alabama to repeal sections 45 and 46 of the act, 
Senator James Phelan of Mississippi stated: “if each state was entitled to its own 
construction of what laws were constitutional, the Confederate Government was at an 
end,” Proceedings of the First Confederate Congress in the Southern Historical Society 
Papers (Richmond, VA: H.J. Eckenrode, 1925), vol. 48, 4; DeRosa, Confederate 
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guided by the interests of the states or the people while Oldham considered the discussion 
of the Confederate Supreme Court to be a bit too “Federalist” for him.36
In January, when Clement C. Clay introduced another bill to repeal sections 45 and 
46 of the March 16, 1861 act, an animated debate began, with violence between Yancey 
and Hill erupting on February 4, resulting in the Senate’s censure of both legislators.37  On 
March 18, the bill was passed by a vote of 14 to 8 and went to the House where it was 
continuously postponed until tabled in March of 1865.38 The battle over the composition 
of the Supreme Court brought to the fore an inherent problem, that the southern 
nationalism from the antebellum period, which was localistic and independent, conflicted 
with the Confederate nationalism which emphasized a strong central government.39  This 
Constitution of 1861, 107.  Senator Phelan's remarks were answered by William 
Yancey, who retorted that “the powers of the Government must not be strained against 
the sovereign States, and no jealousies and animosities will be produced.  But when you 
strain the powers of the Government against the States you will have a war of intellect, 
which will soon become a moral war.” Proceedings of First Confederate Congress, vol. 
48, 15; DeRosa, Confederate Constitution of 1861, 107.  Finally, in March of 1863, the 
Confederate Senate voted on the repeal measure, passing it by a vote of 16 to 6, and 
denying the national Supreme Court the appellate jurisdiction over the states. Ibid.
36 Moore, Conscription and Conflict, 84.
37 Journal of the Congress of the Confederate States of America, 3:176-177.
38 Ibid., for names of votes cast & discussion. The House reported out the bill 
favorably on April 9, 1862, but it was postponed to the next session, then postponed 
again in December. Journal of the Congress of the Confederate States of America,
6:319-320, 537. A new bill, introduced to the Judiciary Committee in May of 1864, died 
in committee but was followed by another attempt in November of 1864, which was 
subsequently tabled. Journal of the Congress of the Confederate States of America,
7:310. A final attempt at the bill was introduced on March 14, 1865 but was tabled as 
well. Ibid., 758.
39 Don E. Fehrenbacher, Constitutions and Constitutionalism in the Slave-Holding 
South (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1989), 70.
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conflict would have to be overcome by state supreme courts enunciating Confederate 
constitutional principles.
Because of the failure to create a Confederate Supreme Court, many litigants 
quickly realized that they stood a better chance of winning their case in state court and 
most Confederate constitutional cases were litigated and adjudicated before state 
supreme courts.40 Without a national supreme court, the Confederate judiciary consisted 
of only the Confederate District Court in each state, providing to Confederate citizens an 
incomplete national judiciary with no effective appellate review from Confederate courts 
and seriously impairing the reputation and efficacy of the Confederate District Courts.  
Even the Confederate government prosecuted in the state courts due to the better 
opportunities for review and the perception that the opinion of the state court would be 
more respected than those of the Confederate courts. 41 The major constitutional issues 
being litigated involved the exercise of the Confederate Government’s war powers,
whether conscription and impressments were consistent with constitutional grants of 
power, whether exemptions provided for in Confederate legislation amounted to a 
contract between the national government and the individual that could not be breached 
under the Confederate Constitution’s Contracts Clause, and whether the exercise of war 
40 During the war, Confederate District Courts adjudicated sequestration, 
admiralty, prize cases, and on a few occasions, issues related to conscription. There 
were many reasons why litigants preferred state courts: they were perceived as having an 
established legal tradition and a permanence that equated to a credibility which the 
Confederate judiciary did not yet enjoy, state courts were more popular, the incomplete 
Confederate court system “impaired the dignity” of the District Courts, and Confederate 
courts possessed no appellate jurisdiction over state courts without creation of national 
Supreme Court. Moore, Conscription and Conflict, 166-167.
41 Ibid.
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powers by the War Department and other Executive Branch agencies amounted to an 
usurpation of legislative powers and thereby violated the constitutional doctrine 
separating government powers.
Conscription was the most litigious constitutional issue and one of the most 
politically charged issues for the courts to address.  There was opposition to conscription 
from some of the “most eminent jurists and statesmen of the country” who considered the 
act unconstitutional and challenged the necessity of the act.42  However, here not all 
opposition was due to sincere devotion to ideological principles; some southern governors 
were motivated to oppose conscription as a Confederate policy because of their own 
ambitions to preserve state patronage powers and control the appointment of military 
officers.43  Reaction to the enforcement of conscription could be violent, especially in 
areas with strong Unionist sentiment.
There was also popular support for conscription.  In a speech published in the 
Charleston Mercury on April 2, 1862, Wigfall identified the importance of 
42 These included Alexander H. Stephens, Robert Toombs, Joseph E. Brown, 
James L. Orr, Henry S. Foote, Chief Justice Richmond Mumford Pearson, Williamson 
S. Oldham. Moore, Conscription and Conflict, 23.  Supporters of conscription included 
Davis' cabinet, Rhett, Yancey, Wigfall, Pollard; see Official Records of the War of the 
Rebellion, ser. IV, vol. I, 1133. Moore referred to popular support for conscription with a 
piece from the Clarke County, Alabama Democrat in December of 1862: “The discussion 
in Georgia respecting the conscription law is disappearing...The decision of the Supreme 
Court in its behalf has reconciled the people to it--at least for the present.” Ibid., 171.
43 Georgia’s Governor Joseph E. Brown’s opposition was due to his belief that 
conscription represented a “bold and dangerous usurpation by Congress of the reserved 
rights of the States.” Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, series IV, volume II, 
130-131. The major issue driving Brown was that of preserving patronage powers and 
the authority to appoint officers of state units.  This was “the milk in the cocoanut” [sic] 
according to Linton Stephens’ speech before the Georgia Legislature, as quoted in the 
Augusta Constitutionalist on October 30, 1862 and the Southern Confederacy on 
November 15, 1862. Moore, Conscription and Conflict, 24-25.
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constitutional ideas and principles, declaring that the Confederacy was not founded 
upon an agreement to join a “loose league” but to form a nation that had to be protected.  
The Virginia Legislature was cited in the April 18, 1862 edition of the Columbus Sun as 
endorsing conscription, expressing their support for it and desire to cooperate with 
Confederate authorities, underscoring the importance of the federal arrangement in their 
thinking.  Herschel Johnson of Georgia articulated the priority of the nation over the 
ideology of states’ rights when he confessed that he could do nothing more than 
acquiesce in conscription because “the only other alternative, he warned, was 
annulment [of the nation], but ‘nullification is folly, and secession is disintegration.’”  
Leading newspapers, including states’ rights papers such as the Charleston Mercury and 
the Richmond Examiner, supported the measure, doing so in the interest of preserving 
the Confederate nation.  Others, such as the Southern Confederacy and the Columbus 
Sun favored conscription as a principle but disapproved of its practice as an exercise of 
Confederate power, believing that the Executive branch and Congress should be held to 
strict accountability with conscription and identifying here the importance of dividing 
national government powers under the separation of powers doctrine.44
When the first conscription bill became law on April 16, 1862, it did so under the 
gravest of situations.  At that time, the Confederate Army was composed chiefly of 
twelve-month enlistments whose terms of enlistment were to expire very soon; Forts 
Henry and Donelson had fallen in February causing the abandonment of all defenses on 
the upper Mississippi; Nashville and Memphis became subject to Federal raids and attacks, 
44 The Columbus Sun (April 22, 1862), the Southern Confederacy (April 20, 
1862 and October 7, 1862) and the Savannah Republican (May 15, 1862); Moore, 
Conscription and Conflict, 21-22, 26.
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Confederate forces in the West were in retreat back into Alabama and Mississippi; New 
Orleans had fallen; Confederate forces had experienced the defeat at Shiloh on April 6th 
with its resulting retreat to Corinth; Roanoke Island, North Carolina had been captured; 
and public and official views pointed to the need to fill the Confederate ranks with 
conscripts since volunteering was not meeting military needs.  The Confederate Congress 
called into service for three years (unless the war were to end sooner) white men 
between the ages of 18 and 35 in order to meet the manpower requirements of the 
Confederate military and there was significant popular support for the measure.45
Military manpower needs made conscription a necessity if the Confederacy, as a nation, 
was to survive and subsequent legislation expanded the class of individuals liable to 
conscription.46
Individual litigants, hoping to secure discharges from military service, initially 
45 The Columbus Sun (July 12, 1863), Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, 
ser. IV, vol. II, 42, 279; Moore, Conscription & Conflict, 12. The passage of the 
conscription act preceded by the expiration of the term of enlistment for 148 regiments of 
12-months' men.  The Act on April 16th, 1862 provided that every able-bodied white male 
from age 18 through 35 was subject to Confederate service and allowed the hiring of 
substitutes who were themselves not liable to conscription. The Confederate Congress 
passed the act by a margin of 2-to-1. Statutes At Large of the Confederate States of 
America, 1st Cong., 1st Sess., chapt. 31 (1862), 29-33; Journal of the Congress of the 
Confederate State of America, II, 154 and V, 228. President Davis' support of conscription 
was evident in his Message to Congress on March 28, 1863. Richardson, Messages and 
Papers, I, 206.
46 Congress amended the first act on September 27, 1862 and expanded the age 
range of liability to those ages 18 to 45 and making substitutes who fell into these age 
ranges now liable for military service. Matthews, Statutes At Large of the Confederate 
States of America, 1st Cong., 2nd Sess., chapt. 15, 61-62. In February of 1864, the 
Congress passed its final amendatory act, expanding the age range to include men ages 
17 through 50, although the additional men drafted were to be employed as reserve 
troops in their home states; see Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, series IV, 
volume III, 178.
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asserted arguments based upon various states’ rights theories—including a state-oriented 
theory of federalism—to contest the exercise of conscription power by the Confederate 
government.47 These efforts to challenge conscription constitutionally on a doctrinal 
level largely failed and litigants and their attorneys altered their legal strategies, pleading 
upon procedural grounds and seeking to invoke the protection and issuance of “the Great 
Writ,” the writ of habeas corpus.
The writ of habeas corpus became the chief means for bringing conscription and 
statutory exemption cases before the state courts by those seeking discharges from 
military service.48  There was a substantive reason for asserting the writ—to produce the 
body of the individual to the court without delay in order to allow the court to determine 
the lawfulness of the detention of the petitioner and the deprivation of their personal 
liberty—and it could be issued by a state court or an individual state supreme court justice 
to order a law enforcement officer or other individual, civil or military, to comply.49
47  Moore, Conscription and Conflict in the Confederacy, 163, 354. There was 
resistance to conscription in the North, as well, and state supreme courts adjudicated 
claims alleging that conscription in the North was unconstitutional in Pennsylvania 
(Henry S. Kneedler v. David M. Lane, Charles B. Barrett, J. Ralston Wells, and Isaac 
Ashmead, Jr. Francis B. Smith v. David M. Lane, Charles B. Barrett, J. Ralston Wells, 
and Christian Young. William Francis Nickels v. William E. Lehman, N. N. Marsellis, 
Charles Murphy, and Ebenezer Scanlan, 25 Pa. 238 (1863)), Indiana (Griffin v. Wilcox, 
21 Ind. 282 (1863)), and Wisconsin (In Re Griner and others, 16 Wis. 382 (1863) a nd 
Brodhead and Others v. The City of Milwaukee and others, Porter v. The Same, 19 Wis. 
624 (1865)). Brummer, “Judicial Interpretation of the Confederate Constitution,” 109.
48 The habeas corpus clause of the Confederate Constitution was found in 
Article 1, Section 9, clause 3. It provided that “The privilege of the writ of habeas 
corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public 
safety may require it.”  Conscription as the chief source of cases during the war is also 
addressed by Neely in Southern Rights, 59.
49 Kermit Hall, Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, 
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1992), 357-358.
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During the war, more than 212 applications were presented before state supreme court 
justices and more than 122 were issued.50  In North Carolina, the writ’s importance in 
protecting against unlawful detention and the Chief Justice’s willingness to use the court’s 
original jurisdiction over applications for writs of habeas corpus resulted in the justices’ 
ability to hear applications without a long delay or the process of appeal through the state 
court system.51
There were serious abuses of the writ for purposes other than determining the 
lawfulness of detention.  In Richmond, Edward A. Pollard condemned the use of the writ 
before [Confederate] courts, calling it “remarkable” that the Confederate Attorney 
General in the city had been called upon to try eighteen hundred cases in which 
petitioners had sought discharge from conscription through use of the writ of habeas 
corpus.  Pollard would declare that the “honored writ” had been reduced to “the vilest 
instrument of the most undeserving men” and that “attached to it [the writ] [there was] a 
record of shame for the South that we would willingly spare.”  He complained bitterly of 
the opportunism of Congressman Humphrey Marshall from Kentucky, representing the 
soldier and refugee vote in the Second Congress, who reportedly “added to his pay as a 
legislator the fees of an attorney to get men out of the army” by rendering his legal skills 
as a “famous advocate in Richmond in cases of habeas corpus” where he “is reported to 
50 More than 37 applications were presented before North Carolina’s Chief 
Justice Richmond Mumford Pearson.
51 Van Zant, “Confederate Conscription and the North Carolina Supreme Court,” 
62.
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have boasted that his practice yielded him an average of two thousand dollars a day!”52
The writ became the favorite legal weapon of attorneys who, with less civil legal business 
to attend to in the courts because of the war, saw the writ practice as an opportunity to 
earn money from individuals who had the financial resources both to hire substitutes for 
military service and to pay for legal services to assist them with their claims for military 
discharges in the courts.53
Yet, despite the broad use of the writ of habeas corpus as a mechanism for giving 
state courts jurisdiction over Confederate prisoners, state courts upheld the procedural and 
substantive integrity of the writ practice, remanding back to Confederate custody a 
significant number of appellants and overturning many habeas corpus cases raised upon 
original jurisdiction.54  Justices asserted limitations on their own exercise of such 
jurisdiction, holding that they considered it “the exercise of a special jurisdiction 
conferred by the [Confederate] Constitution and laws,” that it was to be used only for the 
prompt relief of the citizen against any improper interference with his personal 
liberty,”55 and that the courts were to maintain strict standards and reject those petitions 
that clearly lacked sufficiency.56 State supreme court justices did assert a concurrent 
52 Neely, Southern Rights, 43-44; Ezra J. Warner and W. Buck Yearns, 
Biographical Register of the Confederate Congress, (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1975), 167-168 where there is a great deal more complexity and 
disagreement about Marshall.
53 Neely, Southern Rights, 56-57.
54 Ex Parte Lee and Allen, 39 Ala. 457 (1864).
55 Jason McFarland v. G.W. Johnson (1863), reported in Ibid., 8.
56 Ex Parte Hill, In Re Armistead v. Confederate States & Ex Parte Dudley, 38 
Ala. 458 (1863); Ex Parte J. W. Ainsworth, 27 Tex. 731 (1865).
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jurisdiction over writ of habeas corpus cases, particularly their ability to exercise such 
jurisdiction over Confederate prisoners.57  However, this was not the positive assertion of 
states’ rights ideology; the use of the writ by states courts to acquire jurisdiction over 
federal prisoners was a practice well established in American constitutional and legal 
traditions by 1861.58  For southern state supreme court justices, the writ of habeas corpus, 
often invoked by litigants, was to remain a substantive tool of individual liberty from 
wrongful detention rather than the convenient mechanism for avoiding military service 
and was consistent with their understanding of the Confederate Constitution as a 
substantive and constitutive national document.
Substantive Nature of Confederate Constitutionalism
In 1861, southerners chose to turn their backs on what they regarded as “the 
deterioration of American constitutionalism, a deterioration initiated and sustained by 
their political rivals in the North.” 59  They were convinced that the governmental 
arrangement and institutions provided for in the U.S. Constitution had been corrupted.  
Many southerners professed that state sovereignty was threatened by an increasingly 
intrusive government in Washington and constitutional rights could no longer be 
57 In In Re Bryan, 60 N.C. 1 (1863), the North Carolina court held that state and 
Confederate courts and judges held concurrent jurisdiction in issuing writs of habeas 
corpus. Hamilton, “The State Courts and the Confederate Constitution,” 373-374.
58 Ji-Hyung Cho, “The Transformation of the American Legal Mind: Habeas 
Corpus, Federalism, and Constitutionalism, 1787-1870,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University 
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1995).
59 DeRosa, The Confederate Constitution of 1861, 1.
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protected, especially the property rights in slaves.  Consequently, southerners departed 
from the Union and re-constituted themselves under the terms and principles of a new, 
more innovative constitution.  Yet, in 1861, it wasn’t clear what principles from the Old 
Union were to be invoked in this endeavor nor what role would states’ rights and 
secession play in the creation of a new constitutional order.  Equally unclear as they 
defined a new form of constitutional government was how southerners would re-structure 
their polity both in response to the errors of the past and to facilitate a more effective 
management of conflict in the future.60
The new American constitution they created was designed to remedy the 
shortcomings experienced in the old one and stimulate a new direction towards a more 
effective and federal governmental system.61  Confederate constitutionalism, as a reform 
effort, was both conservative and innovative, looking to both the past and the future to
retain essential elements while also reforming those elements that required change.62
Davis had referred to the character of Confederate constitutionalism as both innovative 
60 Ibid.  In 1861, southerners drafted and adopted a Provisional Constitution, a 
national charter which, though at first glance appeared to be very similar to the United 
States Constitution, was actually a very distinct document. Fehrenbacher contends that the 
Confederate Constitution had a “derivative” character, based upon the U.S. Constitution, 
but also containing distinctively southern constitutional doctrines. Fehrenbacher, 
Constitutions and Constitutionalism, 58-62.
61 Ibid.
62 The extent to which the Confederate Constitution addressed the relevant 
political and constitutional issues of the antebellum period led William Robinson, author 
of Justice in Grey, the comprehensive work on the Confederate legal system, to declare 
that “the Constitution of the Confederate States marked a high point in American 
constitution-making,” due to the attempt by its drafters to improve upon the American 
governmental machine and to “set at rest moot questions,” that had plagued the United 
States in prior decades. William M. Robinson, Jr., “A New Deal in Constitutions,” The 
Journal of Southern History, vol. 4, (November 1938):449-461, 454.
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and conservative when he pointed out that the significant changes made by the 
Montgomery convention included the preservation of a more federal republic 
comprised of both state and national governments and the alteration of “constituent 
parts” to provide greater specificity about government authority and powers.
In this Constitution, southerners attempted to safeguard a political philosophy 
which included individual liberty and equality as well as the “rule of law, including a 
constitution as a permanent, paramount, and binding political law.”63  Casting themselves 
as conservators of the republican ideal, southerners in 1860-1861 aimed to preserve tenets 
they considered to be enshrined in the Constitution of 1787.  In this sense, Confederate 
constitutionalism was conservative, for it looked to the past and sought to preserve a 
tradition of libertarian government which was understood as having taken form with the 
political traditions of the founding era.  Several historians have interpreted this 
development as indicative of the traditionalist nature of the Confederate constitutionalism.  
Clement Eaton argued that Confederate framers purposely avoided framing a new 
constitution, that the Confederate Constitution was the product of profoundly 
conservative constitutionalism and simply added more stringent protection for slavery and 
state sovereignty to the Constitution of 1787.64  Secession was the action undertaken by 
“conservators” of an American constitutional system and they sought to free this system 
63 Herman Belz, “The South and the American Constitutional Tradition at the 
Bicentennial,” in  Hall and Ely, eds., An Uncertain Tradition, 20.
64 Clement Eaton, A History of the Southern Confederacy (New York, NY: 
Macmillan, 1954), 43-45.
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from the corruptive influences of Northern abolitionism and commercialism.65
The conservative nature of Confederate constitutionalism is the subject of much 
disagreement amongst historians.  George Rable contends that the Confederacy was 
conservative because it sought to restore American constitutionalism to its eighteenth 
century origins.  Confederate constitutionalism was conservative because of its preference 
for slaveholders and the objective of reducing social class conflicts over the institution of 
slavery.66  DeRosa also considers the Confederate Constitution as conservative, but not 
because of slavery.  He, in fact, rejects the argument that the Confederate Constitution 
was an effort to sustain the political power of slaveowners.  Rather, secession was in 
response to the centralizing tendencies of the antebellum federal government and the 
Confederate Constitution was designed to prevent the centralization of the national 
government.67  However, as the wartime decisions of the state supreme courts reveal, the 
Confederate Constitution was more than a conservative reform effort.
To facilitate constitutional reform, the Confederate charter included a number of 
innovations which were designed to rectify what southerners perceived of as the 
corruption of the old constitutional system of governing the United States.68  While some 
65 Fehrenbacher, Constitutions and Constitutionalism in the Slave-Holding South, 
62.
66 Rable, Confederate Republic, 39-63.
67 DeRosa, Confederate Constitution of 1861.  
68 This corruption included partisan politics, executive privilege, patronage, and 
the dominance of the national government in Washington, D.C.  As the editor of the 
Richmond Daily Dispatch opined in March 2, 1861, there was “nothing imperfect in the 
instrument which bound us together. But there was corruption, undermining, and 
weakening the main pillars which supported one part of the edifice; there was fanatacism 
[sic] which was endeavoring to destroy another.”
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state authority was retained under the Confederate Constitution, Confederate framers 
placed a greater emphasis on efficiency in national government, strong executive 
leadership, and a more parliamentarian form of government.69  This represented an effort 
by the framers to combine “the best in the European parliamentary system without 
breaking down the distinctively American separation between the executive and 
legislative functions, to eliminate political and judicial waste, to promote economical 
administration, and to keep each echelon of a complex system of government within its 
appointed orbit.”70  These were significant innovations, designed to facilitate a 
constitutional system with meaningful doctrines on federalism, the separation of powers, 
and limited government but in which both the national and state governments possessed 
sufficient authority and powers.  The “fundamental dilemma” in Confederate 
constitutionalism was achieving a balance between “respect for tradition and the need for 
innovation,” a dilemma which made Confederate constitutionalism a “conservative 
revolution” and the Confederate Constitution “both progressive and [emphasis added] 
reactionary, designed both to reform politics and to restore a mythic past.”71
69 In Article 1, the framers did include important state-oriented features by vesting 
legislative powers in Congress as delegated rather than granted powers.  While some 
historians have contended that this underscored the theory that government operated as 
the agent of the people, the wartime decisions specifically rejected this conclusion. 
Confederate Constitution, Article 1, Section 1. Prior to the Confederate Constitution, the 
term delegated had only appeared in the United States Constitution in the 10th 
Amendment. Robinson, “New Deal in Constitutions,” 452.  The Permanent Constitution 
placed restrictions on congressional appropriation bills, internal improvements, and 
tariffs.
70 Robinson, Justice in Grey, 624.
71 Rable, Confederate Republic, 44, 63; Nieman, “Confederate Constitution,” 204; 
Fehrenbacher, Constitutions and Constitutionalism, 65-66; Emory Thomas, The 
Confederate Nation:1861-1865 (New York, NY: Harper Torchbooks, 1979); Emory 
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In wartime state supreme courts decisions, the Confederate Constitution was 
given substantive meaning as the constitutive document of the nation, outlining the 
mechanisms of governance and the purposes of the new nation.  In their wartime 
opinions, state court justices attempted to refine and develop legal and constitutional 
doctrines which would facilitate procedural reforms and substantive ideas included in the 
Confederate Constitution.  Southern state supreme courts held that Confederate 
constitutionalism was substantive, that the national Constitution embodied the political 
philosophy and principles under which the states and the people of the Confederacy had 
manifested themselves to be bound, and that legal disputes about the Confederate 
Constitution would be adjudicated by interpreting carefully the text and principles of the 
national charter rather than deciding constitutional cases according to political preferences 
or military exigencies.72
What held these two seemingly irreconcilable concepts (conservative and 
innovative constitutionalism) together was the distinct purpose, embodied in the 
Confederate Constitution, to establish a separate nation.  While slavery was a part of 
southern society and the economy, it was not the only reason for secession nor the sole 
consideration in Confederate state-building.73  Creating an independent state which 
Thomas, Confederacy as a Revolutionary Experience (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
Hall, 1971).
72 Several historians have argued that as the war progressed, constitutional 
principles became displaced by military exigencies and a balance of power between 
state and national governments was replaced by a consolidated Confederate 
government. Amlund, Federalism in the Southern Confederacy.
73 In August of 1864, John M. Daniel, editor of the Richmond Examiner publicly 
asked president Davis to send a message to foreign nations informing them that slavery 
was not the reason for secession, that “the question of slavery is only one of the minor 
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provided for individual liberty, state sovereignty, and efficient national government was a 
primary constitutional purpose for the Confederate nation, as is suggested by wartime 
jurisprudence in the state supreme courts.
A Federal Balance of Authority and Power
In 1861, Confederate framers stated in their Constitution’s Preamble that they 
were committing themselves to the creation of a permanent and federal government in 
which the supremacy of the Confederate Constitution and Confederate laws was 
unquestionable.74  The power and authority of the national government were nevertheless 
limited within its proper sphere to preserve the authority of the states.75  The Confederate 
Constitution preserved the integral role of the states in national governance but also 
guaranteed to its national citizenry that national policies could and would be implemented 
efficiently.  The Confederate system of federalism, embodied in the Confederate 
Constitution, provided for more than states’ rights.  Yet, at the war’s beginning, it was 
unclear whether states would assert a state sovereignty ideology to nullify national 
wartime measures or to claim concurrent war powers.  Alternatively, in the name of 
wartime military necessity, would state jurists permit an unlimited and consolidated 
issues; and the cause of the war, the whole cause, on our part, is the maintenance of the 
sovereign independence of these States.” Fehrenbacher, Constitutions and 
Constitutionalism, 58.
74  Preamble to the Confederate Constitution. Donald Nieman, “Republicanism, 
the Confederate Constitution, and the American Constitutional Tradition,” in Hall and 
Ely, eds., Uncertain Tradition, 203. Fitts, “The Confederate Convention: The 
Constitutional Debate,” 189-210; Confederate Constitution, Article 6,  sections 3 and 4. 
The supremacy clause under Article 6, Section 3 was identical to the supremacy clause 
found in the U.S. Constitution.
75 Confederate Constitution, Article 5, Article 6, Sections 4, 5, and 6.
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government to emerge during the war?  If Confederate constitutionalism could be 
maintained, it was unclear whether a consistent doctrine of federalism could be 
maintained without becoming heavily influenced by military need and government 
consolidation or states’ rights and state supremacy.
During the war, Confederate legislation prompted new and difficult 
constitutional issues, particularly about the nature of Confederate federalism.76  In their 
wartime decisions, state court justices were compelled to analyze the text of the 
Confederate Constitution in order to construe the federal principle and define the 
relationship between the states and the Confederacy.  Several key federalism issues 
emerged in this wartime litigation, including whether the states were supreme over the 
national government so that the national government was little more than the agent of 
the states, and whether state sovereignty or states’ rights was the essential political 
philosophy of the Confederacy.  Individual litigants, still holding to these ideals, 
contested the authority of the Confederate government and the state courts found 
themselves having to enunciate the precise parameters of Confederate federalism.  The 
promulgation of wartime measures such as conscription, exemption, the suspension of the 
writ of habeas corpus and impressments appeared to contradict the concern for a well-
defined federalism.  If states‘ rights was the constitutive political philosophy of the 
Confederate States of America, these wartime conscription and exemption cases 
provided an excellent opportunity for individual state supreme courts—as state 
76 Federalism a constitutional doctrine in which administrative and 
governmental functions is allocated or divided between national and state/local 
governments.  Each governmental entity operates according to its own separate sphere 
of responsibility and within each respective sphere of responsibilities, each possesses 
primacy and complete authority. Paludan, “The American Civil War Considered as a 
Crisis in Law and Order,” 1016.
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institutions--to enunciate principles that would circumscribe the power and authority of 
the Richmond government and assert the supremacy of state governments.
Wartime jurists did not do this.  Rather, they manifested a determined intent to 
interpret carefully the provisions of the Confederate Constitution, enunciating a doctrine 
of federalism that while it did not dispel the important role of states in Confederate 
constitutional governance, undermined the preeminence of states’ rights in the 
Confederate political philosophy.77
The basic question they would confront was whether the political purpose of the 
Confederacy was to create a nominal national government for the purpose of serving state 
rights and interests,78 or whether the Confederacy was founded upon a commitment to 
create a federal republic.  Southern state jurists were compelled to define carefully the 
doctrine of federalism in the Confederacy and, quite surprisingly, enunciated a doctrine in 
which both national and state governments were to operate effectively within their 
respective spheres of responsibility—as with dual federalism—but the spheres were to be, 
at times, flexible enough to facilitate national purposes.79
77 Confederate federalism in no way was intended to reduce the power of the 
states.  The framers of the Constitution introduced several measures which 
supplemented state powers such as the right of impeachment of federal officials (Article 
1, section 2, clause 5), the simplified system of amending the Constitution (Article 5), 
the prohibitions against bounties, protective tariffs, and internal improvements (Article 
1, section 8, clause 1); Fitts, “The Confederate Convention: The Constitutional Debate,” 
195-204.  However, state jurists in the South were not generally willing to assert state 
sovereignty as a constitutive doctrine or “a constitutional article of faith.” Huebner, The 
Southern Judicial Tradition, 6-7.  The focus on states’ rights has obscured an 
appreciation of the relevancy and importance of the innovations made in 1861 and to 
the configurative effect of the document. Nieman, “Republicanism, the Confederate 
Constitution and the American Constitutional Tradition,” 201.
78 Owsley, States Rights in the Confederacy.
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State courts also were called upon to examine the nature of Confederate 
federalism, deciding whether the states exercised powers that were largely concurrent 
with those of the national government, especially whether state governments and 
officials could exercise concurrent powers over military forces.80  A related issue was 
whether the state courts had concurrent jurisdiction to hear these cases, and state courts 
upheld their jurisdiction over these cases unless it was specifically denied under 
Confederate laws or the Constitution, especially in the absence of a national supreme 
court.81
Conscription led to two “radical changes in the method of raising armies in the 
Confederacy” which presented larger questions about the federal balance of power in the 
Confederacy.  First of all, conscription eliminated the states as the instrument of military 
recruiting and created a means by which the central government operated directly upon the 
individual to effect responsibilities and allegiance to the nation.82  Secondly, it made 
compulsory enlistment the “cardinal principle of military service” in the Confederacy 
(though voluntary enlistments were still allowed thereafter).83  The state justices 
articulated, as an article of Confederate constitutionalism, that state interests and authority 
79 Confederate federalism and its development by state supreme courts is the 
subject of Chapter Four in this dissertation.
80 Prior to the first Confederate conscription act, four states, including South 
Carolina, had enacted conscription statutes themselves as means of satisfying quotas for 
Confederate service, see Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, series IV, vol. I, 
1140; vol. II, 73; Moore, Conscription and Conflict, 122.
81 Moore, Conscription and Conflict, 167-168.
82 Especially Asa O. Jeffers v. Fair, 32 Ga. 347 (1862) and Ex Parte Coupland, 
26 Tex. 386 (1862).
83 Moore, Conscription and Conflict, 16-17.
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could be eclipsed by those of the national government.  They would enunciate that the 
constitutional source for this authority was the Necessary and Proper Clause, making 
purposeful the provisions of the national charter, even in wartime, and making clear that 
there were national purposes at work in Confederate constitutionalism.  In so doing, these 
justices articulated a political philosophy that provided for significant national powers and 
responsibilities and that elevated the importance of the duties of Confederate citizens to 
their nation.
When state jurists enunciated principles of federalism and enforced the war 
powers of the Confederate government, they facilitated the implementation not the 
alteration of constitutional principles.  Contrary to the Civil War Confederate 
historiography, state court justices articulated a national doctrinal development in which 
the supremacy of the national war powers resulted neither from military necessity nor 
political exigency.  These decisions were not based on wartime exigencies, but reflected 
an adherence by state courts—a commitment— to national constitutional principles.  In 
their decisions, justices articulated principles at odds with states’ rights but derived 
from the Constitution, and, most notably, the creation of “a more perfect federal 
government,” even amidst war, one more balanced, more efficient, and more clearly 
defined than that under the Constitution of 1787.
Federalism became an increasingly important doctrine during the war because it 
defined the creation of the Confederacy, it laid down a structure for Confederate 
governance, and it contained a philosophy about the national purpose of the 
Confederacy.  In partitioning sovereignty into two parts, one being vested with the state 
and the other with the national government, justices made the principle of federalism a 
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viable tenet of Confederate constitutionalism and reduced the preeminence of states’ 
rights in the South as a constitutional matter of faith.  Sovereignty now was vested by 
the people of the Confederacy in state and national governments.   Their decisions 
contradict an understanding of the Confederacy as a loose confederation of states, each 
acting independently, because they articulated these principles as constitutional 
doctrines, which could not be easily changed after the war.  As such, the Confederate 
experience at war represented “an interesting new chapter...in the history of constitutional 
government.”84
Preserving Limitations Under the Separation of Powers Doctrine
On April 21, 1862, only five days after passing its first conscription act, the 
Confederate Congress provided for statutory exemptions from conscription and military 
service for Confederate and state officials and for certain additional classes of professions 
and specific circumstances.85  As with the conscription laws, the exemption acts raised 
legal and constitutional issues from Confederate citizens who challenged the wartime 
power of the national government in state courts, specifically the authority of the 
executive branch to exercise what were alleged by some litigants to be legislative 
84 Fehrenbacher, Constitutions and Constitutionalism, 67.
85 “An Act to exempt certain persons from enrollment for service in the Armies 
of the Confederate States,” Chapt. LXXIV, in The Statutes at Large of the Confederate 
States of America, Passed at the First Session of the First Congress; 1862.  Public Laws 
of the Confederate States of America, Passed at the First Session of the First Congress; 
1862.
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functions.86  Conflicts emerged as state governments and individual litigants challenged 
the War Department’s authority to declare whether the statutory requirements for 
exemption had been met and the more restrictive terms for exemptions from Confederate 
military service.  The challenge for the courts was to determine how to separate the 
national government to prevent usurpation and provide for political liberty yet also to 
ensure that each branch remained effective with sufficient powers to carry out its duties 
according to its constitutional charge.
In these wartime cases, state courts were called upon to enunciate the 
Confederacy’s doctrine of the separation of powers and to explain the scope and extent of 
the duties and functions of each branch.87  Yet, it was not always evident how to separate 
86 The first exemption act would be repealed on October 11, 1862 and replaced 
with a much more limited  and specific statue, “An Act to exempt certain persons from 
military duty, and to repeal an Act entitled “An Act to exempt certain persons from 
enrollment for service in the army of the Confederate States,” approved 21st April,
1862.” Chapter XLV in The Statutes at Large of the Confederate States of America, 
Passed at the Second Session of the First Congress; 1862. Public Laws of the 
Confederate States of America, Passed at the Second Session of the First Congress; 
1862. The final acts were passed on December 28, 1863 (abolishing substitutes), January 
5, 1864 (abolishing the exemptions of those who had previously provided substitutes), and 
February 17, 1864 (abolishing all exemptions), Chapt. III, Chapt. IV, and Chapt. LXV in 
The Statutes at Large of the Confederate States of America, Passed at the Fourth 
Session of the First Congress;1863-1864.  Public Laws of the Confederate States of 
America, Passed at the Fourth Session of the First Congress;1863-1864, 172, 213.
87 The Separation of Powers is a constitutional doctrine in which government 
possesses the primary responsibilities of making and enforcing laws but each branch of 
government is distinct and charged with different functions and responsibilities. The 
purpose for the doctrine is to assert the supremacy of the people's representatives in 
lawmaking and, by denying the executive branch any share in the highest and most 
important power of government, to confine him to merely an administrative function.  
In a republican form of government, the separation of powers established a measure of 
popular control, elevating the people’s representatives to a dominant role in contrast to 
the executive and vesting in them the sole responsibility for lawmaking. Alfred H. 
Kelly, Winfred A. Harbison, and Herman Belz, The American Constitution: Its Origins 
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governmental powers while also ensuring sufficient powers to prosecute a modern war.  It 
wasn’t clear whether the separation of governmental powers could be articulated let alone 
maintained due to the continuous demands to mobilize men and material and when 
responsibilities and duties of carried over to other branches and the separation  of power 
could become blurred.
Innovations in the Confederate governmental structure, with its emphasis upon 
greater efficiency, cooperation, and “the smooth operation of the system” made 
Confederate government more parliamentary in form than in the earlier U.S. model and 
also raised additional challenges for state supreme courts trying to demarcate the division 
between branches and the assignment of national government powers.88  Confederate 
framers had included in the Constitution a provision allowing cabinet members to sit in 
Congress and debate on issues relevant to their portfolios and had diminished the use of 
negative minorities in Congress.89  This “non-separation of branches” was an interesting 
innovation that actually provided for the inclusion rather than separation of the Executive 
in congressional affairs.  Alexander Stephens referred to this development as more honest 
and straightforward for the public benefit since “’Our heads of department can speak for 
themselves and the administration…without resorting to the indirect and highly 
and Development, 7th edition, vol. 1 (New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company, 
1991), 71-73.
88 Alexander Stephens to Linton Stephens, February 17 and March 10, 1861, in 
the Alexander Stephens Papers, op cit. Nieman, “Republicanism, The Confederate 
Constitution, and the American Constitutional Tradition,” 214-215.
89 Confederate Constitution, Article 1, Section 6 provided that “Congress may, 
by law, grant to the principal officer in each of the Executive Departments a seat upon 
the floor of either House, with the privilege of discussing any measures appertaining to 
his department.”
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objectionable medium of a newspaper…It is to be greatly hoped that under our system we 
shall never have what is known as a Government organ.’”90  This had the effect of 
encouraging greater cooperation— “working majorities”—between the Congress and the 
Executive Branch, particularly on issues of appropriations, appointment, and treaties but 
making the demarcation of governmental boundaries difficult.
The Civil War also brought with it new constitutional issues about separated 
powers and new needs to interpret provisions and enunciate principles.  Under the 
exemption legislation, the War Department was provided with the opportunity to create 
regulations—including procedures for adjudicating claims for exemptions under the 
statutes—for the efficient administration of exemptions.  When the first legislation was 
passed in 1862, it wasn’t clear whether the courts would interpret the secondary 
legislative functions that had been conveyed by Congress to the War Department as 
substantive and purposeful to facilitating constitutional goals.  It wasn’t clear whether 
the courts would become restrictive and resist such executive action as usurpation and 
instead allow for greater access to exemptions, perhaps even due to localized interests 
and pressures.  Courts followed the rigid lines separating the branches and facilitated 
the larger national and constitutional goals and purposes, refusing to allow litigants to 
seek legal remedies before they had exhausted these procedures provided by the War 
Department under the exemption legislation.  The courts were equally adamant about 
preserving the judicial authority to interpret statutes.
Southern justices were very conscious of the dangers to constitutional 
90 See the Milledgeville Southern Federal Union, April 2, 1861, op cit. Nieman, 
“Republicanism, The Confederate Constitution, and the American Constitutional 
Tradition,” 215.
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government during war and the pressures to violate the separation of powers doctrine 
because of wartime needs.  In a series of decisions the state supreme court courts in 
Virginia, Georgia, North Carolina, and Texas manifested their intent to preserve the 
doctrine and rejected the unconstitutional expansion of executive authority to raise 
Confederate armies and Executive usurpation of congressional war powers.  State 
supreme courts would be compelled to render decisions that identified the boundaries of 
governmental authority and power in more sophisticated ways and according to the larger 
principles ensconced within the national charter.  The justices would hold that, under the 
Confederate Constitution, the system of checks and balances upon government branches 
was specific and they refused, as unconstitutional, any perceived usurpations of 
constitutional authority or powers by government branches.  These courts even 
vigorously applied the separation of powers doctrine to themselves, in their role as a 
surrogate for the third branch of the Confederate government, refusing to enlarge their 
own power at the expense of the Executive Branch.
This unique separation of powers under the Confederate Constitution pitted the 
Executive and the Legislative branches against each other on some wartime issues yet 
facilitated increased cooperation and efficiency in national governance, especially when 
facilitated by judicial review.  If government was to operate smoothly, like its 
parliamentary form in Great Britain, it would require a “unity of responsibility,” Congress 
and the President working together, and a more unified national sense of purpose.91  State 
91 Fitts, “The Confederate Convention: The Constitutional Debate,” 209. Nieman 
argued that these developments were connected to local politics in that “they were deeply 
rooted in popular political-constitutional attitudes and state constitutional practice.  
Moreover, they anticipated the direction of constitutional change in post-Civil War 
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supreme courts would articulate a separation of powers doctrine that sought to separate 
governmental power, but would do so in a flexible manner, utilizing as the measure of 
necessary flexibility the responsibility all branches owed to the Confederate people and 
the larger national goals and purposes in the Confederate Constitution.
In 1861, Confederates created a “new national ideology” which was “a 
political and social act,” drawing southerners into a common effort to “work 
together for the Confederate cause” and to ensure Confederate national survival.92
This national ideology was given form and expression in the Confederate 
Constitution and it identified the reasons for the creation of the Confederacy, the 
structure for Confederate governance, and the philosophy and national purpose of 
the Confederacy.  But, as Jefferson Davis had indicated in 1861, the principles 
and ideas of the Constitution and this “national ideology” would not be 
understood without judicial review.
State jurists understood the Confederate Constitution as something 
substantive and, operating as a de facto supreme court, they considered its text 
and principles seriously in scores of wartime decisions.  They upheld the exercise 
of constitutional Confederate war powers, limited government within a carefully 
balanced system of nation-oriented dual federalism, and strict separation of 
powers, all in order to facilitate distinctly national purposes.  Their decisions 
America.” Nieman, “Republicanism, The Confederate Constitution, and the American 
Constitutional Tradition,”204.
92 Drew Gilpin Faust, Creation of Confederate Nationalism (Baton Rouge, LA: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1988), 10-15.
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contradict an understanding of the Confederacy as a loose confederation of states
with each acting independently and the frequency and consistency of these court 
opinions reveals the substance and character of the Confederate constitutional 
thought and politics as a shared set of values and principles across southern 
jurisdictions.
Because many southern jurisdictions articulated these principles as 
essential to constitutional doctrines, they could not have been easily changed after 
the war, making their enunciation of Confederate constitutional principles more 
established and less likely to be altered by political interests.  For a nation that 
existed only at war and was affected by the dynamic political challenges of 
modern war, these state supreme court decisions may also be considered our best 
definition as to the essence of Confederate constitutionalism and political 
ideology.  These decisions have been often ignored in our understanding of 
Confederate constitutionalism.  Yet, as Jefferson Davis revealed to the 
Confederate nation in his Inaugural Address in February of 1861, in these 
decisions on the Confederate Constitution by the justices of the state supreme 




In February of 1862, as he adjourned the Provisional Congress, Howell Cobb, 
president of the Confederate Congress, declared that the Confederate constitutional 
order and political revolution were founded upon conservative tenets and ideas: “ours is 
the first revolution which history records, wherein the tendency has been to 
conservatism and stability.”93  Jefferson Davis, in his inaugural address as the First 
President of the Confederacy, likewise asserted conservative constitutional tenets, 
proclaiming that the framers of the permanent Confederate government were committed 
“to perpetuate the principles of our Revolutionary fathers.”94  In 1861, southerners 
removed themselves from the political community of the United States and re-constituted 
themselves as the Confederate States of America.  This was a significant step but it was 
unclear whether this represented the establishment of a political community based upon a 
new constitutional order, constitutive purposes, and “moral” political principles.95  It is 
the wartime decisions of the state supreme courts, though, that reveal that the Confederate 
constitutional order was significant as a conservative constitutional reform movement in 
American constitutionalism by addressing, correcting, and strengthening traditional 
93 “Adjournment of the Provisional Congress,” Richmond Daily Dispatch, 
February 16, 1862.  The importance of order to the essence of a constitution was 
evident in the writings of Russell Kirk, who defined a constitution as “a system of 
fundamental institutions and principles, a body of basic laws, for the governing of a 
commonwealth.  It is a design for permanent political order [italics added].” Russell 
Kirk, Rights and Duties: Reflections on Our Conservative Constitution (Dallas, TX: 
Spence Publishing Company, 1997), 3.
94 Jefferson Davis, Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, (New York, NY:  
D. Appleton and Co., 1881), 2:232-236.
95 Rable, Confederate Republic, 39-63.
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constitutional principles, including republicanism, limited government, and national 
purpose.96
The Confederate Constitution and constitutional order were “conservative” 
because they were designed to facilitate the conservation of important values and 
principles held to be constitutive of the American political tradition and to stabilize and 
preserve the political order.97  Within this conservative constitutionalism, “the basic law 
preserves the pattern of political order through time and change.”  Understanding the 
constitutional history of the Confederacy and its political philosophy rests upon an 
understanding of the Confederate Constitution.  But, this conservative constitutionalism 
is more than a blind positivistic application of the “black letter law” or textual original 
intent.  Like the U.S. Constitution, which was “rooted in the experience and the thought 
of earlier times,” Confederate constitutional conservativism sought to re-implement 
national stability and order over time by looking backward to the foundational ideas and 
principles of the American nation, chiefly republican values of preserving the common 
good, virtuous politics, and individual obligations to safeguard the republic.98
The Confederate Constitution, like other constitutive documents, reveals not 
only the governmental forms and relationships—the “descriptive” components—but 
also the purposes and goals for which the nation was created and the ideology and tenets 
96 Constitutionalism is that “complex of ideas, attitudes, and patterns of behavior 
elaborating the principle that the authority of government derives from and is limited by 
a body of fundamental law.” Fehrenbacher, Constitutions and Constitutionalism in the 
Slave-Holding South, 1. 
 
97 Conservative did not mean that the framers were “neophobic” or “resistant to 
change.” Kirk, Rights and Duties: Reflections on Our Conservative Constitution, xiv, 6.
98 Ibid., xv.
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according to which those states making up the political community of the Confederacy 
chose to constitute themselves and be governed.99 A constitution, generally, is 
something substantive and purposeful for it is related to “making or establishing 
something, giving it legal status, describing the mode of organization, locating 
sovereignty, establishing limits, and describing fundamental principles.”100  It is “a 
document of political founding or refounding [that] amounts to a comprehensive picture 
of a people at a given time.”101  In the American context, including the experience of the 
Confederacy, a constitution is something very specific, “the summary of our political 
commitments and the standard by which we assess, develop, and run our political 
system.”  Like other American constitutive documents, the Confederate Constitution 
“describes the framework and parts of government or the overall composition of the 
polity” and, it includes “the principles, institutions, laws, practices, and traditions by 
99 A constitution “prescribes official conduct and provides a standard of legitimacy 
for assessing the validity of governmental action” and “constitutional government has 
usually been described as limited government.” Kelly, Harbison, and Belz, The American 
Constitution: Its Origins and Development, 7th ed., vol. 1, xix, xx.  The substance of the 
constitution as document was to be measured, according to Lutz, by eight purposes for 
which a constitution might be written, including: 1) to “define a way of life” (this 
includes “the moral values, major principles, and definitions of justice toward which a 
people aims”; 2) to “create and/or define the people of the community so directed”; 3) 
to “define the political institutions, the process of collective decision making…to define 
a form of government”; 4) to “define the regime, the public, and citizenship”; 5) to 
“establish the basis for the authority of the regime”; 6) to “distribute political power”; 7) 
to “structure conflict so it can be managed”; and 8) to “limit governmental power.” 
Donald Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1988), 16.  Each of these purposes would be made manifest in state 
supreme court decisions during the war and give shape and character to Confederate 
constitutionalism.
100 Lutz, Origins of American Constitutionalism, 21; Belz, A Living Constitution 
or Fundamental Law?
101 Lutz, Origins of American Constitutionalism, 3.
46
which a people carried on their political and governmental life.”102
The Confederate Constitutions were the cornerstones of Confederate nation-
building and reflected the purposes of its framers.  Jabez Lamar Monroe Curry said of 
the Confederate Constitution, “as the instrument of government, [it] is the most certain 
and decisive expression of the views and principles of those who formed it, and is 
entitled to credence and acceptance as the most trustworthy and authoritative exposition 
of the principles and purposes of those who established the Confederate 
Government.”103 The document represented the merging of an historical republican 
ideal with the innovative pragmatism and efficiency in national administration of 
governance required of modern politics.104  This constitution became the central focus 
in the state supreme court decisions on Confederate conscription and exemption statutes 
which became the only legally definitive interpretation of the Confederate Constitution.
In these state cases, as Jefferson Davis stated in his First Inaugural, historians 
possess “a light that reveals the true meaning” of the Confederate Constitution, 
specifically two key constitutional commitments.  First, Confederate constitutionalism 
was the product of a commitment to preserve republican principles, especially a 
national common good and virtue in politics.105 The Confederate Constitution differed 
102 Kelly, Harbison, and Belz, The American Constitution: Its Origins and 
Development, 7th ed., vol. 1, xix.
103 Curry, The Southern States of the American Union Considered in their 
Relations to the Constitution of the United States, 91.
104 Robinson, Jr., “A New Deal in Constitutions,” 454.
105 The enunciation of a national common good and its priority over the rights of 
the states and individual citizens was evident in cases challenging restrictive application 
of the exemption statutes.  This was a major constitutional idea expressed by courts in 
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from the U.S. Constitution because of the revision of several articles in the original 
document designed to facilitate the reform of American constitutional government and 
eradicate the abuses and excesses southerners believed had perverted the federal 
government during the antebellum period.  This conserving propensity is rooted chiefly 
in the “unwritten constitution,” consisting of many different ideals, purposes, habits, 
and practices which are only partially expressed in the written artifact.”106  While 
reformist in nature, Confederate conservative constitutional commitments “were within 
the mainstream of American constitutional development.”107
Secondly, Confederate constitutionalism was designed to bring about limited 
national government, chiefly through the interpretation and implementation of the 
provisions and restrictions that appeared in the written constitution.108  Antebellum fears 
about national government abuse led to a great effort to limit government in order to 
stem the tide of corrupt, partisan practices that many southerners (and northerners) 
believed had come to characterize mid-nineteenth century American government.  In an 
cases where the Contracts Clause was invoked by litigants as a bar against the 
elimination of substitutes for military service, as in Gatlin v. Walton, 60 N.C. 310 (1864); 
Weems v. Farrell, 33 Ga. 413 (1863); Burroughs v. Peyton, 16 Va. (Gratt.) 470 (1864); 
and Daly & Fitzgerald v. Harris and Harwell v. Cohen, 33 Ga. 38 (1864). Brummer, 
“Judicial Interpretation of the Confederate Constitution,” 112-113.
106 Kirk, Rights and Duties: Reflections on Our Conservative Constitution, xv.
107 Nieman, “Republicanism, the Confederate Constitution, and the American 
Constitutional Tradition,” 202.  Fehrenbacher agreed with Nieman that Confederate 
constitutionalism reflected an adherence to eighteenth century republicanism. 
Fehrenbacher, Constitutions and Constitutionalism in the Slave-Holding South, 65.
108 Three other constitutional principles or doctrines were also essential to 
Confederate constitutionalism.  These were federalism (the focus of chapters four and 
five), the separation of powers (the focus of chapter six), and national purpose 
(contained within chapters two through six).
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improved Article I, Confederate framers placed limitations upon the national 
government in an effort to conserve the tenets of American constitutionalism and 
restore uncorrupt government without handicapping national government from 
completing its goals and objectives.109  These provisions of the Confederate 
Constitution facilitated the conservative effort to restore the principles espoused by the 
framers in 1787 and the political ideas found in eighteenth century republicanism.110
Conservative purposes could be both written and unwritten.  Russell Kirk argued 
that in the American constitutional tradition, the unwritten constitution existed “side by 
side” with the written constitution.  Of these two constitutions, “one…is the formal 
written constitution of modern times; the other constitution is the old ‘unwritten’ one of 
political compromises, conventions, habits, and ways of living together in the civil 
social order that have developed among the people over the centuries.”111  This tradition 
of drawing upon written and unwritten constitutions was evident in the decisions of the 
state supreme courts where they interpreted and enunciated the principles and operation 
of the Constitution and the constitutional order of the Confederacy.  State supreme 
courts drew upon textual provisions and the shared unwritten values, principles, and 
109 Particularly the enumerated powers of Congress under Article I, Section 8.
110 DeRosa, The Confederate Constitution of 1861, 17; Nieman, 
“Republicanism, the Confederate Constitution,” 204-205. DeRosa argued that “the 
C.S.A. Constitution is essentially a traditional Whig-Antifederalist document, designed 
not to thwart republicanism (government premised upon the consent of its citizenry) but 
to secure the states from uncontrollable and perhaps authoritarian central government.” 
DeRosa, The Confederate Constitution of 1861, 132.
111 Kirk, Rights and Duties: Reflections on Our Conservative Constitution, 4.
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ideas of the Confederate nation.112
A Confusing Historiographical Tradition
The historiography about the Confederate Constitution and Confederate 
constitutionalism is undecided about the essential character of the Confederate 
constitutional order and a general survey of the major works in this field reveals a rather 
varied, confusing, and often inconsistent scholarly tradition.  One reason why 
historians’ arguments about Confederate constitutionalism and the importance of the 
Confederate Constitution have been so contradictory and confusing may be due to the 
brief life of the document or the desire to reduce Confederate constitutional thought into 
the doctrinaire framework of states’ rights.113  Since the Permanent Confederate 
Constitution existence lasted a little more than three years, some historians may “have
either disregarded or understated its importance and have tended to belabor the 
112 Ibid., xvii.
113 States Rights is a political doctrine or philosophy in which the states 
possessed sovereignty prior to the creation of the American nation and, when the nation 
was founded, the states never relinquished sovereignty, entering into a national compact 
to create a central government which was to be the agent of the states.  Because the 
states retained sovereignty, they had to remain vigilant against encroachment upon state 
power by the national government and, if they believed that the national government 
had acted upon powers or authority that had not been delegated to it, the states
possessed the ability to determine the constitutionality of the act and to nullify any 
national laws. Forrest McDonald, States’ Rights and The Union: Imperium in Imperio, 
1776-1876, (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 4-5; Lacy K. Ford, Jr., 
“Inventing the Concurrent Majority: Madison, Calhoun, and the Problem of 
Majoritarianism in American Political Thought,” The Journal of Southern History, 
Volume 60, Issue 1 (February, 1994):19-58, 20, 21, 35, 49, 52; Arthur Bestor, Jr., State 
Sovereignty and Slavery: A Reinterpretation of Proslavery Constitutional Doctrine, 
1846-1860,” Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society, Volume 54 (1961):117-
180. Emory Thomas argued that the purposes of the Confederate government were to 
“affirm state sovereignty in general terms” and to codify “the Southern status quo.” 
Thomas, The Confederate Nation, 64-66.
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similarities between it and the United States Constitution.”114  Reviewing the 
historiography about the Confederate Constitution and constitutionalism reveals three 
basic arguments: no distinctive Confederate constitutionalism existed; Confederate 
constitutionalism lacked substance and was simply the product of wartime needs; and 
Confederate constitutionalism was based upon a corpus of substantive political ideas 
and an ideology solely based upon states’ rights.
Those historians who argue that no distinctive Confederate Constitution or 
constitutionalism existed, contend that the southern constitution was “in most respects a 
copy of the U.S. Constitution” and that the general “verbatim” adoption of many 
provisions of the U.S. text is evidence that both documents were practically identical.115
One reason for this conclusion, or at best, the lack of appreciation for the distinctive 
character and form of the Confederate Constitution may be due to its similarity to the 
U.S. Constitution.116 At first glance, the document appeared to be very similar to the 
United States Constitution in existence at that time, with the exception of the 
substitution of the word “Confederate” for “United” whenever the phrase “United 
114 Edward L. White, III, “The Constitution of the Confederate States of 
America: Innovation or Duplication?” The Southern Historian, Vol. 12 (1991):5-28, 6.
115 James McPherson, Ordeal By Fire, Volume I: The Coming of War, 3rd edition  
(New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 2001), 150 and Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War 
Era (New York, NY: Ballantine Books, 1988), 258; Bruce Catton stated that the 
Confederate Constitution was “very much like the Constitution of the United States” in 
The Civil War (New York: NY, The Fairfax Press, 1971), 16; Jesse Carpenter, The 
South as a Conscious Minority (New York, NY: The New York University Press, 
1930); Bensel, Yankee Leviathan, 99.
116 Retaining some language from the U.S. Constitution was part of a determined 
political strategy rather than a lack of creativity. White contends that the Confederate 
framers were able to provide for “a smoother transition for the Southern people from the 
Union to the Confederacy.” White, “The Constitution of the Confederate States of 
America: Innovation or Duplication?,” 6.
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States” appeared.  Emory Thomas characterized the Confederate Constitution as “an 
altered version of the U.S. Constitution.”117  However, the Confederate Constitution 
was more than “mere imitation” of the U.S. Constitution.  It was  “a living and 
workable document that had the capacity to establish a form of government, which, 
because of its innovative forms, would have halted political wastefulness, stimulated an 
economical government, and restrained each governmental branch to its designated 
field of authority.”118 Yet, despite its apparent similarities to the U.S. Constitution of 
the period, the Confederate Constitution was a distinctive document that attempted to 
reform American constitutional government and redefine the balance of power and 
authority between the state and central governments.
For a second group of historians, the commitment to Confederate constitutional 
principles was weak and the development of constitutional arrangements, powers, and 
relationships was shaped by the war.119  These historians have contended that the 
exigencies of America’s first modern war proved to be the most significant influence 
upon the shape and character of Confederate constitutionalism and the meaning of the 
Confederate Constitution.  Confederate leaders left the Union because they believed the 
federal government was undertaking actions that encroached on states' rights and the 
117 Thomas, The Confederate Nation, 64-66.
118 White, III, “The Constitution of the Confederate States of America: 
Innovation or Duplication?,” 6; Robinson, “A New Deal in Constitutions.”
119 Historians who have argued that Confederate constitutionalism lacked a 
substantive basis in ideas have included Curtis Amlund, Emory Thomas, Jesse 
Carpenter, and Richard Bensel.
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resulting constitution “was established in the urgency of conflict.”120  But, according to 
Curtis Amlund, the war forced Confederate leaders to sacrifice the nation’s 
constitutional principles established in the Confederate Constitution (most notably, 
federalism) in order to successfully prosecute the war. 121  This development caused a 
“practical expansion” that so empowered the national government that it became the 
dominant governmental entity, exceeding the separate and respective sphere of power to 
which it was limited under the Confederate charter.122  Amlund maintained that 
Confederate officials in Richmond manipulated constitutional principles, chiefly the 
Confederate supremacy clause, “to gain political and constitutional ascendancy over the 
states.”123  Taking a rather limited view of the wartime state supreme court decisions, 
Amlund contended that state jurists interpreting the Constitution were compelled by the 
war effort to sacrifice principles for victory.124  While Amlund argued that 
120 DeRosa, The Confederate Constitution of 1861, 22-25.
121 The Confederate government was an agent of change, transforming a 
revolution for states’ rights into a centralized modernization effort led by a modern, 
central national government, see Thomas, The Confederacy as a Revolutionary 
Experience, 58-59.
122 Amlund argued that “An effort was made at Montgomery to incorporate into 
the 1787 document a similarly worded constitution with differently intentioned 
meanings, but it did not work out well in practical terms. In reality the intent of the 
Confederate framers evolved into a conception of governmental responsibilities that 
approximated the conception of Washington leaders. Realistically, the full extent of the 
constitutional powers given Richmond signified that it would be able to assert itself 
against the states and exceed the sphere of action outlined for it in the Constitution.”
Amlund, Federalism in the Southern Confederacy, 27.
123 Ibid. However, Amlund did not analyze the wartime cases that analyzed and 
explained the Confederate Supremacy Clause or the extent of government war powers 
under its provisions, as articulated by the courts.
124 Ibid., 94.
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constitutional principles were established but had to be sacrificed during the war, later 
historians of this school concluded that the demands of mobilization and modern war 
made virtually impossible any real sustained commitment to constitutional principles.
Richard Bensel’s Yankee Leviathan is perhaps the best example of this 
understanding of the Confederate constitutional order as the product of mobilization and 
ongoing war-related exigencies.  Bensel examined both the Union and the Confederacy 
as modern states and argued that there was very little difference in their constitutional 
orders, that they “started the American Civil War with almost identical governmental 
structures and developed their modern states in “close similarity,” so “that their 
expansion and development during the war was almost solely the product of the nature 
of the challenge presented by the war itself.”125  Bensel, borrowing from Amlund’s 
analysis of the Confederate constitutional order, saw no real difference between the 
Confederate and U.S. Constitutions, concluding that the Confederate framers “adopted a 
constitutional framework that was almost a verbatim copy of the federal model.”126
Bensel’s assessment of the significance of states’ rights was also shaped by his belief 
125 Bensel, Yankee Leviathan, 12-13, 99-100.
126 Ibid., 12, 99; Amlund, Federalism in the Southern Confederacy, 17-27; 
Thomas, The Confederate Nation, 64; and Lee, The Confederate Constitutions, 82-140.  
Bensel stated that three innovations provided for in Article I of the Confederate 
Constitution—“prohibitions against government subsidized internal improvements,” the 
protective tariff, and state legislative powers to impeach Confederate officials—
amounted to “little more than cosmetic adornments” because they were not used during 
the three years of war.  He concluded that within this constitutional framework, the 
Confederate Congress “passed legislation that adopted without change almost all 
antebellum federal statutes.” However, Bensel includes no analysis of state supreme 
court decisions or other provisions of the Confederate Constitution. Confederate 
conscription, exemption, suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and other wartime 
statutes certainly broke with any antebellum legislative traditions and raised serious 
debates in the Confederate Congress about constitutional principles and values and 
national goals and objectives. Bensel, Yankee Leviathan, 12, 99-100.
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that there were no configurative constitutional principles in the Confederacy; states’ 
rights proved to be “a pragmatic political program” and once the southern states 
seceded from the Union, they “jettisoned states’ rights and built a central state much 
stronger than either the antebellum or post-Reconstruction federal governments, a 
government to mobilize resistance to the military forces of the Union.”127
Continuing Bensel’s argument about the vacuous quality of Confederate 
constitutionalism, Mark Neely, in his study of political prisoners and civil rights in the 
Confederacy, argued that “under the pressures of a war for national existence, the 
Confederate Constitution proved as ‘flexible’ as the Constitution of the United States, 
on which it was modeled” and that the Confederate state was more committed to the 
successful prosecution of the war than the preservation of individual rights and liberties.  
Neely concluded that the Confederate constitutional order was so shaped by wartime 
demands that Confederate constitutionalism amounted to little more than a “myth.”128
A third group of historians have maintained that the Confederate Constitution 
was distinctive, comprised of substantive ideas and principles, though their conclusions 
about the source of these have differed considerably.  The configurative effect of the 
states’ rights and state sovereignty ideologies on Confederate constitutional ideas has 
127 Bensel, Yankee Leviathan, 13.  Bensel does not see state building and 
constitutional principles as having an interrelated quality.  He argued that 
“ultimately…most of the bureaucratic expansion of the Confederate state was built 
upon new foundations that had little or no precedent in antebellum experience.  Much of 
this expansion was attributable to the central state mobilization of men and materiel for 
war.” Ibid., 103.
128 Neely, Southern Rights: Political Prisoners and the Myth of Confederate 
Constitutionalism, 169.
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shaped much of twentieth century historiography. 129  J.G. Randall, David Donald, and 
Forrest McDonald argued that the only modifications that Confederate framers made to 
the U.S. Constitution were those to accommodate states’ rights.130 Like Randall and 
Donald, Charles Lee ascertained that states’ rights and state sovereignty played an 
important role in the Confederate constitutional order, but Lee argued that these were not 
the only configurative and substantive principles.  Lee, though, perceived of the 
Confederate Constitution as part of the ongoing development of American 
constitutionalism as well as a southern political document.  It was “the reform of the 
machinery of government that is manifested in the Confederate Constitutions” and, as a 
reform document, the Confederate Constitution was directed against the spoils system 
perpetuated by antebellum political parties, and in support of the fiscal integrity of the 
government.  Lee, argued that the Confederate Constitution represents “a significant 
constitutional legacy” and “a milestone in the constitutional development of the United 
129 “A preponderance of Southerners saw in the preservation of slavery, in the
sovereignty of the states, and in the creation of the Confederacy the application of basic 
American values: freedom and voluntarism (for whites); individualism, limited 
government, and local self-determination.” Morton Keller, “Power and Rights: Two 
Centuries of American Constitutionalism” The Journal of American History, Vol. 74, 
No. 3 (Dec., 1987):675-694, 682; Roger D. Hardaway, “The Confederate Constitution: 
A Legal and Historical Examination,” The Alabama Historical Quarterly (Vol. 44, Nos. 
1 & 2, Spring & Summer 1982):18-31 and Paludan, “The American Civil War 
Considered as a Crisis in Law and Order,” 1020.
130 Randall and Donald argued that the creation of the Confederate Constitution 
“moved in old grooves; and in framing the new instrument for the Southern nation little 
originality was shown.  In its general pattern the constitution closely resembled that of 
the United States; indeed at most points its wording was precisely the same.  The main 
differences were in those features which looked to the guaranteeing of state rights…The 
emphasis upon state rights was made evident at the outset.” J.G. Randall and David 
Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction, 2nd edition (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath 
and Company, 1969), 157-159.
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States.”131
In some agreement with Lee’s conclusion about the Confederate charter being 
part of a developmental process, George Anastaplo argued that the Confederate 
Constitution was both “a commentary upon the United States Constitution” and “a 
challenge to its principles,” addressing controversial issues and interpretations that had 
been the source of many antebellum problems.132  Yet, Anastaplo broke with Lee on 
whether the Confederate Constitution differed from the U.S. Constitution, arguing instead 
that the Confederate Constitution reflects “a radically different [italics added] approach to 
the governance of a country from that found in the 1787 Constitution.”  Though 
Anastaplo did not specify how, it is clear from the enunciation of Confederate 
constitutionalism by the state supreme courts, that this difference existed both 
philosophically and operationally.133
Political scientist Marshall De Rosa also argued in favor of an understanding of 
the continuity of Confederate constitutionalism with the American tradition, drawing 
connections between “the fundamental issues of 1787 and 1861 (issues such as American 
131 Lee, Confederate Constitutions, 150; Robinson, Justice in Grey, 149, 623-624. 
Cooper and Terrill likewise argued that there were notable differences between the two 
constitutions chiefly due to the emphasis in the Confederate charter to eradicate political 
corruption and protect slavery. William J. Cooper and Thomas E. Terrill, The American 
South: A History, 2nd edition (New York, NY: The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1996), 
326-328.
132 George Anastaplo, The Amendments to the Constitution: A Commentary, 
(Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1995), 126.
133 Evident in the Confederate Constitution, as enunciated by the state supreme 
courts, was the fear and suspicion of special interests, commerce, and government 
subsidies, the diminished role of the Chief Executive as head of their respective party, the 
importance of federalism, and divided national government. Ibid., 127-131.
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federalism, fiscal responsibility, and even republican government itself).”134  DeRosa 
argued that the constitutional principles of the Confederacy bore a striking resemblance to 
Antifederalist ideas and principles on limited national government because “the primary 
concern of the Confederate framers was the centralization of political power at the 
national level to the detriment of the states; it was this centralization inherent in the 
political principles of the Federalists which they rejected.”135
Although DeRosa understood Confederate constitutionalism as conservative, he 
did not dismiss its serious and substantive nature; the Confederacy “was neither simply a 
historic accident initiated by radicals attempting to prolong the life of an anachronistic 
system of labor nor the product of ‘fire-eating’ political opportunists seeking personal 
aggrandizement at the expense of their fellow citizens.”  Rather, “the Confederate States 
of America was the consequence of a constitutional crisis the origins of which could be 
traced back to the U.S. Constitution of 1789.  It was not a crisis for constitutional 
government per se, but the consequence of an incrementally changing constitutional 
arrangement increasingly unacceptable to the southern section of the Union” and 
southerners “reaffirmed their commitments [italics added] to constitutional government 
under the auspices of the Confederate Constitution.”136 Confederate constitutionalism 
134 DeRosa, The Confederate Constitution of 1861, 4.
135 Ibid., 5.
136 Ibid., 1. DeRosa warned against focusing on the slavery issue so that 
Confederate constitutional ideas and principles become reduced to legitimizing slavery 
as a social and economic system, that this would “slight a crucial period of American 
constitutional development.” DeRosa argued for greater appreciation for Confederate 
constitutionalism since “many of the Confederate principles are indigenous to the 
American constitutional system of government…the Confederate Constitution is relevant 
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was a conservative reform effort designed to preserve a distinctly American 
constitutional form of government and the commitment of the framers to conserve 
American constitutional principles was rooted in their devotion to the principles of the 
Revolution but from which the antebellum U.S. government had strayed.137
In 1860-1861, Howell Cobb and many other southern political leaders 
characterized themselves as conservators of the American constitutional tradition and 
set about re-constituting a government they believed would adhere to and preserve those 
tenets enshrined in the Constitution of 1787 but that had been eroded by partisan 
politics during the antebellum period.138  In the winter and spring of 1861, southerners 
chose to leave behind “the deterioration of American constitutionalism, a deterioration 
initiated and sustained by their political rivals in the North.”139  Southern leaders 
resisted the “inevitable changes that the political, social, and economic forces were 
thrusting upon the U.S. Constitution, transforming the community of states into a 
national community of individuals.”140  The resulting constitutions that Cobb and his 
colleagues created in Montgomery in 1861 and 1862 were very conservative reform 
because it raised, and continues to raise, pertinent questions that cannot be glossed over if 
American constitutionalism is to be placed on terra firma.” Ibid., 2-3.
137 In an 1862 public tract, Robert H. Armisted, of Virginia complained about 
the threat of “despotic power” that the Republican administration would visit upon the 
South, see Soldiers of Our Army, (Williamsburg, VA: Macfarlane & Fergusson, 
Printers, March 1862), 1, 3.
138 DeRosa argued that the Confederates “were seceding on behalf of the U.S. 




documents, part of their conservative effort to return to the constitutional principles of 
the founding.141  Southerners believed that they were escaping from a system of 
constitutionalism which had so deteriorated by 1861, that the essential quality of 
American governance—that government rested upon the consent of the governed—had 
been eradicated from the political system and that the Constitution, which was to embody 
the philosophy and mechanics of this principle, had been perverted.142
Commitment to Preserve Republican Principles
Throughout the antebellum period, the U.S. Constitution remained the focus of 
federal government and national politics and, as sectional differences mounted in the 
United States during the 1840s and 1850s, many Southerners looked to the Constitution 
for resolutions.  In 1860, the ascendancy of a sectional party to the Presidency and in 
the Congress meant to many southerners that the guarantees that they could expect and 
enjoy under the U.S. Constitution would no longer be protected and in drafting their 
new national charter, Confederate framers attempted to preserve constitutional 
protection and guarantees by imposing limitations upon the national government.  To 
southern U.S. congressmen like Howell Cobb, a firm believer in conciliation and 
141 Ibid., 1. The Permanent Confederate Constitution of March of 1862 has been 
characterized as a “reactionary document.” As southerners opined in March of 1861, 
there was “nothing imperfect in the instrument which bound us together. But there was 
corruption, undermining, and weakening the main pillars which supported one part of 
the edifice; there was fanatacism [sic] which was endeavoring to destroy another,” as 
portrayed in “A Strong Government,” Richmond Daily Dispatch, March 2, 1861. One of 
the responsibilities inherent within this concept of conservatorship, and an integral part 
of constitutional law decisions on conscription and exemption statutes, was the 
insistence upon the “traditional” limitations of power of the central government.
142 DeRosa, The Confederate Constitution of 1861, 1-2.
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compromise with Northern politicians and statesmen, the Republican victory in 1860 had 
serious constitutional implications for it meant that Northern sectionalism and anti-slavery 
“nullifiers” of “constitutional obligations” had become the dominant political power in 
Congress, threatening the delicate balance of interests and compromise in Congress.143
The South would face “doctrines and principles violative of her constitutional rights, 
humiliating to her pride, destructive of her equality in the Union, and fraught with the 
greatest danger to the peace and safety of her people.” 144
Southerners perceived the demise of a national understanding of “the common 
good” by the Republican Party as “wanton violation” of the tenets of the U.S. 
Constitution.  They considered this “a declaration of the purpose and intention of the 
people of the North to continue, with the power of the Federal Government, the war 
143 Howell Cobb, Letter of Hon. Howell Cobb to the People of Georgia on The 
Present Condition of the Country (Washington, DC: M’Gill and Witherow, Printers, 
1860), 14.
144 Ibid., 15. In December of 1860, Robert Toombs wrote of the “wrongs” of the 
crisis in constitutional terms, that “we shall be driven out of the Territories by law.  
Upon this Mr. Lincoln and his party are unanimously agreed” and “This they propose to 
do in violation of the Constitution of the United States as generally construed from the 
beginning of the Government and in express violation of that instrument as expounded 
by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, ed., The 
Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens, and Howell Cobb.  (New 
York, NY: Da Capo Press, 1970), 520-521. David Clopton, Alabama’s commissioner to 
Delaware, in his January 1, 1861 letter to Delaware’s Governor, cited the Republican 
victory as a primary threat to the constitutional rights of southern citizens.  He also 
referred to an ongoing threat of corruption that might accompany Lincoln’s election and 
a dominant Republican Party: “The fact that it is a sectional party includes the 
additional fact that its aim will be, by all the means & legislation and of the 
administration of the Government, to promote and foster the interests and internal 
prosperity of one section, see Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, series IV, 
vol. 1, 34. The same sentiment was echoed by the Carroll County Resolution in support 
of secession: “’They have the power and the will to trample under foot, and totally 
disregard the rights guaranteed to us, by our forefathers in the Constitution, leaving us 
no position in the Union, but one of inequality, degradation and misrule.’”
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already commenced by the ten nullifying States of the North, upon the institution of 
slavery and the constitutional rights of the South.”145  The inability to protect the 
institution and expansion of slavery and maintain the traditional system of national
political compromise within the framework of the Constitution prompted many 
southerners to believe that the republican ideals of virtuous government, a national 
government facilitating the common good and interests of the entire people, and 
national virtue, had been overcome by sectional politics.  This encouraged southerners 
to abandon the federal government through secession.146
Howell Cobb complained of an increasingly sectional Northern prejudice in 
1860; northerners had “trampled upon the Constitution of Washington and Madison, 
and will prove equally faithless to their own pledges.  You ought not—cannot trust 
them.  It is not the Constitution and the laws of the United States which need 
amendment, but the hearts [italics in original] of the northern people.”  Cobb was not 
optimistic about any constitutional resolution because of the belief that the common 
bond of national purpose and a national sense of a common good was lacking and this 
145 Cobb, Letter of Hon. Howell Cobb to the People of Georgia on The Present 
Condition of the Country, 15.
146 Despite antebellum criticisms of the national government’s broad interpretation 
of implied powers, the Confederate framers did not do away with implied powers nor did 
they limit the national government to only those powers expressly delegated to it.  Rather,
they attempted to forestall abuses of such powers by specifying which express powers 
were to be delegated to the national government while refusing to handicap the national 
government from facilitating its responsibilities in the national sphere. Anastaplo, The 
Amendments to the Constitution: A Commentary, 126-127. This represented an effort to 
perfect constitutional for the sake of preserving principle and purpose.
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was essential to a common understanding of the constitutive document.147  He called the 
amendment of the U.S. Constitution “a hopeless undertaking” and the amendment of the 
hearts of northerners “an impossibility” and concluded that “[n]othing now holds us 
together but the cold formalities of a broken and violated Constitution.  Heaven has 
pronounced the decrees of divorce, and it will be accepted by the South as the only 
solution which gives her any promise of future peace and safety.”148
It was this fearful reaction to partisan and sectional politics that had led 
Southern state governments, charged with the responsibility of protecting the 
constitutional rights of their citizens, to protect them by drastic means, even if secession 
was the means to accomplish this.149 Antebellum southerners believed they were the 
147 C.F. Jackson wrote to “My Dear Shields” in December of 1860 raising the 
issue of remaining in the Union, only if constitutional protections would be guaranteed 
through constitutional amendments: “I do not know that we should ask this by way of 
amendment, but rather as an explanation of the tine meaning of the Constitution. We 
should also require a proper penalty of every State that has failed to comply in good 
faith with the Constitution and laws upon this subject,” Official Records of the War of 
the Rebellion, series IV, vol. 1, 27.
148 Cobb, Letter of Hon. Howell Cobb to the People of Georgia on The Present 
Condition of the Country, 15.
149 When Alabama Governor A.B. Moore addressed the members of the [U.S.] 
House of Representatives in January of 1861, he declared that the state leaders were 
bound to protect the interests of their citizens from threat by a sectional and 
consolidated government, see Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, series IV, 
volume I, 48. Other southern states followed in similar fashion, citing the disintegration 
of the American constitutional system, especially due to partisan politics. Florida’s 
governor stated that the “sectional party” [the Republican Party] had “destroyed the 
Government and buried the spirit of the Constitution” see Ibid., 87. In Virginia’s
convention it, too, was “convinced that those rights [constitutional rights], cannot be 
secured in the Federal Union.” Ibid., 89. Jonathan Gill Shorter, writing to Georgia 
Governor Joseph E. Brown in January of 1861, believed about the Republican Party that 
“under the forms of the Constitution and the laws, they will usurp the machinery of the 
Federal Government and madly attempt to rule, if not to subjugate, and ruin the South.” 
Ibid., 16. Additional concerns about Republican victory in 1860 were raised in a 
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true heirs and conservators of the traditional republican ideology of the Revolution, a 
political philosophy that included “the right of the people to govern themselves as free 
political communities through the separation and division of power and the rule of law, 
including a constitution as a permanent, paramount, and binding political law.”150
Having withdrawn themselves from the Union because of the perceived threats to their 
constitutional guarantees because of a lack of an understanding of the common national 
good, Confederate framers drafted a constitutive document more committed to
specifying the nature and features of American limited government and with a 
philosophical idea of the common good that was national in character.
In 1860-1861, having cast themselves in the role of conservators of the 
republican ideal, many southerners  set about creating a government that would adhere 
to and, most importantly, preserve in the national constitutive document those principles 
inherited from the Revolution, specifically virtuous and uncorrupt representation and 
limited national government.  In April of 1861, Confederate Congressman Thomas 
Reade Rootes Cobb told his constituents in Clark County, Georgia that the Confederate 
effort was “A bloodless revolution,” a monumental event “from which the future 
resolution before the Georgia State Convention in which it was declared “while the 
State of Georgia will not and cannot, compatibly with her safety, abide permanently in 
the Union without new and ample security for future safety, still she is not disposed to 
sever her connection with it precipitately nor without respectful consultation with her 
Southern confederates. She invokes the aid of their counsel and co-operation to secure 
our rights in the Union if possible, or to protect them out of the Union if necessary.” 
Ibid., 58.
150 Belz, “The South and the American Constitutional Tradition at the 
Bicentennial,” 20.
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historian will mark a new era in the progress of man.”151 Cobb explained that, almost a 
century after the Revolution, the Confederacy would realize “the full fruition of that 
theory of self-government which the Revolution of 1776 presented to an incredulous 
world” and the founding principles of limited government would be realized more 
completely; “soon the principles of this [emphasis in original] Revolution will be so far 
acknowledged that the oppressed of the world shall feel that the calm voice of the 
people may peacefully overturn the government which withholds from the governed the 
protection for which it was established.”152 The idea of civic virtue in politics remained 
an important one throughout the war.  In its January 1864 “Address to the People of the 
Confederate States, the editorial staff of the Atlanta Register referred to this vision of the 
republican past and the importance of republicanism and a common good towards the 
creation of a constitutive national charter, describing how “the whole population has been 
condensed into one mighty incarnation of valor, and, for the first time in the annals of 
humanity, men, women, children, have been joint-participants in a grand conflict, and 
151 The imagery and identification with the Revolution was significant in shaping 
the understanding of the Confederate constitutionalism.  Even a year after Cobb’s 
comments, the identification with the Revolution proved to be strong.  The Daily 
Picayune of New Orleans indicated that the war was a cause that “contains every 
element of the struggle for freedom and property and rights which marked the struggle 
of 1776,” New Orleans, The Daily Picayune, February 19, 1862.  On its front page of 
February 23, 1862, in large capital letters, the daily referred to the war as the “Second 
American Revolution,” New Orleans, The Daily Picayune, February 23, 1862.
152 The constitutional protection of the institution of slavery was a serious issue 
with serious constitutional implications for other aspects of southern life because it fell 
under the category of domestic tranquility.  Any failure, or worse yet, any partisan 
effort by the executive and legislative branches to interfere with the domestic tranquility 
of the southern institutions represented a serious breach of constitutional guarantees and 
purposes. “Substance of An Address of T.R.R. Cobb, To His Constituents of Clark 
County,” April 6th, 1861, 6.
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joint heirs of its illustrious renown.”  Rallying the people in a national common cause, the 
serial declared “towards one another, towards our political institutions we are all 
republicans—the same republicans as when in 1789, we shaped the American 
Constitution to be the embodiment of the popular will.”153
In their wartime decisions, state supreme courts articulated these distinctive 
national republican values and principles, especially a common, national majoritarian 
good that was held to be more important than state interests and individual rights.
These values and principles became very important in the state court decisions on 
substitution and addressing whether the repeal of substitution had breached a contract 
between the principal and the Confederate government established under the conscription 
acts.154
In the Second Conscription Act, passed in September of 1862, the Confederate 
Congress made substitutes between the ages of 35 to 45 years subject to conscription, with 
the added result that their principals were thereby subject to conscription and national 
military service since the substitute serving in their place was now liable on their own.155
A subsequent statute, passed January 5th, 1864, abolished substitution altogether, a 
development that raised serious questions about the constitutionality of such an act.  The 
question was whether the repeal of substitution breached a contract between the principal 
153 “Address of the Atlanta Register, to the People of the Confederate States,” 
Atlanta Register, January 1, 1864.
154 Moore, Conscription and Conflict, 179.
155 “An Act to amend an act entitled ‘an act to provide further for the public 
defense,’ approved 16th of April, 1862,” see Public Laws of the Confederate States, 1st
Cong., 2 Sess., 1862, Chapt. XV.
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and the Confederate government established under the conscription acts.  The answer 
depended upon whether a contract had actually been created and whether the national 
government was precluded, by constitutional provision, not to impair the obligation of 
such a contract if it did exist.156  The cases that resulted from the repeal of substitution 
compelled the state supreme courts to define the Contracts Clause of the Confederate 
Constitution.  Courts enunciated the importance of republican values on public virtue, 
public duties, and common good in Confederate constitutionalism.  For a nation founded 
in secession, states’ rights, and the assertion of vested property rights, the resulting 
doctrinal development enunciated the priority of national purpose and a national common 
good over individual rights as a matter of public policy.  This is significant because it 
underscores the Confederate purpose of creating a new nation that was to be more than the 
agent of the states and serve the larger national political community.
In 1863, North Carolina’s Chief Justice Pearson insisted that the initial 
understanding between the Confederate government and principals who had previously 
hired substitutes was a binding contract that, under the Confederate Constitution, Congress 
could not impair and therefore he issued writs of habeas corpus to discharge principals 
held by enrolling officers.157  Pearson was unwilling to consider the substitution as a 
“legislative contract” but his opinion was overruled in 1864 by the court en banc in Gatlin 
156 The Contracts Clause is found in Article I, Section 10, clause 1 of the 
Confederate Constitution.  It provides that “No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, 
or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; make anything but 
gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, or ex post 
facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts; or grant any title of nobility.”
157 In Re Bryan, 60 N.C. 1 (1863).
67
v. Walton, 158 where the North Carolina court addressed the issue of whether the 
Confederate government had bestowed upon principals a contract guaranteeing them 
substitution and exemption from military service.
In Gatlin v. Walton, Associate Justice Battle, borrowing from Chief Justice 
Pearson’s decision in Ex Parte Walton,159 extended the principle of public duty.  He 
found government possessed the power to invalidate a contract between the principal and 
the Confederate government “by virtue of the power inherent in all governments whose 
organic power does not expressly deny them that power.”160 In Pearson's original 
decision, Ex Parte Walton, he chastised those who sought to extend the language of the 
Constitution to fit their needs, reminding them that “...the Confederate States was a 
written Constitution, which all officers are sworn to support.  This Constitution, and 
laws made in pursuance thereof, is ‘the supreme law.’ The Constitution, being written, 
can neither bend nor stretch, even in a case of extreme necessity.”161
On February 19, 1864, when the court, sitting en banc, finally addressed the issue 
of whether substitution conveyed a contractual obligation upon the national government, it 
did so amongst great public interest and anticipation.  In the days before the case was to be 
158 Gatlin v. Walton, 60 N.C. 310 (1864).
159 Ex Parte Walton, 60 N.C. 205, 222 (1864). Walton was conscripted in 
August of 1862 under the April Conscription Act, obtained a substitute (as provided for 
under section 9 of the act), and was discharged from service.  Walton was later 
conscripted under the act of January 5, 1864 and claimed that by virtue of his obtaining 
a substitute for conscription under the first conscription act, he was discharged from any 
further military duty for the war.
160 60 N.C. 310; Moore, Conscription and Conflict, 179-181; Amlund, Federalism 
in the Southern Confederacy, 90.
161 60 N.C. 205, 226.
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heard, the Greensboro Patriot indicated the importance of the trial in providing a definitive 
answer to a divisive issue and their expectations for “able and elaborate arguments, to be 
followed with a final decision, now highest known to the law, from a full Bench; which we 
trust may be cheerfully submitted to and acquiesced in, by all upon this at present much 
vexed question.”162 Battle, though, did not disappoint his fellow North Carolinians.  The 
Carolina Watchman applauded the opinion by Justice Battle in Gatlin v. Walton stating 
that the decision “embraces the broad and comprehensive argument of the power, as an 
attribute of sovereignty.  It enforces the just conception of a government in its strength and 
majesty.”163
In Gatlin, Walton argued that the act of April 16, 1862, which authorized him to 
exempt himself from conscription by hiring a substitute, had resulted in his entering into a 
binding contract with the government that the Confederate Congress could not impair
under the Confederate Contracts Clause.  Battle stated that, when the necessities of the 
country required it, the government did have the power to repudiate such an agreement
and, when necessary for a common good, to impair such contracts, dismissing any 
characterization of the nature of Walton's interest in exemption as a property interest under 
the Constitution.  The exemption was characterized simply as a “personal privilege” and 
Walton was liable to the national government since “the necessities of a nation, as of an 
individual, have laws of their own” and the interest of the nation and preserving the 
162 Salisbury Carolina Watchman, February 15, 1864.
163 Ibid., July 18, 1864.
69
common good were of a higher priority than the individual’s interest 164
Battle maintained that the superior duty lay in the central government’s duty to 
protect the population and that the war power wielded by the central government was 
significant as an “absolute power to control the citizens for military duty.”  Here, Battle 
refused to accept the argument that Walton could contract himself out of his duty to the 
nation and at the injury to a national common interest, stating, “A service was thus 
demanded of him, which he owed, and from which he had no escape as a matter of right.  
Why should the Government make any contract with him dispensing him irrevocably from 
duty, and weakening and fettering its military power?”165 Underscoring the interest in 
resolving this issue and the extent of constitutional development in other state supreme 
courts across the South, Associate Justice Manly referred in his concurring opinion to 
other decisions in Georgia,166 Virginia,167 and Alabama.168  He said, “We have been 
assisted in our consideration of the subject before us by cases of a like nature …which 
seem to have been well considered.  These cases decide the acts of April and 
September, 1862, and also the act of January, 1864, to be constitutional and valid.”  He 
added “They are entitled, I think, to much weight, and serve to confirm and strengthen 
the conclusion to which this Court has come.”169
164 60 N.C. 205, 213; see also Hamilton, “The State Courts and the Confederate 
Constitution,” 399.
165 60 N.C. 205, 219.
166 Daly and Fitzgerald v. Harris and Harwell v. Cohen, 33 Ga. 38 (1864) .
167 Burroughs v. Peyton & Abrahams v. Peyton, 16 Gratt. 470 (1864).
168 In Re Tate, 39 Ala. 254 (1864).
169 60 N.C. 205, 221.
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Beginning in 1864, several jurisdictions handed down decisions that articulated 
more clearly the nature of the Confederate Contracts Clause.  These cases reveal a 
commitment to the social contract that lay at the core of the Confederate constitutional 
order.  Evident in the courts’ analyses was the paramount importance of substantive 
constitutional principles, such as the primacy of the commonwealth and the duties of 
individual citizens owed to other citizens within the political community.  State supreme 
courts concluded that there were substantive principles embedded within the social 
contract of the Confederate Constitution that could not be removed from it through 
legislation.
In the Virginia case of Burroughs v. Peyton, the court took up the question of 
whether the January 5, 1864 act to revoke all exemptions due to substitution was 
unconstitutional because the authority to do so was not provided under the Confederate 
Constitution and whether it was specifically prohibited under the prohibition against 
impairing the obligation of contracts.170 In Burroughs, the court decided two cases 
simultaneously, with both appellants claiming that they were held illegally as conscripts 
by Major T.J. Peyton, commandant of Camp Lee, near Richmond, and that both had 
hired substitutes who were still in service.  Burroughs’ substitute was an unnaturalized 
foreigner and Abrahams’ substitute was a fifty-seven-year-old.
The appellants had challenged the conscription acts under the argument that 
Congress possessed no power to compel “citizens of a state” into the Confederate 
Army, “[t]hat a power so to do, would be despotic in its nature, and far greater and more 
dangerous than any possessed by the government; subjecting as it does the personal 
170 Burroughs v. Peyton 16 Va. (Gratt.) 470 (1864).
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freedom of every citizen to arbitrary discretion.171 Associate Justice Robertson made 
clear that any limitation stemming from the Constitution’s Article I, Section 10, clause 
1 prohibition from impairing the obligation of contracts applied only to the states, that 
the national charter “does not impose any restriction upon the power of Congress in this 
respect.”172  Robertson distinguished the language of the Constitution by pointing out 
that “the term ‘contracts’ in that clause is not meant to include rights and interests 
growing out of measures of public policy.  Acts in reference to such measures are to be 
regarded as rather in the nature of legislation than of compact, and although rights or 
interests may have been acquired under them, those rights and interests cannot be 
considered as violated by subsequent legislative changes which may destroy them.”173
The issue of whether the national government could contract away its obligations 
to preserve the common good and safeguard the public interest materialized in Virginia in 
Burroughs v. Peyton, with the Virginia court affirming the North Carolina court’s decision 
in Gatlin v. Walton.  Here, Robertson raised the issue of national purpose as a bar 
against any argument that the Confederate government could contract away its
constitutional duties and obligations to the people of the nation.  Once the government 
had been given the authority for preserving the national good and conferred with the 
war powers to protect the nation, these constitutional powers were to be used and “[n]o 





contracting that it will not exercise the powers confided to it.”174  The preservation of 
the nation took on a real importance in Burroughs and, against the claims for individual 
liberties being abrogated, Robertson stated that “[t]he power of coercing the citizen to 
render military service” while “inconsistent with liberty, it is essential to its 
preservation.”175
Robertson made clear that substitution was a temporary grant against which the 
national government and the safety of the nation could make demands as a matter of 
duty since “the obligation of the citizen to render military service is a paramount social 
and political duty.  It is a matter in which the whole body politic is interested.”176  In his 
opinion, he reasoned that substitution “was originally permitted as a privilege to 
individuals, and not from any benefit the government expected to derive from it; and it 
did not cease to be a privilege because of the terms imposed as a condition of granting 
it.” 
 This was a significant step for he next drew upon the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, stating that the public interest was 
to be protected as a general rule of construction since “all grants of privileges and 
exemptions from general burdens are to be constructed liberally in favor of the public 
and strictly against as against the grantee.  Whatever is not plainly expressed and 
unequivocally granted is to be taken to have been withheld.”  The plain language of the 





may be received as substitutes for those who are, under such regulations as may be 
prescribed by the Secretary of War’” and Robertson concluded that “This is the whole 
provision on the subject. There is not one word to show that it was intended to extend 
the exemption from liability, by reason of having furnished substitutes.”177 Robertson 
also rejected the assertion that no authority to conscript (a specific mode of raising 
armies) existed under the general grant of power to raise armies, that conscription was 
“repugnant to the spirit of free institutions, the principles on which our constitution 
rests, and the rights secured by it.”  Robertson identified the separation of powers issue 
and stated that it was the constitutional responsibility of Congress, not the courts to 
determine the nature of the necessity to provide for the public defense by ending all 
exemptions by substitution. But, since Congress had exercised its constitutional duty in 
identifying the necessity, the courts were bound to enunciate these clearly using 
appropriate rules of construction and following the provisions of the Confederate 
Constitution.178
In Burroughs, it became more evident that the national and not the state 
governments became the principal guarantor of the peoples’ general welfare, 
undermining an important idea in the states’ rights ideology.  The duty of the national 
government to protect all Confederate citizens was a permanent and highly important 
constitutional duty and could not be abrogated by individual claims.  In Virginia, the 
court held that “[n]o right has been conferred on the government to divest itself, by 




country may demand, the whole military strength that has been placed at its 
disposal.”179  Robertson made clear that substitution was a temporary grant against 
which the national government and the safety of the nation could make demands: “[t]he 
arrangement of substitution cannot be made to extend further than to discharge the 
person putting in the substitute from the liability to which he is then subject under the 
existing law,” and any interpretation of the Contracts Clause that would impact the 
national obligation for national defense had to take into account the national social 
contract.180  Robertson made clear that “[t]he obligation of the citizen to render military 
service is a paramount social and political duty.  It is a matter in which the whole body 
politic is interested.”181  Here, the court articulated the republican idea of a national 
common good that was to be protected.  The national government, in the exercise of its 
constitutional powers and authority and in furtherance of meeting its constitutional 
obligations to protect and preserve the common good of the nation, could operate 
directly upon individuals in the states who owed duties and obligations as Confederate 
citizens to their national community, the Confederate States of America.
In the 1864 case of Daly & Fitzgerald v. Harris and Harwell v. Cohen, a jointly-
decided case, Daly, Fitzgerald, and Cohen hired substitutes for Confederate service, all of 
whom were accepted and mustered into Confederate service.182  Following the passage of 




182 Daly & Fitzgerald v. Harris and Harwell v. Cohen, 33 Ga. 38 (1864).
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supplied a substitute, Conscript Bureau officers summoned all three for Confederate 
service.  The Georgia court considered whether the January 5th, 1864 act was 
unconstitutional because it denied these three the “right of exemption from military service 
vested in them by a contract between the Confederate Government and themselves” and 
thus resulted in the impairment of the obligation from a valid contract.183  Associate Justice 
Jenkins developed the court’s opinion that exemption was only a privilege by pointing out 
that the extension of the privilege and the withdrawal of it had been done by the same 
Congress comprised of the same elected individuals who in no way ever intended to bind 
themselves or successive Congresses to any course of action which might in the future be 
detrimental to the nation: “It is the Congress withdrawing an exemption previously granted 
by itself, alleging as its reason, that the altered circumstances of the country forbid its 
longer enjoyment” and Jenkins called any judicial interpretation to the contrary a “novelty 
in jurisprudence.”184
Jenkins’ interest in providing consistency with other decisions became evident 
in his analysis of how statutory exemptions were handled by other state courts.  Jenkins 
pointed out that statutory exemptions were provided for mechanics and those with 
special trades.  However, exemptions were based upon a contingency that the exemptee 
would provide the nation with a service more valuable than military service and the 
government always retained the right to revoke such a statutory exemption without 
allegation that it had breached a contract.  Likewise, here, the government could revoke 
the exemption provided to principals when a greater service to the nation could be had 
183 33 Ga. 38, 41.
184 Ibid., 47-48.
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through their military service.  Without the intent to be bound irrevocably, an essential 
consideration in determining whether a contract existed, Jenkins held that no contract 
had been created.185
His textual analysis of the legislation and the Confederate Constitution concluded 
that “the government had no intention to contract, and hence the element of mutual assent 
of minds and wills was wanting.”186  The other reason that Jenkins refused to characterize 
exemption as a contract was because of the civic responsibilities which he identified as 
part of the Confederate social compact and implicit in the Confederate Constitution: 
“Writers upon the social compact and political law, affirm the proposition inwrought with 
the foundation of all society, that each member owes to all other members [in original] 
(not to government), the duty of defending the State, as far as he is capable, and that 
governments instituted simply to administer the public affairs of organized society, are 
powerless to release him from this obligation…it is not true of all governments invested 
with legislative power for the common weal, that no Legislature can, by contract, divest 
either itself or its successors of any power necessary to the well-being of the State.187
Jenkins also went on to state that to assume that the Confederate government could 
contract itself out of its responsibilities was violative of the fundamental principles 
inherent in any government and especially in the Confederate charter: “that an agency 
185 Ibid., 49.
186 Ibid., 50.
187 Jenkins cited to numerous treatises and U.S. Supreme Court cases, including 
The Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) ; 
Goszler vs. Georgetown, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)  593 (1821); and Ohio Loan, Insurance and 
Trust Company vs. Debolt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 416 (1854). Ibid., 50.
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established by society for certain specified ends, may, in its discretion, defeat those very 
ends…would be contrary to first principles, and subversive of all government…We need 
not go to remote antiquity nor inquire into first principles, upon which the social compact 
is founded…The solution is the question is found in a document, accessible to all, 
recognized as fundamental as supreme law, ordained but three years since, whereto we all 
were consenting.”188  As Jenkins pointed out, “the Constitution contains no express grant 
of the power in question” namely, to enter into contracts exempting individuals out of 
military service to the nation, in derogation to individual civic duty and specific purposes 
and responsibilities articulated in the constitutive document.189
Yet, the national government was not alone in possessing constitutional duties; 
there were also significant individual duties which the national government had to 
enforce if the common good was to be served, “that the well-being of society, and the 
daily operations of the Government, impose upon the citizen certain public duties, 
which, if not performed upon requisition, must be enforced,” such as the public duty of 
the juror, which if not maintained, had to be enforced.190  However, “the obligation of 
public duty” owed to preserve the nation and the common good through military service 
was essential to the very fabric of society and public order.  Jenkins stated that “each 
one owes to all of his associates the duty of defending them against external dangers.  
Without this, there can be neither government nor society.”  This was not a specific 





Confederate constitution which authorize the raising of armies and calling forth of the 
militia do not create: [sic] they but recognize the obligation and provide for its 
enforcement.”  Allowing easy access to exemptions would violate these social 
principles and permit recusant conscripts “to throw off the burthen [sic] of a public 
duty?” 191
Republicanism formed the basic “vision” of the Confederate framers and shaped 
the national charter as a reform document to reflect the values and constitutional ideas 
shared by southerners generally.  Confederate framers were committed to conserving 
republicanism as a founding principle, with its emphasis upon disinterested and virtuous 
government, virtue, and common good.192  These principles shaped southern 
expectations and, by 1860, many southerners had become vehemently opposed to 
partisan politics, specifically Republican Party politics, because of political corruption 
and abuse.193 The conservative commitments of the Confederate framers and the 
191 Ibid., 33. Similar conclusions were also reached by the courts in Texas and 
Alabama, as in Ex Parte Abraham Mayer, 27 Tex. 715 (1864) and The State, ex rel. 
Graham, in re Pille, 39 Ala. 459 (1864).
192 The Confederate Constitution “embodies the distinctive principles of republican 
government to which the South was committed.”  DeRosa rejects the argument made by 
Jesse Carpenter that the U.S. Constitution and the Confederate Constitution were very 
similar with only “slight” modifications in wording used in the respective documents. 
DeRosa, The Confederate Constitution of 1861, 17.
193 Nieman, “Republicanism, the Confederate Constitution, and the American 
Constitutional Tradition,” 204-205. As Ericson pointed out, “The existence of a 
common interest binding together the whole nation is one of Webster’s political 
truisms.” David F. Ericson, “The Nullification Crisis, American Republicanism, and the 
Force Bill Debate,” The Journal of Southern History, vol. 61, No. 2 (May, 1995):249-
270, 264; Daniel Webster, Writings and Speeches, vol. VI (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 
1903), 222; Robert F. Dalzell, Daniel Webster and the Trial of American Nationalism
(Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), 33-34; Daniel Walker Howe, Political Culture 
of the American Whigs (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 217.
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innovations they would employ in their new constitutive document were heavily 
influenced by this republican ideology.  They became an important component in 
Confederate constitutionalism that provided the perspective and language that “deeply 
influenced the Confederate framers’ approach to constitutional reform, especially the 
significant changes they made in the presidency.”194  They would also shape the 
jurisprudence of the state supreme court justices who sought to enunciate its principles 
accurately and in conformity to the intent of the founders and the nation they had 
represented.
Confederate Commitment to Limited Government
The Confederate Constitution and the constitutionalism that emerged during the 
war reflected a commitment to limiting national government, a commitment made even 
more significant in the Confederacy because of the many war-related demands that 
pulled the national government towards consolidation and a greater exercise of power 
and authority.195  In 1861 and 1862 Confederate framers were committed to preserving 
limitations upon national government based upon their understanding of the 
Constitution of 1787 and their antebellum experiences.  To this end they drafted a 
national charter with more specific limitations in Article I, Article II, and Article V than 
194 Discussed in Chapter Three.
195 The centralization caused by the war was of critical concern. DeRosa argued 
that the Confederate framers’ commitment to limited national government was a major 
political and constitutional objective because “the primary concern of the Confederate 
framers was the centralization of political power at the national level to the detriment of 
the states.” DeRosa, Confederate Constitution of 1861, 5.
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contained in the U.S. Constitution of 1787.196
In Article I, Section 1, the Confederate framers’ commitment to limited 
government included significant and numerous alterations to the legislative powers 
exercised by the Confederate Congress.  Their restrictions were substantial and more 
than fifty percent of all changes in the draft of the Permanent Confederate Constitution 
were made in this first article.197  One of the most significant revisions was changing the 
conveyance of national legislative powers so that these powers were delegated to the 
Confederate Congress instead of being granted, as they were in the Constitution of 
1787.198  This reflected the belief that the Congress acted as the representative of the 
people and this delegation of sovereignty was not a permanent one.  J.L.M. Curry 
characterized this as an expression of states’ rights thinking, though it reflected limited 
government restrained within republican guidelines since “’[t]he permanent 
Constitution was framed on the States rights theory, to take from a majority in Congress 
unlimited control, and to give effective assurances of purity and economy in all national 
legislation.’”199  This delegation was a temporary trust of the sovereignty of the people.  
Although this provision has been interpreted as providing that Congress was to be the 
196 Donald Lutz argued that limiting governmental power was a purpose by 
which a constitution was to be measured. Lutz, Origins of American Constitutionalism, 
16. Limitations upon the President in Article II and the Amendment process in Article 
V are both discussed in Chapter Three.
197 Lee, The Confederate Constitutions, 89.
198 The full text from Article I, Section 1 is “All legislative powers herein 
delegated shall be vested in a Congress of the Confederate States, which shall consist of 
a Senate and House of Representatives” [italics added].
199 J.L.M. Curry, Civil History of the Confederate Government, With Some 
Personal Reminiscences (Richmond, VA: B.F. Johnson Publishing Company, 1901), 
69.
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“agent of the individual states” and that “the states could withdraw the power they had 
given Congress whenever the need arose,” such a principle was specifically rejected 
during the war by the state courts .200  This emphasis upon a sovereignty emanating from 
the people and the national government’s responsibility for facilitating the will of the 
people was also brought to bear upon the procedures for electing Confederate Senators.  
In Article I, Section 3, clause 1 of the Confederate Constitution, Confederate Senators 
were to be “chosen for six years by the Legislature thereof, at the regular session next 
immediately preceding the commencement of the term of service.”  The end result of 
this revision would be the election of national senators by state legislators who were 
themselves recently elected to office.  Free from the corruption of their own extended 
incumbencies, the state legislators would make choices in accord with the will of the 
people with whom they would have had recent affiliation prior to being elected.201
One of the most profound examples of the commitment to limited government in 
the Confederate Constitution, however, is the provision by which state legislatures 
could impeach Confederate federal officials.  The language contained in Article I, 
section 2, paragraph 5, afforded that “any judicial or other Federal officer, resident and 
acting solely within the limits of any State, may be impeached by a vote of two-thirds of 
200 Hardaway, “The Confederate Constitution,” 23. In Ex Parte Abraham Mayer, 
26 Tex. 715 (1864), the court specifically rejected any belief that the Confederacy was 
the creation of the states.  Associate Justice Reeves held that the Confederate 
government was the creation of the people of the Confederacy, that “the government of 
the Confederate States, like the government of a state, is derived from the same source, 
the people, and founded on their authority; that the constitution and laws of the
Confederate States are the supreme law of the land, and not in any sense dependent on 
the constitution of a state for their authority,” 26 Tex. 715.
201 Hardaway, “The Confederate Constitution,” 27. This provision was intended 
to make Confederate Senators “more beholden to their state legislature’s directives.” 
DeRosa, The Confederate Constitution of 1861, 42.
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both branches of the Legislature thereof.”202  Under this paragraph, Confederate 
officials, including federal judges, were subject to the biases and influence of the local 
state constituencies, rather than owing their complete allegiances to the central 
government, reinforcing the belief that the people were the source of sovereignty and to 
ensure that national government policies reflected the will of the people.203  In 
Alabama, Associate Justice Stone added that the national government was intended to 
be limited under the Constitution in the exercise of governmental powers and vigilance 
was necessary “to prevent it from enlarging its powers by construction.”204  Under the 
threat of impeachment, no Confederate official could act with impunity to expand the 
powers of the national government and in defiance of the principles of limited 
government.
The ability of Congress to expand its powers by construction had been a serious 
threat to southerners and in the Constitution, the Confederate framers attempted to 
prevent this from occurring by making significant revisions to congressional powers 
under Article I, Section 8.  Congressional taxing power was constrained in order to 
prevent abuse and Congress was provided with only enough power to lay and collect 
taxes to pay government debts, provide for the common defense, or pay for the business 
202 Journal of the Congress of the Confederate States of America, 1:909-923; Lee, 
Confederate Constitutions, 173.
203 On March 2, 1861, T.R.R. Cobb introduced the provision for impeachment of 
federal officers.  Lee argued that this was “a significant embodiment of the theory of 
state rights.” Lee, The Confederate Constitutions, 92.
204 Ex Parte Hill, In Re Willis, et al. 38 Ala. 429, 454-456 (1863).
83
of the government.205  The restriction of congressional powers under Article I, Section 8 
was also achieved with the inclusion of language and powers that were more specific 
and less ambiguous than the language used in the U.S. Constitution.  During the 
antebellum period, the phrase “post-roads” had been interpreted broadly in order to 
facilitate ambitious federal road projects.  Confederate framers’ commitment to limited 
government led them to substitute the earlier language from the U.S. Constitution for 
the phrase “post-routes.”206
Fiscal irresponsibility had been a common allegation leveled against the U.S. 
Congress, especially due to the extravagances with pork barrel legislation and the waste 
of national funds.  Undeterred in their commitment to limited government, Confederate 
framers revised their national constitutive document to require specificity in bills of 
appropriation as to the specific amount of funds requested and the purpose of the 
appropriation.  Article I, section 9, clause 20 required that every bill be related to only 
one subject, which was also to be expressed in the title of the bill, a development which 
was designed to prevent the antebellum abuse of attaching riders to bills.207  Under 
205 Article I, Section 8, clause 1. This section reads, “To lay and collect taxes, 
duties, imposts, and excises for revenue, necessary to pay the debts, provide for the 
common defense, and carry on the Government of the Confederate States; but no 
bounties shall be granted from the Treasury; nor shall any duties or taxes on 
importations from foreign nations be laid to promote or foster any branch of industry; 
and all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the Confederate 
States.” See also White, “The Constitution of the Confederate States of America: 
Innovation or Duplication?,” 12.
206 Article I, Section 8, clause 7.  White, “The Constitution of the Confederate 
States of America: Innovation or Duplication?,” 14-15.
207 Each bill was limited to one subject, explicitly stated in the title, see Article I, 
Section 9, clause 20. White, “The Constitution of the Confederate States of America: 
Innovation or Duplication?,” 14.
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Article I, Section 9, clause 10, Congress was prohibited from paying any additional 
compensation to any persons after contract terms and prices were established.208
More broadly, the elimination of the General Welfare clause was a substantive 
and procedural constitutional innovation meant by the Confederate framers to 
strengthen constitutional limitations for the sake of effective government and to restrict 
all government authority to those powers and duties specified in the Constitution.209  In 
the 1864 case of Ex Parte Abraham Mayer, Associate Justice Reeves, writing for the 
Texas high court, held that the primary responsibility of the Confederate government 
was to fulfill the purposes for which it had been created, namely “to protect the states 
against invasion and domestic violence” and any attempt to interfere with this 
“obligation” of the national government would violate one of the national purposes 
contained within the Confederate Constitution.”210
In determining the scope of national government power to raise armies and 
accomplish this, however, Reeves stated that any expansion of the national power, 
especially under the notion that wartime demands required it, would be 
208 Ibid.
209 Anastaplo argued that the elimination of the general welfare phrase in the 
Confederate provisional Constitution, in reaction to the potency of the same clause in 
the Constitution of 1787, should be evaluated by original intent interpreters as providing 
for “a weaker national government.” Anastaplo, The Amendments to the Constitution: A 
Commentary, 133. Anastaplo pointed out that despite antebellum criticisms of the 
national government’s broad interpretation of implied powers, the Confederate framers 
did not do away with implied powers nor did they limit the national government to only 
those powers expressly delegated to it; rather they attempted to forestall abuses of such 
powers by specifying which express powers were to be delegated to the national 
government while refusing to handicap the national government from facilitating its 
responsibilities in the national sphere. Ibid., 127.
210 Ex Parte Abraham Mayer, 26 Tex. 715 (1864).
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unconstitutional: “the power to raise armies must not be so construed as that its use, if 
exercised, might result in the destruction of the state governments [a violation of the 
doctrine of federalism], or that would impair any right over which congress has no 
power to legislate [a violation of the separation of powers doctrine], or that would 
render the Confederate States unable to give that protection to the states to which they 
are entitled, and may demand, under the guaranties [sic] of the constitution [a violation 
of the guarantee to republican government].”  For Reeves, this stretching of 
constitutional powers beyond the authority provided in the Constitution “would be to 
pervert the power which was intended for the protection and common defense of all the 
states into an engine of self-destruction.”211
The commitment to limited government was not just directed against the 
national government; there were also significant limitations placed upon the state 
governments to maintain the delicate balance of powers between the two entities and to 
prevent state government, chiefly the state legislatures, from usurping national 
governmental powers.  Congress still held power to legislate bills for appropriating 
funds to aid in coastal navigation, harbor improvements, the removal of river obstacles, 
and to tax transportation which benefited from such improvements.212  Under Article I, 
Section 10, clause 3, states were required to coordinate with the Confederate Congress 
before imposing duties for the improvement of rivers and harbors. However, in the 
exercise of this power, the state governments were limited to imposing only such duties 
that did not violate any Confederate treaty obligations and as they were necessary.  
211 Ibid.
212 White, “The Constitution of the Confederate States of America: Innovation 
or Duplication?,”13.
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States were prohibited from using duties as a means of raising revenue for other means 
and any surplus revenue generated by such duties had to be paid into the Confederate 
coffers.213
The war unleashed tremendous pressures on the national government to 
mobilize and outfit large modern field armies, but, while state supreme courts held 
many exercises of government power as constitutional, there were limitations to the 
extent of national government power, particularly with regards to the impressment of 
foodstuffs and war materiel and the requirement to provide just compensation.214  In 
Georgia, Alabama, and Florida cases, the state supreme courts applied “strict 
constitutional tests” to protect the right to property, what William Yancey had described 
as “one of the most sacred known to the Constitution.”215  In doing so, state courts 
revealed a commitment to prevent the national government from overstepping its 
constitutional bounds, manifesting a commitment to uphold the principles of limited 
government regardless of the demands of war.216
213 The language of this clause is “No State shall, without the consent of 
Congress, lay any duty on tonnage, except on seagoing vessels, for the improvement of 
its rivers and harbors navigated by the said vessels; but such duties shall not conflict 
with any treaties of the Confederate States with foreign nations; and any surplus 
revenue thus derived shall, after making such improvement, be paid into the common 
treasury.” Ibid.
214 The Confederate Constitution provided for eminent domain in Article I, 
section 9, clause 16: “nor shall private property be taken for public use without 
compensation.”  Brummer, “Judicial Interpretation of the Confederate Constitution,” 
126-127.
215 DeRosa, The Confederate Constitution of 1861, 115.
216 The importance of adhering to substantive constitutional principles, even 
during war, was evident in J.L.M. Curry’s post-war recollections about the reluctance of 
the Confederate Congress to issue Treasury bills as legal tender in the Confederacy: 
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While the Confederate power to impress was never questioned, the courts did 
question the manner by which the Confederate government ascertained “just 
compensation.”  In Cox & Hill v. James F. Cummings,217 Georgia’s Chief Justice 
Lumpkin did not question the ability of the Confederate government to impress because 
this power—the power of eminent domain—was provided for under the Confederate 
Constitution.  According to Chief Justice Joseph Lumpkin, this power was exercised by 
Congress when it promulgated the impressment legislation.  However, possessing 
constitutional authority was not enough; the Confederate government had also to 
observe constitutional forms and limitations in the proper exercise of its powers, chiefly 
that private property should not “’be taken for public use without just 
compensation.’”218  The issue in Cox & Hill was whether the Superior Court erred in its 
determination of what was just compensation for the impressments of sugar, how was 
just compensation to be determined, and how, when, and in what paid?
In this case, William B. Jones & Co. of Richmond purchased from A. C. Wyley 
& Co. of Atlanta, 33, 942 pounds of brown sugar in 135 barrels, stored in warehouses of 
Cox & Hill in Atlanta.  The sugar was “choice” sugar, with a market price of $1.10 per 
pound and barrels worth $3.75 each.  Major James F. Cummings was commissary of 
“such a compulsory method of imparting an artificial value to money or government 
credit had universally proved a failure; that it was an impairment of contracts; that the 
injection into the Constitution of a power not specifically granted, but intentionally 
omitted, was an utter departure from the fundamental principles of a government which 
was intended to guard against the assumption of powers not granted.” J.L.M. Curry, 
“The Struggle of the Confederacy: a Review,” Publications of the Southern History 
Association, volume 5, 1901: 504-511, 508.
217 33 Ga. 549 (1863).
218 Ibid., 554-555.
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subsistence and gave notice to Jones & Co. that he was going to impress the sugar for 
the Confederate States and that he would pay 75 cents per pound, the price set by price 
commissioners appointed by the Confederate States and the State of Georgia.  The agent 
for Jones & Co. refused to accept the sum from Major Cummings on the basis that it 
was not just compensation and, in the alternative, proposed that Cummings pay either 
the market price or its value in Atlanta at that time.  Cummings declined this proposal, 
stating that the sugar was worth 85 cents per pound rather then the price fixed by the 
commissioners and he believed that he was not empowered to pay more than the fixed 
price.  Jones & Co.’s agent refused to hold the sugar for Cummings, whereupon, on 
June 16, 1863, Cummings seized the sugar (worth at that time $1.25 per pound) by 
force and removed it without permission from Jones & Co.  Before the Justices of the 
Peace, Cummings asserted that the seizure was justified under the Impressment Act of 
April 1863 and the War Department’s General Orders No. 37 of April 6, 1863.
Lumpkin, a vigorous supporter of states’ rights, looked to the impressment 
legislation and took seriously its market-value orientation and provision that 
compensation “should be determined in the case of producers by two or three impartial 
loyal citizens of the vicinage, and in the case of non-producers, by two commissioners 
in each State, one appointed by the President, the other by the Governor.”219  However, 
Lumpkin also noted that shortly after the passage of the impressment act, a case in 
Virginia had resulted in the impressment of hay and an extreme appraisal of its value.  
The result of this was that Congress passed supplemental legislation so that if the 
impressment officer refused the appraised price, State commissioners would determine 
219 Ibid., 555.
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price, denying the producer any further role in determining value or price.  Accordingly, 
the War Department issued regulations to impressment officers denying them any 
authority to accept prices in excess of the scheduled prices fixed by commissioners for 
the state.  The supplemental legislation was a rejection of the earlier position by 
Congress to allow local citizens a role in determining price.220
Since the provisions impressed in this case were not of “pressing necessity” to 
the Army, Lumpkin held that for the taking to be constitutional and to assure “just 
compensation” under the Constitution, it could be accomplished in one of three possible 
manners: either by the agreement of the parties, by the intervention of a jury, or by 
commissioners selected by mutual agreement of the parties.  Lumpkin refused to 
provide Congress any special consideration because of wartime exigencies and he stated 
that “Congress is but the creature of the Constitution.”  He was adamant about Congress 
satisfying the test for a constitutional takings and he rejected any claim that Congress 
could promulgate legislation depriving owners of their property “even for public use, 
unless adequate compensation is secured by the law.”221
Lumpkin evaluated the propriety of the schedule of prices and whether this 
schedule provided the just compensation required under the Constitution.  He concluded 
that the schedule, as established, had “no reference to demand and supply at the time 
and place the article is seized than which nothing is more fluctuating at this eventful 
220 Ibid.
221 Ibid., 556. Lumpkin looked to the U.S. Supreme Court case of Vanhorne’s 
Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (1795) in which Justice Patterson emphasized 
the importance of establishing fair and just compensation to preserve the rights of the 
private property owner, “’except in cases of absolute necessity or great public utility.’” 
33 Ga. 549, 557.
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period” and that the schedule did not anticipate changes in prices over long periods of 
time.  Rather, according to Lumpkin, the owner of private property “is entitled to the 
value of the property taken, and at the time it is taken [italics in original]—the amount 
to be assessed by a proper tribunal and paid in money.  It is a debt against the public, 
who takes the property, and must be paid like all other debts.”222  Lumpkin observed 
that here there was no schedule of prices for the sugar impressed by Cummings, that the 
price of 75 cents per pound was established for “good sugar” and not “choice sugar” 
while the sugar taken by Cummings was “choice,” a higher grade of sugar, “and 
consequently this sugar did not come within the schedule of prices fixed by the 
commissioners.”223  Lumpkin held that “no schedule of prices, including this particular 
grade of sugar, ever was fixed by the board of commissioners, either at the time it was 
taken or before; that its true value never has been ascertained by any legal or 
constitutional tribunal; and that the same was seized by the agent of the Government 
against the consent of the holders, without making or tendering therefor [sic] just 
compensation.”224  Lumpkin also held that, unless the parties could decide upon a price 
for the sugar, the question of just compensation should be referred on to a special jury 
in the Superior Court of Fulton County at its next term.225
The court in Georgia did not have to wait long for its next impressment case, 






reconciled to the Confederate Constitution’s Article I, Section 9 provisions for 
constitutional takings in Hardie C. Cunningham v. David L. Campbell. 226  Here, the 
court enunciated the specific parameters of and specific procures for government power 
to be exercised, considering congressional legislation, War Department regulations, and 
principles of equity.  Cunningham, a Confederate Assistant Commissary for Georgia, 
had seized a quantity of sugar from three different businesses, one of which was David 
Campbell’s.  Cunningham had claimed authority to do so under the March 26, 1863 
legislation (“An Act to Regulate Impressments”) and had offered to pay these owners 
seventy-five cents per pound for the sugar, according to the schedule that was 
established by the appraisers appointed for the State of Georgia.  The owners claimed 
and proved that they had purchased the sugar for $1.00 per pound and they offered to 
sell the sugar to the government at a “market price,” which, at the time of its seizure, 
was approximately $1.20 to $1.25 per pound.  The plaintiffs claimed that the process for 
assessing compensation was at odds with the Takings Clause in Article I, Section 9, 
Paragraph 16 of the Confederate Constitution.227
Associate Justice Jenkins, writing for the court, rejected the proposition that 
constitutional limitations could be dispensed with due to wartime exigencies and 
provided a narrow definition of “necessity” and specifying the proper conditions under 
which “necessity” could provide a rationale for dispensing with constitutional 
provisions.  “Necessity” was the result of drastic circumstances, “it looms up and 
asserts itself in the inevitable now,” and “it discloses present evil menacing the body 
226 33 Ga. 625 (1863).
227 Ibid., 625-626.
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politic, and demands a present and sure remedy” in order to safeguard the safety of the 
people.228  Jenkins noted that the “necessity” standard was not included within the 
Article I, Section 9, paragraph 16 language that conveyed the impressment power upon 
the Confederate government.  He noted that the language was “’nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation’” and was not “’nor shall 
private property be taken to meet a public necessity, but for public use.’”  Impressment 
was compared to the taking of private property for the “promotion of public gain” such 
as “the construction of public highways, railroads and bridges, and the opening of 
streets.”  These purposes were very different from matters of “great public necessity” in 
which the purpose was “to prevent public loss” and “avert calamity” such as “the 
repulsion of an invading army, the stay of pestilence, or the arrest of conflagration.”229
The court held that when the Confederate Congress authorized the seizure of 
property with the Impressment Act, it did so with the understanding that impressment 
would proceed under the Article I, Section 9 provisions requiring “just compensation,” 
adding “whatever may be said of the existence of the power to seize, independently of 
this clause, there can be no question as to the limitation thus placed upon its exercise” 
and “the terms in which this clause is expressed, are adapted rather to limiting an 
inherent or preexisting power, than to an original grant of it.”230  If an impressment 
officer was to claim authority under the Impressment Act for the seizure of property, the 





under which he claimed authority.  There were procedures established for resolving 
disagreements between impressment officers and producers over the value of the goods 
being seized and a determination of “just compensation.”231
The court enunciated, as a matter of constitutional doctrine, that the 
constitutional limitations and statutory procedures were to be followed by all parties and 
it refused to revise any understanding of the statutory or constitutional limitations upon 
national government power here in the name of military necessity.232  While 
acknowledging the condition of the Confederate nation, the court also held that “not 
even war, with its attendant horrors, may rightfully impel the judiciary.  Positive 
conviction of constitutional obligation may not be yielded under any circumstances.”  
Jenkins stated that there could be “fatal consequences likely to result from judicial 
interference with the war measures of the Government; but let it be remembered that by 
a provision of the instrument itself, Judges, as well as legislators, are sworn ‘to support 
the Constitution;’ and this they are to do in war, as well as peace.”233
The rationale for the constitutionality of impressment became clearer in 1864 
when the Alabama court adjudicated the case of Alabama and Florida Railroad Co. v. 
231 Ibid, 631-633.
232 For Belz, constitutionalism “is the theory and practice of conducting politics 
in accordance with a constitution” and essential components of constitutionalism 
include legalism—“the belief that right conduct consists in following rules,” especially 
the supremacy of the constitution, and “purposive political action” to avoid the rigid 
formalism that could result from legalism. Kelly, Harbison, and Belz, The American 
Constitution: Its Origins and Development, 7th edition, vol. 1, xx.
233 Ibid, 633-634.
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Kenney.234  The railroad had petitioned for and received an injunction to prevent 
impressment officers from impressing rolling stock and other property belonging to the 
railroad. The impressment agents filed a response, claiming that their acts were carried 
out under the authority of the Secretary of War.  When the chancellor dissolved the 
injunction and dismissed the case, an appeal was made claiming that the taking of 
private mortgaged property by the government impairs the obligation of contract and, in 
this case, impressment of property by the Confederate government resulted in the 
“destruction of a franchise granted by the state, making the act invalid and 
unconstitutional.  The case compelled Chief Justice Walker and the Alabama court to 
address the constitutionality of the impressment legislation by considering the specific 
circumstances that would permit the national government to impress and the issue of 
just compensation.235
Under the Confederate Constitution, the standard applied was the national 
majoritarian common good, for this common good was what the national government 
was charged to preserve.  This linked republicanism and constitutional limitations in a 
way that provided a doctrinal structure for deciding impressment cases.  Walker stated 
that “there is a power, alike in the general government and in the states, to take private 
property for established governments, it is a recognized principle, that all property is 
held subject to an inherent right in the government to appropriate it to the public use, 
when the public good may require it to be done.”  Walker’s emphasis upon 
safeguarding the common good was evident in his explanation as to the source of this 
234 39 Ala. 307 (1864).
235 Ibid., 307-308.
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principle, that it might have originated from “’the mutual necessities of the individuals 
about to constitute a political community.’”236
But, there were also constitutional limitations to this taking, namely that just 
compensation was to be provided to those from whom goods or services were 
impressed, even during wartime and here, the court limited the influence of wartime 
exigencies to influence constitutional decision making and remove constitutional 
protections for individual producers.  Walker made clear that under the Confederate 
Constitution, impressing private property for the public good did not impair the 
obligation of contract but rather “it transfers to the government the rights of property 
given by the contract; and compensation for the benefits of the contract is required to be 
made.”  Here, Walker and his brother justices held that the Confederate government had 
not “taken the franchise, nor property indispensable to the existence of the franchise, or 
the exercise of the privileges bestowed by the act of incorporation.”237
During the war, state supreme courts became charged with enunciating 
constitutional limitations in the Confederacy.  As they examined the provisions of the 
written Confederate Constitution, especially the limitations placed on government 
authority and power, the courts also enunciated the Confederate unwritten Constitution and 
constitutional order, particularly republican values which the framers believed inherited 
from the Revolution and the early Republic.  The importance of written provisions and 
unwritten but shared values, both of which were enunciated by the state supreme courts, 
suggests that the Confederate constitutional order was about more than just the 
236 Ibid., 309.
237 Ibid., 309-310, 312.
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“juxtapositions of power” within the Confederate political order and placing restrictions on 
national government.
Although the powers in the Confederate Constitution were enumerated powers, 
this did not mean that the national government was to remain powerless to fulfill its 
constitutional functions and responsibilities.  Confederate constitutionalism comprised 
principles of limited government, but the nature of Confederate constitutionalism was 
not so doctrinaire as to reduce principles and constitutional provisions to meaningless 
formalities. Historian Don Fehrenbacher argued that “the constitutional-makers at 
Montgomery seem to have regarded themselves as both conservators and innovators—that 
is, as defenders of traditional rights who had been forced to become revolutionaries and 
builders of a new political order.”238  The new political order and the Confederate 
Constitution that the Confederate framers created were both conservative and innovative.  
It was this dual nature of the Confederate Constitution that made it such a distinctive 
document, shaped a constitutional reform effort, and was enunciated in the 
constitutional decisions issued by state supreme courts interpreting its provisions.




The Commitment to Purposeful Innovations
In February and March of 1861, Confederate framers prided themselves on their 
ability to conserve the original constitutional ideas of the American founding and to 
improve upon its constitutional forms.  They believed that they had corrected the 
“’defects’” of the Constitution and ushered in the “best form of government” 
possible.239  In March, Howell Cobb, President of the Confederate Provisional Congress 
and a member of the Constitutional Convention, evaluated publicly the provisional 
constitution of the new southern nation and the ideas that had shaped it.  Focusing on 
the document’s adherence to constitutional principles and more modern, innovative
forms, he concluded that, as a constitutive document, it would become very popular and 
much admired: “What ever [sic] may be the criticism of the hour upon the Constitution 
we have formed, I feel confident that the judgment of our people, and indeed of the 
world, will in the end, pronounce it the ablest instrument ever prepared for the 
government of a free people.”240
The Provisional Constitution received attention and praise from politicians and 
newspapers in the North as well as South, who believed that Confederate revisions of 
the Constitution of 1787 would address successfully the political and constitutional ills 
239 J.L.M. Curry, Civil History of the Government of the Confederate States, as 
cited in Amlund, Federalism in the Southern Confederacy, 63; Carpenter, The South as a 
Conscious Minority, 222; Hardaway, “The Confederate Constitution: A Legal and 
Historical Examination,” 22-23.
240 The Weekly Mail, March 22, 1861.
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of the United States, perhaps even providing the basis for reunion.241 T.R.R. Cobb 
explained the importance of this reform effort, telling his listeners that “To provide 
against these [abuses], has been the chief labor in forming your Constitution.” 242
Alabamian Robert Hardy Smith, a member of the Confederate Constitutional 
Convention, candidly told his listeners in March, 1861, “We come to-night to indulge in 
no Utopian idea, that we have attained perfection in Government, or that we have, by 
the clearness of language, left no room for evasion or perversion or usurpation of 
power.”  Yet, he went on to share with them his optimism and pride about the 
document, confessing “we may, I think, congratulate ourselves that grave errors have 
been corrected, and additional hopes given for the preservation of American liberty.”243
In an editorial, the New York Herald praised the new constitution for its innovations and 
proclaimed that “The new Constitution is the Constitution of the United States with 
various modifications and some very important and most desirable improvements. We 
are free to say that the invaluable reforms enumerated should be adopted by the United 
241 Southern newspapers recorded general satisfaction with the new national 
charter. In Atlanta, The Intelligencer stated on February 16, 1862 “We are now seeking 
to create a government that will be nearer perfection than the one we have left” and 
three days later it warned that “Our public servants, who are now in Montgomery, 
organizing a Government, should not lose sight of the great principle lying at the 
foundation of our Republican system, that the people are the source of all power.” On 
February 25, 1862, the New Orleans Daily Picayune stated that the Confederate 
Constitution was “a clear, calm, stately manifesto of the cause which impelled eight 
millions of free people to withdraw from a Government, which had, by a long train of 
abuses and usurpations...evinced a design to reduce them under absolute despotism.” 
242 “Substance of An Address of T.R.R. Cobb, To His Constituents of Clark 
County, April 6th, 1861, 2-3.
243 An Address to the Citizens of Alabama on the Constitution and Laws of the 
Confederate States of America by the Hon. Robert H. Smith, (Mobile, AL: Mobile Daily 
Register Print, 1861), 12.
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States, with or without a reunion of the seceded States, and as soon as possible.”244  So 
appropriate and timely were the alterations made in this Confederate Constitution that 
an editorial in Harper's Weekly predicted, “Most of them would receive the hearty 
support of the people of the North.”245
Yet, this understanding of the Confederate Constitution as something innovative, 
inventive, or modern, and transforming the American constitutional tradition into 
something  new, more energetic, and efficacious seems to contradict statements made by 
Howell Cobb, Jefferson Davis, and T.R.R. Cobb in 1861 that the Confederacy was 
founded upon conservative constitutional tenets from the past.246  These different 
assessments raise significant questions about the nature and tendency of the southern 
constitutional order.247  If the constitutive principles, purposes, and ideas of the 
Confederate constitutional order were committed to the preservation of eighteenth 
244 The New York Herald, March 19, 1861.
245 Harper's Weekly, March 30, 1861, 194:3.
246 In February of 1862, as he adjourned the Provisional Congress, Howell 
Cobb, president of the Confederate Congress, declared that the Confederate 
constitutional order and political revolution were founded upon conservative tenets and 
ideas: “ours is the first revolution which history records, wherein the tendency has been 
to conservatism and stability.” “Adjournment of the Provisional Congress,” Richmond 
Daily Dispatch, February 16, 1862. Jefferson Davis, in his inaugural address as the First 
President of the Confederacy, likewise asserted conservative constitutional tenets, 
proclaiming that the framers of the permanent Confederate government were committed 
“to perpetuate the principles of our Revolutionary fathers.” Davis, Rise and Fall of the 
Confederate Government, 2:232-236.
247 Mark Neely has argued that a traditional understanding of the Confederacy 
and Confederate leaders as protective of individual and constitutional rights is incorrect 
and that Confederate constitutional history has “remained frozen in the assumptions of 
the Lost Cause past.” Neely, Southern Rights: Political Prisoners and the Myth of 
Confederate Constitutionalism, 1-10, 168-173.
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century ideas and principles such as limited government, and consistent with the 
Constitution of 1787,248 should Confederate revisions designed to establish energetic 
and efficient government be considered as innovative, enlightened, modern, or 
establishing something new in American constitutionalism?  Could the national charter 
be premised upon the preservation of principles from the past and limiting government 
authority and power while also providing for constitutional forms focused on 
transformation, change, and more efficacious national government?  Were these ideas 
irreconcilable in Southern political and constitutional thought?  This chapter will 
examine these questions and will conclude that the Confederate Constitution, while 
conservative in principles and origins, provided for constitutional innovations and new 
forms in order to make national government more energized, efficacious, and 
responsive to a national constituency.  Moreover, these aspects of the Confederate 
constitutional order were complementary.
The Confederate Constitution was the cornerstone of Confederate nation-
building and it possessed a character that was both conservative and innovative in its 
spirit, provisions, and purposes.249  As noted in Chapters One and Two, without a 
national court it was left to the state supreme courts to enunciate not only its specific 
provisions but also this hybrid character.  State wartime litigation did not always raise 
direct questions about the conservative or innovative nature of the document, but it did 
248 DeRosa argued that Confederate constitutionalism looked to the past and was 
strongly influenced by eighteenth century political ideas, republicanism, and the 
Antifederalist tradition. DeRosa, The Confederate Constitution of 1861.
249 The Confederacy is termed “innovative” here because of the nature of its 
reform measures, the implementation of new constitutional forms and relationships, and 
the establishment of a new nation with a new or modified political philosophy.
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require addressing specific constitutional issues and the doctrinal development of key 
constitutional concepts that were shaped (quite appropriately) by this character of the 
document.  It was this dual character of the Confederate Constitution, both conservative 
and progressive, that made it such a distinctive document for the Confederacy and, as 
the source and embodiment of a constitutional reform effort, shaped the nature and 
substance of the constitutional decisions issued by state supreme courts interpreting its 
provisions.250
As with the conservative principles enunciated by the state supreme courts 
(limited national government and the preservation of national common good and virtue 
in politics), wartime cases reveal the significant and substantive reform-minded 
concepts of Confederate constitutionalism.  In their wartime decisions, state supreme 
court justices explained its principles and innovative forms and purposeful objectives 
which were to usher in new era of specificity and efficiency in American constitutional 
government, chiefly by: 1) creating a more effective and managerial chief executive; 2) 
forming a more purposeful and effective national government focused on its 
constitutional duties; and 3) establishing a permanent fundamental law framework for a 
national political community that diminished the importance of the states’ rights 
250 Fehrenbacher stated that “the Confederate reconstruction of the American 
presidency was nostalgic as well as progressive” and that “constitution-makers at 
Montgomery seem to have regarded themselves as both conservators ands innovators—
that is, as defenders of traditional rights who had been forced to become revolutionaries 
and builders of a new political order.”  The unique mixture of  “reverent imitation and bold 
invention in the Confederate Constitution suggests an ambivalent desire to be 
quintessentially American and at the same time distinctively, independently southern.”
Fehrenbacher, Constitutions and Constitutionalism, 66.
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constitutionalism that had facilitated secession.251 In the Confederate experience, it was 
uncertain following secession whether the new Confederate constitutional order would 
be built upon a states’ rights political philosophy.  State court decisions affirmed the 
commitment to view the constitution as fundamental law and, surprisingly, Confederate 
fundamental law possessed a distinct national character.
Innovative Constitutionalism
The historiography on Confederate constitutionalism has been limited, largely 
discounting or ignoring the state supreme court decisions that provide the definitive 
judicial interpretation of the Confederate Constitution.  Consequently, historians have 
found it difficult to understand the Confederate constitutional order as shaped by 
anything other than the states’ rights ideology.252  Several historians of Confederate law 
and politics have acknowledged the significant effort by the Confederate framers to re-
structure and reform American constitutional government.253 William Robinson, author 
of Justice in Grey, the comprehensive work on the Confederate legal system, declared 
251 In the American tradition, a constitution possesses an extra-statutory quality 
and is regarded as fundamental law, with the fundamental law comprised of 
“immemorial custom and the principles of reason, justice, and equity that constituted 
natural law.” Belz, A Living Constitution or Fundamental Law?, 2.
252 McDonald, States’ Rights and The Union, 4-5; Ford, “Inventing the 
Concurrent Majority: Madison, Calhoun, and the Problem of Majoritarianism in 
American Political Thought,” 20, 21, 35, 49, 52; Bestor, “State Sovereignty and 
Slavery: A Reinterpretation of Proslavery Constitutional Doctrine, 1846-1860”; 
Finkelman, “States’ Rights North and South in Antebellum America,” 126; Thomas, 
The Confederate Nation, 64-66.
253 Nieman, “Republicanism, the Confederate Constitution, and the American 
Constitutional Tradition,” 201-224; Fehrenbacher, Constitutions and Constitutionalism in 
the Slave-Holding South, 58-62; Robinson, Jr., “A New Deal in Constitutions,” 454.
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that “the Constitution of the Confederate States marked a high point in American 
constitution-making” due to the attempt by its drafters to improve upon the American 
governmental machine and to “set at rest moot questions,” which had plagued the 
United States in prior decades and to correct the “defects” in the Constitution of 
1787.254  Charles Lee, author of a major work on the creation and development of the 
Confederate Constitutions, studied the political developments during the Constitutional 
Convention and concluded that “the reforms in the Confederate Constitutions represent 
a significant constitutional legacy,” that “they mark a milestone in the constitutional 
development of the United States,” and became an influence upon subsequent reforms 
in U.S. constitutional government.255  However, historians, have never agreed on the 
character of the Confederate Constitution or whether it represented a new direction in 
American constitutionalism or constitutional government.  There has never been 
consensus on whether the spirit and provisions of the document represented something 
substantively different from the U.S. Constitution of 1787.
This idea that the Confederate Constitution was simply a direct copy of the 
Constitution of 1787 or was an incomplete and inconclusive instrument of reform has 
resulted from its close resemblance to the U.S. Constitution and the failure of historians’ to 
understand constitutional legal decisions and constitutional doctrinal development by the 
254 The Confederate Constitution was designed to overcome the shortcomings of 
the old political system, to improve government, and remove the sources of dissension. 
Robinson, Justice in Grey, 623 and Robinson, “A New Deal in Constitutions,” 454.
255 Lee, The Confederate Constitutions, 150.
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courts as explicative of more pervasive political and constitutional principles.256  Richard 
E. Beringer, Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, and William N. Still, Jr., drawing upon the 
earlier argument of Rollin Osterweis, acknowledged that the Confederate Constitution 
“had the potential for creating a stronger government than that of the Union in 1861” but 
they disregarded the conceptual and textual differences in the document, concluding that 
the Confederate Constitution was little more than “a word-for-word copy of the Federal 
Constitution” and that this charter therefore lacked nationalism.257  Beringer and his 
colleagues preferred to look to political developments and popular interpretation for their 
insight and bothered little with judicial interpretations.  Lee concluded that the 
Confederate Constitutions were “significant” because “they make a valuable 
contribution through the legacy of governmental reform” but, looking to political 
statements and behavior rather than court decisions and constitutional doctrinal 
development, he maintained that these reforms were based upon a states’ rights 
ideology.258 Sidney Brummer acknowledged that there was a “development” of 
Confederate constitutional law during the war but failed to identify or explain which 
256 Alan Barker, The Civil War in America (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 
1961); David Donald & J.G. Randall, The Civil War and Reconstruction (Boston, MA: 
Little and Brown, 1969); Henry S. Commager, William E. Leuchtenberg, & Samuel E. 
Morison, The Growth of the American Republic (New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 1980); Peter J. Parish, The American Civil War (New York, NY: Holmes & 
Meier Publishers, 1975).
257 Richard E. Beringer, Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, and William N. Still, Jr., 
Why The South Lost The Civil War (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1986), 65, 
76.
258 Lee, The Confederate Constitutions, 150. Lee believed that this reform 
served the states’ rights ideology and that the Confederate Constitution represented “the 
ultimate constitutional expression of the state rights philosophy and the state 
sovereignty concept in nineteenth century America.”
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doctrines had been developed.  There was little basis upon which to initiate change 
because the Confederacy’s Permanent Constitution “was so closely modeled after that of 
the United States” and little incentive to promote change because so many questions of 
constitutional law had already been settled during the antebellum, both of which led 
Brummer to conclude that during the war, “there naturally were not many constitutional 
points raised in the southern courts in such troublous times.”259
However, there were distinctive philosophical and operational differences 
between the Confederate Constitution and the U.S. Constitution of 1787.  George 
Anastaplo stated that Confederate Constitution reflects “a radically different [italics 
added] approach to the governance of a country from that found in the 1787 
Constitution.”260  The Confederate Constitution was more than “mere imitation” of the 
U.S. document and individual articles in the Confederate charter were “more than 
mirror images of their federal counterparts.”261  While it was true that many articles 
from the U.S. Constitution were retained in the Confederate Constitution, this was done, 
in part, out of framers’ reverence for the original document, and also because of their 
political objective to provide for “a smoother transition for the Southern people from 
the Union to the Confederacy”262  The Confederate Constitution was “a living and 
259 Brummer, “The Judicial Interpretation of the Confederate Constitution,” 131.
260 Anastaplo, The Amendments to the Constitution: A Commentary.
261 White, “The Constitution of the Confederate States of America: Innovation 
or Duplication?,” 6, 21.
262 Ibid., 6. White argued that the similarities were due to the need to create a 
nation quickly before the seceded states were brought back into the Union, to appease 
Southern Unionists who opposed secession and who rejected any constitutional rights to 
destroy the Constitution and to “emphasize the tranquility of the Southern movement” 
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workable document that had the capacity to establish a form of government, which, 
because of its innovative forms, would have halted political wastefulness, stimulated an 
economical government, and restrained each governmental branch to its designated 
field of authority.”  “Far from being a hasty, improvident duplication of the United 
States Constitution, the Constitution of the Confederate States of America was a 
thoughtful and farsighted innovation.”263
The innovative provisions of the new national charter “reflected Southern 
discomfort with the workings of the United States Government during the years 
preceding the outbreak of the Civil War.”264  As a result, Confederate framers initiated a 
constitutional reorganization in which reform “dictated innovation” so that “’[t]he new 
document departed from the United States Constitution…where necessary to guard 
against what were considered the dangers and evils ‘which led to the dissolution of the 
late Union.’”265  To facilitate this constitutional reform, the Confederate charter 
included a number of innovations that were designed to rectify what southerners 
perceived of as the corruption of the old constitutional system of governing the United 
and establish its legitimacy. Ibid., 8-9. Alexander Stephens recounted “’The Southern 
people were actuated by no disloyalty to the [United States] Constitution, to the 
principles it contained, or to the form of government thereby established.” Stephens, 
Recollections of Alexander H. Stephens (New York, NY: Doubleday, Page & Company, 
1910), 171, op cit. Ibid., 9; Journal of the Confederate Congress, 1:19; White, “The 
Constitution of the Confederate States of America: Innovation or Duplication?,” 9.
263 Ibid., 6.
264 Ibid., 21.
265 Horace Montgomery, Howell Cobb’s Confederate Career (Tuscaloosa, AL: 
Confederate Publishing Co., 1959), 26; White, “The Constitution of the Confederate 
States of America: Innovation or Duplication?,” 10.
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States.266 This corruption included partisan politics, executive privilege and patronage, 
the dominance of a spoils system that had resulted in an inefficient and ever-growing 
national government in Washington, D.C., and the cessation of a national government 
serving distinctly national interests.267  In place of what they perceived as an extremely 
partisan and easily corrupted Chief Executive, the Confederate framers sought to create 
a more effective and managerial national government.
More Effective and Managerial National Government
Constitutional government in the Confederacy, though firmly rooted in 
conservative principles of limited government, was not designed to be weak or 
ineffective; Confederate constitutionalism possessed a innovative reform quality (in 
addition to its conservative quality) with the objective of transforming the Confederate 
government into an effective, efficient, energetic, and purposeful entity aimed at 
fulfilling national goals and objectives.268  Notwithstanding restrictions or the patronage 
266 Curry conceded that the 1861 Constitution was copied with “almost literal 
fidelity.” His contention was that specific alterations were made to remedy the “evils”
which had provoked secession; these changes were supposed to expurgate the “vicious 
interpretations of selfish majorities,” and to accomplish the “true ends of the 
Confederacy.” Robert McElroy, Jefferson Davis: The Unreal and the Real, vol. 2 (New 
York, NY: London, Harper & Brothers, 1937), 263, op cit. Amlund, Federalism in the 
Southern Confederacy, 17.
267 It was the failure to preserve the national constitutional system under the U.S. 
Constitution, especially slavery and comity, that had prompted Southern withdrawal: 
“why attempt longer to hold together hostile States under the stipulations of a violated 
Constitution?…The Northern States and their citizens have proved recreant to their 
obligations under the Federal Constitution.” Official Records of the War of the 
Rebellion, series IV, volume I, 9-10.
268 The Confederate framers “created a document that included provisions for a 
more streamlined government.” White, “The Constitution of the Confederate States of 
America: Innovation or Duplication?,” 21.
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powers and partisanship of the president, the Confederate framers did not aim to 
emasculate the office of the chief executive.  Reforms implemented by Confederate 
framers were designed to strengthen and make more efficient the national government.  In 
furtherance of this goal, the Confederate framers created a more powerful chief 
executive under Article II, implemented significant changes in the appropriations 
process, and provided for cabinet participation in congressional debate.
Confederate framers believed that the most pernicious threat to the American 
constitutional order was the extreme partisanship of the two-party system.  Partisanship, 
a concern of the framers in 1787, had, during the antebellum period, overturned the 
distinctly national character of governance in Washington that they believed consisted 
of a national perspective in politics, a concern for the welfare of a national population, 
and the safeguarding of the national government.269  In the election of 1860, southerners 
considered the election of Lincoln, a sectional candidate, as a sign that they could no 
longer rely upon a national elected official to uphold a national perspective and pursue a 
nation-oriented platform and to disregard sectional interests.270 Robert Hardy Smith
269 They saw it not as an extension of, but as “a threat to, a constitutional 
republic,” see Keller, “Power and Rights: Two Centuries of American 
Constitutionalism,” 679. Richard Hofstadter, Idea of a Party System: The Rise of 
Legitimate Opposition in the United States, 1780-1840 (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1969), 40-73, and Kelly, Harbison, and Belz, The American 
Constitution: Its Origins and Development, 7th ed., vol. 1, 212-271.
270 In Georgia, Lincoln’s election and a belief that Northern states would 
continue to violate their obligations under the Constitution, led 60% of the population to 
support secession while only 7.5% opposed it. Allen Chandler, ed. The Confederate 
Records of the State of Georgia (New York, NY: AMS Press, Inc., 1972), 162. Official 
Records of the War of the Rebellion, series IV, volume I, 6-8. Nieman argued that “By 
1860 southerners were perhaps more receptive to antiparty ideas than other Americans.  
The meteoric rise of the Republicans impressed upon southerners the evils of party: in 
their eyes the Republican party was bent upon using government to promote the interests 
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described to his constituents in 1861 how the U.S. President “’had come to be the 
appointee of a mere self-constituted and irresponsible convention” and how “as a 
consequence, each four years heralded the advent of a politician thrown upon the surface 
by accidental causes and reflecting the latest heretical dogma of a section, rather than 
addressing himself to the good of the whole country.”271
In their new national charter, Confederate framers sought to raise the Chief 
Executive above the corrupting influence of partisan politics by creating a single six-
year term of office.272  A President ineligible for re-election would be more interested in 
concentrating on the tasks of leading the nation rather than political self-interest.273  The 
single six-year term was widely approved, even in the North, where Harper’s Weekly
commented, “These innovations [six year term and ineligibility for reelection] will 
commend themselves to the approval of all who have watched the mischiefs [sic] 
produced by the too speedy recurrence of elections, and by the maneuvers of acting 
presidents for reelection…They would gladly be adopted by the people throughout the 
of the North by riding roughshod over the rights of the South.  As such, it was a chilling 
reminder of the dangers posed by political parties.” Nieman, “Republicanism, the 
Confederate Constitution, and the American Constitutional Tradition,” 207.
271 Smith, An Address to the Citizens of Alabama on the Constitution and Laws of 
the Confederate States of America, 13.
272 Article II, Section 1 of the Confederate Constitution provided that “The 
executive power shall be vested in a President of the Confederate States of America. He 
and the Vice President shall hold their offices for the term of six years; but the President 
shall not be reeligible.”
273 Nieman, “Republicanism, the Confederate Constitution, and the American 
Constitutional Tradition,” 215.
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Union.”274  J.L.M. Curry favored the single six-year term because of its potential for re-
focusing national political leadership upon national affairs and interests rather than 
sectional interests.  He stated that “A President ineligible is freed from the temptation of 
using his official influence to secure reelection.  He is the executive of the whole people 
and not merely the head of a party.”275  Consequently, there was little debate over on 
Robert Barnwell Rhett’s idea that the presidential term be limited to a single six-year 
term, the framers believing “that they were lifting the president above party politics and 
freeing him to pursue the national interest.”276
Once freed from the evils of party politics, the national chief executive was to 
become an efficient and powerful national manager in order to lead a lean national 
bureaucracy, to restrict the excesses of legislative politics, and to balance out the 
particular energies and efforts of the state governments.277  Confederate framers 
provided the president with the line item veto, a significant innovation with the specific 
purpose of arresting “legislative abuses” and facilitating a more efficient legislative fiscal 
274 From “The Two Constitutions” in Harper’s Weekly, March 30, 1861, 194; 
Nieman, “Republicanism, the Confederate Constitution, and the American 
Constitutional Tradition,” 209.
275 Curry, “The Confederate States and Their Constitution” in Galaxy 17 (1874): 
402; Smith, An Address to the Citizens of Alabama on the Constitution and Laws of the 
Confederate States of America by the Hon. Robert H. Smith, 13-14; Nieman, 
“Republicanism, the Confederate Constitution, and the American Constitutional 
Tradition,” 207.
276 Smith, An Address to the Citizens of Alabama on the Constitution and Laws of 
the Confederate States of America by the Hon. Robert H. Smith, 13-14 and Nieman, 
“Republicanism, the Confederate Constitution, and the American Constitutional 
Tradition,” 207.
277 Fitts, “The Confederate Convention: The Constitutional Debate,” 194.
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process to be conducted in consultation with the president.278  It proved to be far superior 
to the simple veto provided in the Constitution of 1787 as it “would expand the rationality 
of the process beyond the simple veto because, at the discretion of the president, portions 
of legislation could be selectively returned to the Congress for further deliberations and 
subject to two-thirds approval.”  Regardless of whether the president would actually utilize 
the line-item veto, the mere opportunity to do so “would modify the legislative behavior 
regarding pork-barrel bills, as the legislators would be obliged to consult with the 
executive branch in advance, thereby facilitating dialogue between the two branches.”279
The primary objective here was to empower the presidency to the extent required 
for him to fulfill his constitutional duties and responsibilities to the nation, particularly 
with respect to national appropriations under Article I, Section 7.280 According to Robert 
278 Article I, Section 7, clause 2 provides, “The President may approve any 
appropriation and disapprove any other appropriation in the same bill. In such case he 
shall, in signing the bill, designate the appropriations disapproved; and shall return a 
copy of such appropriations, with his objections, to the House in which the bill shall 
have originated; and the same proceedings shall then be had as in case of other bills 
disapproved by the President.” Federalist No. 73 in Jacob E. Cooke, ed., The Federalist
(Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), 495. The most serious abuses of 
the general welfare clause had to do with fiscal policies, so Confederate framers created 
strict prohibitions, especially on protectionist tariffs and internal improvements, in order 
to facilitate “a national political economy of minimal interference with market forces.” 
DeRosa, The Confederate Constitution of 1861, 91-92.
279 Ibid., 84.
280 Article I, Section 7, clause 2 provides that “Every bill which shall have 
passed both Houses, shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President of the 
Confederate States; if he approve, he shall sign it; but if not, he shall return it, with his 
objections, to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the 
objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it…The President may 
approve any appropriation and disapprove any other appropriation in the same bill. In 
such case he shall, in signing the bill, designate the appropriations disapproved; and 
shall return a copy of such appropriations, with his objections, to the House in which 
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Hardy Smith, it was the Chief Executive who was to occupy the primary role in national 
governance as the people’s representative, the efficient manager, and the leader towards 
the accomplishment of national constitutive purposes and goals.  The President, as a 
representative of the entire nation, could initiate appropriations bills and these could be 
passed in Congress with only a simple majority under the rationale that the President 
(unlike congressmen) responded to a national constituency and therefore was best able to 
initiate appropriations in the national interest.  Smith believed these restrictions 
necessary, based “upon the idea that the chief Executive as the head of the country and 
his cabinet should understand the pecuniary needs of the Confederacy, and should be 
answerable for an economical administration of public affairs, and at the same time 
should be enabled and required to call for whatever sums may be necessary to 
accomplish the purposes of Government.”281 Meanwhile, congressionally-initiated bills, 
which could be tainted by political squabbles and favoritism, required a two-thirds vote for 
passage.  The Constitution’s Article I, Section 9 restrictions on appropriation bills were 
drafted in opposition to the localized pork barrel legislation that had characterized 
congressional appropriations during the antebellum period.282  The executive budget 
and line item veto were examples of an emphasis on efficient and managerial leadership 
the bill shall have originated; and the same proceedings shall then be had as in case of 
other bills disapproved by the President.”
281 Smith, An Address to the Citizens of Alabama on the Constitution and Laws of 
the Confederate States of America by the Hon. Robert H. Smith, 7-8.
282 Article I, Section 9, clause 9 stated “Congress shall appropriate no money 
from the Treasury except by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses…unless it be asked 
and estimated for by some one of the heads of departments and submitted to Congress 
by the President; or for the purpose of paying its own expenses and contingencies; or 
for the payment of claims against the Confederate States.” Nieman, “Republicanism, the 
Confederate Constitution, and the American Constitutional Tradition,” 204.
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and responsibility in fiscal matters.  These were additional mechanisms for the 
eradication of corruption, special interests, patronage, and irresponsible national 
spending that southerners believed rampant, especially during the Buchanan 
administration.283
This concept of managerial efficiency also included the specific objective of 
making the president more independent by empowering him with unequivocal 
constitutional removal powers.  In Article II, Section 2, clause 3 of the Confederate 
Constitution, diplomats and heads of Executive Branch departments could be removed 
from office “at the pleasure of the President” while “all other civil officers of the 
Executive Departments may be removed at any time by the President, or other 
appointing power, when their services are unnecessary, or for dishonesty, incapacity, 
inefficiency, misconduct, or neglect of duty.”284  This innovation, more representative 
of the “presidential system” of government, gave the Confederate president increased 
independence from interference by the Confederate Congress or other non-
governmental interests and provided the Chief Executive with greater freedom to direct 
the affairs of the nation without having to contend with political intrigue, partisanship, 
283 White, “The Constitution of the Confederate States of America: Innovation 
or Duplication?,” 13.
284 Article II, Section 2, clause 3 provides that “The principal officer in each of 
the Executive Departments, and all persons connected with the diplomatic service, may 
be removed from office at the pleasure of the President. All other civil officers of the 
Executive Departments may be removed at any time by the President, or other 
appointing power, when their services are unnecessary, or for dishonesty, incapacity,
inefficiency, misconduct, or neglect of duty; and when so removed, the removal shall be 
reported to the Senate, together with the reasons therefor [sic].”
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or the influence of special interests.285
This innovative strengthening of the executive at the expense of the legislature 
was designed “to keep the body politic in a healthy condition.”  It reflected the more 
general concern for a common good and public honesty that characterized the reform of 
state constitutions against corruption and patronage.286  Yet, the framers also understood 
the importance of the executive and legislative branches working together effectively and 
they sought to institutionalize greater communication and cooperation between the two 
branches.  Unlike the U.S. Constitution, Confederate framers created a constitutional 
provision that provided for representation of Cabinet portfolios on the floor of Congress 
and here the framers borrowed only that much from the “Cabinet System” as was 
necessary for efficient and effective national government.287  The experiences of the 
past had suggested to the Confederate framers that “our Fathers, by refusing the 
285 DeRosa, The Confederate Constitution of 1861, 81-82.  According to Walter
Bagehot, the “presidential system” of government occurs when “the President is elected 
from the people by one process, and the House of Representatives by another.  The 
independence of the legislative and executive powers is the specific quality of 
Presidential Government.”  The “Cabinet System” differs from the “Presidential 
System” because of the “fusion and combination” of the legislative and executive 
branches. Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution and Other Political Essays (New 
York, NY: D. Appleton & Company, 1877), 47, 82, 84.
286 Milledgeville Southern Recorder, February 19, 1861.  The Confederate 
Constitution’s restriction on legislative initiative for appropriations was reflective of the 
same spirit and intent as the state constitutions created after the late 1830s when 
legislative powers over finances was strictly curtailed following the speculation and state-
funded debt that spelled disaster in 1837 and the emergence of executive powers over the 
purse. Nieman, “Republicanism, the Confederate Constitution, and the American 
Constitutional Tradition,” 211-213; Fehrenbacher, Constitutions and Constitutionalism in 
the Slave-Holding South,  64-65.
287 Article I, Section 6, clause 2 provides “Congress may, by law, grant to the 
principal officer in each of the Executive Departments a seat upon the floor of either 
House, with the privilege of discussing any measures appertaining to his department.”
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executive the right to be heard through his constitutional advisers on the floor of the 
Legislature, had interposed barriers to that free intercourse between the two departments 
which was essential to the wise and healthy action of each.”288  J.L.M. Curry 
remembered that “the restricted privilege worked well while it lasted, and the 
occasionally appearance of cabinet officers on the floor of Congress and participation in 
debates worked beneficially and showed the importance of enlarging the privilege.”289
Robert Hardy Smith would look upon these innovations with a great deal of 
satisfaction, stating that “we have, I trust, greatly purified our Government, and, at the 
same time, placed its different parts in nearer and more harmonious relations.”  He 
enumerated the innovations, “refusing to a mere majority of Congress unlimited control 
over the treasury,” requiring a roll call vote for all appropriation bills initiated in the 
Congress, by prohibiting the Congress from deciding on claims against the 
government,290 providing for Executive representation in debate on the floor of the 
Congress,291 “placing upon the administration the duty and responsibility of calling for 
appropriations,”292 and “giving the President the power to veto objectionable items in 
288 Smith, An Address to the Citizens of Alabama on the Constitution and Laws of 
the Confederate States of America by the Hon. Robert H. Smith, 9.
289 No enabling legislation was passed for these provisions in the Permanent 
Confederate Constitution, though J.L.M. Curry’s favorable recollections of it suggest 
that it was a positive development under the Provisional Confederate Constitution. 
Curry, Civil History of the Confederate Government, 83; White, “The Constitution of 
the Confederate States of America: Innovation or Duplication?,” 15.
290 Article I, Section 9, clause 9 of the Confederate Constitution.
291 Article I, Section 6, clause 2 of the Confederate Constitution.
292 Article I, Section 9, clause 9 of the Confederate Constitution.
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appropriation bills.”293  These significant reforms were premised upon an understanding 
that the provisions were to be adhered to if the reform was to be successful.  It would 
fall to the state supreme courts to ensure that constitutional provisions were preserved 
and applied consistently in wartime decisions.
Purposeful Government and Constitutional Duties
In his Inaugural Address as Provisional President, Jefferson Davis urged 
adherence to constitutional provisions, articulated by the courts, as the guide for all 
public office holders to follow (including himself), in order to preserve limited 
government for the benefit of the people of the Confederacy.294  However, according to 
state supreme courts that interpreted the provisions and principles of the Confederate 
Constitution, the intent of the Confederate framers was to make national government 
limited but not powerless, in order to facilitate the principles, goals, and purposes for 
which their nation and constitutive documents had been created.  The framers 
institutionalized their intent by eliminating the Article I, section 8 General Welfare clause 
and, thereby restricting the national government from expanding its own authority, in 
derogation of the manifested will of the people.  The elimination of the General Welfare 
clause was a major innovation in Confederate constitutional government, one designed 
293 Article I, Section 7, clause 2 of the Confederate Constitution.  Smith, An 
Address to the Citizens of Alabama on the Constitution and Laws of the Confederate 
States of America by the Hon. Robert H. Smith, 11.
294 Davis said, “Thus instructed as to the just interpretation of the instrument, 
and ever remembering that all offices are but trusts held for the people, and that 
delegated powers are to be strictly construed.” Official Records of the War of the 
Rebellion, series IV, volume I, 106.
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to promote greater “economy” as compared to the “extravagance and corruption of the 
old Government.”295
Davis made clear, however, that while the national government was to be limited 
in the scope of its authority to specific constitutional duties and responsibilities, it was 
also vested with broad powers to fulfill those duties and responsibilities.  Authority
refers to the sphere and scope of responsibility for governmental duties and 
responsibilities while power refers to the range of action that a governmental entity may 
take in order to realize the duties and responsibilities with which it has been charged.  
When Confederate framers eliminated the General Welfare clause, they limited the 
authority of the national government to specific duties and responsibilities.  Yet, they 
retained the Necessary and Proper clause in Article I, Section 8, so that national 
government, now limited to specific concerns, duties, and responsibilities, might be 
more fully effective with these specific charges, provided with a full range of powers 
deemed as “necessary and proper” for the government to fulfill its duties and 
responsibilities under the Constitution.296
295 Substance of An Address of T.R.R. Cobb, To His Constituents of Clark 
County, April 6th, 1861, 4. Curry recounted how the Confederate Congress was reluctant 
to issue Treasury bills as legal tender in the Confederacy because of their adherence to 
constitutional principles and their refusal to expand constitutional authority of the 
national government. States restricted creditors by passing stay laws and relaxing the 
collection laws as “remedial legislation and to help debtors in their distress.” “The 
Struggle of the Confederacy: A Review,” 508. George Anastaplo argued that the 
elimination of the general welfare phrase provided for “a weaker national government.” 
Anastaplo, The Amendments to the Constitution: A Commentary, 133.
296 White argued that the General Welfare clause was omitted in deference to 
states’ rights, drawing from Curry that the clause was vague and had been interpreted 
during the antebellum period in pursuit of “’powers for personal and party and sectional 
advantage.’” Curry, Civil History of the Confederate Government, 83; Yearns, The 
Confederate Congress, 24; White, “The Constitution of the Confederate States of 
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During the war, desperate military situations and exigencies were likely to 
compel the justices to interpret the Constitution as providing for broad grants of 
authority to a highly centralized Confederate government as well as broad powers.  
Southern state supreme courts resolved this dilemma early in the war by enunciating a 
constitutional doctrine of limited national government restricted in its political authority
but provided with complete political powers to facilitate this authority.  The result was the 
creation of a philosophical framework that encouraged and supported a more fully capable 
and effective national government to fulfill its duties and responsibilities within express 
constitutional limits.  During the war, state court litigants who attempted to avoid 
Confederate military service asserted a states’ rights conceptualization of Confederate 
limited government by claiming in their pleadings that conscription was unconstitutional 
as a breach of these express limitations upon national government authority.
State supreme courts were faced with a very interesting constitutional problem of 
interpreting the Necessary and Proper clause so that the national government would be 
America: Innovation or Duplication?,” 11. James Jason Kilpatrick argued that within the 
U.S. Constitution, there was a pervasive “self-evident desire to restrain all government.”  
He added, “ours was to be a limited government…And what a mockery it is of their 
prudent labors to see men contend for the absurd notion that the power to lay taxes ‘to 
provide for the general welfare’ vests the Congress with the power to do whatever 
Congress pleases!” James Jason Kilpatrick, “The Case for States’ Rights,” in Robert A. 
Goldwin, ed., A Nation of States: Essays on the American Federal System, 3rd printing, 
(Chicago, IL: Rand McNally & Company, 1965), 95. Yet, limited government did not 
mean that the national government was to be ineffective, weak, or was not to receive the 
allegiance of the people: “The plan of our fathers; and it was a good plan, was simply to
assure the people the best of both worlds—a central government strong enough to act 
boldly and powerfully in the preservation of national security and in the promotion of truly 
national interests, yet not so strong that it would swallow up the administration of those 
local and domestic responsibilities which the people wanted kept close at hand.” 
Kilpatrick, “The Case for “States’ Rights,” 97.
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both limited and fully effective.297  In Georgia, in November 1862, Asa Jeffers claimed 
that the conscription acts of April 16 and September 27, 1862 were unconstitutional and 
therefore the enrolling officer, John Fair, had no authority to hold him.  Jeffers claimed 
that the power claimed by the Confederate government violated the Confederate 
Constitution because it was “incompatible with State sovereignty and subversive of the 
State Governments.”  In Jeffers v. Fair, 298 the Georgia Supreme Court was called upon 
to decide whether the conscription act of April 16, 1862 and the amendatory act of 
September 27, 1862 were constitutional under the war powers conferred upon the 
national government in Article I of the Confederate Constitution.  In order to adjudicate 
this claim, the court first had to consider “the extent and proper construction of the grant 
of ‘power to raise armies’ contained in the 12th clause” of Article I and “distinguish 
between it and the grant of ‘power to call forth, the militia,’ etc., contained in the 15th 
clause.”  The court held that the Confederate Constitution outlined the intent of the 
framers for the national government and its purposes, stating that the national 
government’s power over individuals and its ability to conscript them resulted from the 
act of forming and constituting the Confederate States of America.  The court, 
“impressed with the importance of the question, and the responsibility involved in its 
decision” gave the issue in this case “careful and anxious consideration” and rejected 
Jeffers’ argument.299
In construing the power to raise armies, Georgia’s Associate Justice Jenkins 
297 Article II, Section 8, clause 18 of the Confederate Constitution.
298 Jeffers v. Fair, 32 Ga. 347 (1862).
299 Ibid., 348.
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declared that the Necessary and Proper clause in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution 
was “very general in its terms—neither specifying nor prohibiting any means” and that this 
language “could not express a broader, more general grant of a specific power” intended 
by the Confederate framers: “we hold that the clause, ex vi termini, express a grant of 
power—of power commensurate with the object—of power over the populations of the 
several States, entering into and becoming component parts of the Confederate States of 
America.”  Jenkins reasoned that to assume that the Confederate government did not enjoy 
this broad grant of power would mean that the national government, which had been 
entrusted with the broad authority to raise armies for the nation’s defense, would be 
prohibited from exercising the power to raise these armies even though the states could 
utilize compulsory enlistment but were denied the authority to declare war and raise 
armies.  Jenkins held that “compulsory enrollment is a proper incident of the power to raise 
armies” for which the Confederate Congress had and the States did not have the power.300
Jenkins reasoned that even if Article I, Section 12 did not grant the power for compulsory 
enrollments, the Article I, Section 8, clause 18 eighteenth clause [the “Necessary and 
Proper clause”] of the Constitution did provide such power since “it confers ‘power to 
make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into effect the foregoing 
powers,’ etc.”301  Jenkins concluded that “the people of the Confederate States 
adopted…these powers, the same Constitution.  Our conclusion is, that the power of 




it was seen by them to be so.”302
In Jeffers, the Georgia high court established the constitutional principle of limited 
but fully effective national government.  It rejected states’ rights on the ground that it 
might render the national government powerless in its respective responsibilities.  
Associate Justice Jenkins refuted any state sovereignty claim, choosing to look to the 
Confederate Constitution and a determination of whether the government’s actions were 
the exercise of delegated powers or the usurpation of a reserved power.  Jenkins made very 
clear that while the Confederate government was limited, it was limited from usurping 
general or reserved powers.  In the exercise of its delegated responsibilities, which 
included raising and supporting an army under Article II, Section 8, it was to enjoy the full 
powers to fulfill these responsibilities and the provisions and principles of the Confederate 
Constitution precluded interference by the states: “If the true construction of the 
Constitution be, that in deference to State sovereignty the Confederate Government must 
depend upon the separate, unconcerted action of the several States for the exercise of 
powers granted to it in general comprehensive terms, it is but the shadow of a government, 
the experiment of Confederate Republics must inevitably fail, and the sooner it is 
abandoned the better.”303
Jenkins articulated that there was another political philosophy served by 
Confederate limited government beyond states’ rights and that government was to be 
limited under the constitutive principles of the Confederacy so as to facilitate general and 
national goals.  To underscore this statement, Jenkins stated that it was preferable to have 




political statement to include in a decision enunciating constitutional principles.304
In his opinion, Jenkins identified very clearly the distinction between authority
granted to government under the Constitution and the power that government could 
exercise in furtherance of this authority and to realize the national goals and purposes, a 
statement that mirrored the elimination of the General Welfare clause and the retention of 
the Necessary and Proper clause.  Jenkins stated that although the national government’s 
power to raise armies was “unlimited as to the use of means” is was not unlimited in its 
authority, “as to the subjects upon whom it may operate” and state government officials 
who were necessary to the operation of state governance would not be subjected to 
conscription.  Jenkins was unequivocal in asserting the court’s commitment to the 
enforcement of constitutional principles and limitations, stating that “civil power, even in 
despotic governments, is held in and restrained within limits by great first principles, or by 
limitations inherent in each peculiar system.”305
The Georgia high court’s pronouncement of limited but purposeful government 
was followed in Alabama in January, 1863 in the jointly-decided case of Ex Parte Hill, In 
Re Armistead v. Confederate States & Ex Parte Dudley.  Associate Justice Walker made 
clear that the power conferred under the Constitution included a full grant of power to 
fulfill the responsibilities of the respective government, within its scope of authority.306
In his reasoning, Walker underscored the importance of the Necessary and Proper 
clause as a complete grant of power to the Confederate government, but limited to only 
304 Ibid.
305 Ibid., 365-367.
306 38 Ala. 458 (1863).
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that authority afforded the national government in the Confederate Constitution.  “The 
constitutional power of executing the laws of congress, whether they touch the person 
or the property of the citizen, can not [sic] be subordinated to the authority of a State 
tribunal…[t]his is the inevitable deduction from the proposition that the general 
government is, within the sphere of its delegated powers, coordinate with the respective 
States.”307 By limiting the scope of general authority but expanding the power of the 
national government within the limited scope of its authority, the Confederate framers 
had hoped to correct the abuses of the national government without impairing its ability 
to meet its constitutional obligations and duties to the nation.  Southern justices 
enunciated this principle as a matter of constitutional doctrine.
The enunciation of limited authority with the full range of powers necessary and 
proper for their fulfillment was addressed by the Alabama court again in 1863.  
Associate Justice Stone, in a concurring opinion in another January 1863 case, Ex Parte 
Hill & Willis, Johnson and Reynolds v. Confederate States, held that the conscription 
statutes were constitutional under Article I, section 8, clauses 11, 12, 13, and 14 as 
“specific grants of power, in language free from ambiguity.”308  Here, drawing upon 
Federalist No. 33, Stone was very clear in identifying that Congress was empowered to 
the extent necessary but only for those “specific grants” provided for in the Confederate 
307 Ibid., 479-480.
308 38 Ala. 429, 445 (1863).  Willis, Johnson, and Reynolds were captured, held 
by L.H. Hill, an enrollment officer, and severally petitioned the Montgomery County 
probate judge for writs of habeas corpus, praying for discharge and exemption because 
of physical disability. The probate judge issued the writs and Hill filed an application 
for writs of prohibition against the probate court of Montgomery County, to enjoin that 
court from any further action in the cases of the three petitioners.
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Constitution since “there should be no incidents to incidental powers.309  Stone analyzed 
the Necessary and Proper clause to determine whether the jurisdiction and powers over 
conscription were rightly held by the Confederate government and he concluded that 
since “congress is clothed with power to raise armies by direct means, without calling to 
its aid State authority…with the well known limitation, that the means employed shall 
be both necessary and proper for carrying into execution the granted power.”
Stone interpreted the phrase “necessary and proper” to mean “that both 
qualifying words shall have operation and effect; necessary to the full employment of 
the right; and proper—homogeneous and harmonious with our compound system of 
government.”  Stone made clear that the Constitution also dictated the extent of what 
was to be considered “necessary” and what was to be considered as “proper” so that “no 
matter how necessary the proposed means may appear…if it antagonize any of the 
reserved rights of the States or the people, or militate against any of the principles 
which underlie our liberties, then it is not proper” while “on the other hand, if the means 
proposed be in harmony with every principle of our institutions, but not necessary to the 
full enjoyment of some power granted to the Confederate government, the employment 
of such means by that government would be a sheer usurpation.”310
That same year, in Ex Parte Randle, the Texas Supreme Court took up the issue 
of whether Randle, in his capacity as a principle exempted from Confederate service 
after hiring a substitute under the provisions of the Conscription Act of April 16, 1862, 




state militiaman.311  Moore, writing for the court, refused Randle’s application, holding 
that Randle and others who were discharged from their original obligation through 
substitution, could later be obliged to render service as a militia soldier in service to 
Texas, even under a requisition of the Confederate government, during the same period 
for which they were originally discharged.  The specific grant of authority to the 
Confederate Congress in the Constitution to raise and support armies was “separate and 
distinct” from congressional powers to call out the militia and this specific grant of 
authority included the full and necessary powers to make it effective: “Congress may 
raise armies by its own immediate and direct action upon the arms-bearing citizens of 
the State; under the second, by and through the action of the officers of the State, the 
militia are called for the temporary exigencies indicated in the Constitution, into the 
service of the Confederate States.”312  Moreover, in Ex Parte Randle, the Texas court 
established the primacy of fundamental over statutory law, preserving the constitutional 
order from the vagaries of political strife and the political vicissitudes of the 
Confederate Congress.  In interpreting the extent of the Conscription Act of April 6, 
1862, Moore stated that “This act was not intended and could not have the effect of a 
311 Randle was a Texas citizen and on July 7, 1861, enlisted for one year in the 
3rd Georgia Regiment. Randle’s term of enlistment was extended under the first 
Conscription Act on April 6, 1862. On August 6, 1862, Randle furnished a substitute, 
38 years of age, and was discharged from service. When he returned to Texas, Randle 
was enrolled in the state militia.  After the Confederate commanding general for the 
Military District made a requisition upon the Governor of Texas in December of 1862 
for 5,000 militia to protect the coast and to repel the Union invasion of the state, Randle 
was drafted into the state militia. He filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in 
February, 1863 under the claim that he was exempt by virtue of his providing a 
substitute to the Confederate Army.
312 Robards, Synopses of the Decisions of the Supreme Court of the State of 
Texas, 10.
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negation or limitation of the right of the Confederate Government to call forth the 
militia, under the other constitutional grant of power conferring this authority.”313
In Thomas Barber v. William A. Irwin Associate Justice Jenkins denied any 
express limitations upon the Congress’s general power to raise armies and conscript 
men because “The Constitution makes it the duty of the Confederate States to ‘protect 
each of the States against invasion.’”  Jenkins held that the framers of the Confederate 
Constitution intended the Confederate Army to be the “chief instrumentality” for 
exercising the strength of the southern nation, particularly in offensive actions or on 
foreign soil.314  Jenkins refuted a states rights oriented interpretation of the Confederate 
charter, holding that as a matter of constitutional law, the Confederate Government was 
given broad, general powers with respect to the raising of the army, within its 
responsibilities for the nation’s safety.  Therefore, there were no restrictions that the 
state militia could only be called out after exhausting all resources in raising the 
national army.  The court interpreted the specific lack of limitations upon the general 
powers of the national government to protect the nation as evidence of the intent of the 
framers to give the national government fully sufficient powers within its delegated 
authority.315  Jenkins rule for strict construction of the general powers afforded to the 
national government followed the court’s reasoning that since the Confederate 
Constitution was “of very recent origin, and its framers not without the benefit of 
313 Ibid., 11.
314 Thomas Barber v. William A. Irwin [E. T. Jones v. Nathaniel F. Mercer; E. T. 
Jones v. Issac B. Brinson; Issac Dennis, et al. V. Willis B. Scott; E. T. Jones v. William 
Warren, 34 Ga. 27 (1864).
315 Ibid., 35-36.
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experience…in theory, at least, they [the Confederate framers] have solved the problem; 
and if practical efficiency be not yet fully attained, it must be sought in amendment of 
the fundamental law.”316
In enunciating effective national government as an express goal of Confederate 
constitutionalism, the Mississippi state high court revealed, during its October term of 
1864, that the Confederate Constitution was part of an American constitutional tradition 
and development in which the state rights ideology was not only diminished but 
rejected.317  In Simmons v. Miller, the court addressed whether Mississippi possessed the 
authority to call up her citizens to military service before they were taken for 
Confederate service, to the exclusion of the right of the Confederate States to their 
military service, when required by that government.318  The court explained that the 
constitutional tradition from which the Confederate charter had originated was not that of 
the Articles of Confederation but the Federalist Papers.
In his opinion, Chief Justice Handy drew from Federalist No. 22 and specifically 
rejected the Articles of Confederation, referring to the latter’s want of effective
leadership and the omission of necessary national authority to address the demands 
316 Ibid., 37-38.
317 David Simmons v. J.H. Miller, Enrolling Officer, 40 Miss. 19 (1864).
318 David Simmons was between forty-five and fifty years of age when the 
Confederate Congress passed the amended Conscription Act in February of 1864, 
expanding the age of conscripts to fifty.  In March he received notice to enroll and in 
April was appointed a county deputy sheriff.  Six days later he reported for enrollment
and was registered as a deputy sheriff.  His position as a deputy sheriff expired in 
August of 1864 and Simmons was arrested in January 1865 by the enrolling officer, 
Captain J. H. Miller. Simmons sued out a writ of habeas corpus, was tried, and after 
being remanded to the custody of the enrolling officer, sued out a writ of error. 40 Miss. 
19, 19-20 (1864).
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from the Revolution.  Handy stated that the states’ rights-oriented argument presented 
by Simmons violated the specific grants of authority and powers to the national 
government in the Constitution.  Such an understanding of the Confederate Constitution 
“would render those powers wholly inefficient in time of war, and throw the 
Confederate Government back to the inconveniences under the articles of 
confederation” and a constitutional arrangement under which the national government 
would become “entirely dependent on the several States for troops to carry on the war, 
restoring the system for the most part of resorting to quotas of troops from the several 
States, and leaving it in their power to supply or refuse troops for carrying on the war, at 
their discretion.”319
Handy dismissed the application of the state sovereignty doctrine to the issue of 
war powers, drawing from John Marshall’s opinion in Sturges v. Crowninshield,320 and 
the rule “whenever the terms in which a power is granted to Congress, or the nature of 
the power, require that it shall be exercised exclusively by Congress, the subject is as 
completely taken from the State legislatures as if they had been expressly forbidden to 
act on it.”    Handy concluded that “if each State has the right to withhold from 
Congress any portion of her citizens fit for military service and subject to it, she has 
equally the power to withhold all such persons whenever she may think fit to do so.”  
Handy rejected this idea since “government would be wholly powerless to raise a single 
man within its limits to carry on the war, if the several States thought fit to retain their 
citizens in their service.”  In its holding, the court rejected this development under the 
319 Ibid., 26.
320 17 U.S. 122 (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
129
Confederate Constitution, stating “this is ‘absolutely and totally contradictory and 
repugnant’ to the provisions of the constitution referred to, and would render the war-
powers granted in the constitution nugatory…It would, in effect, paralyze the war-
power of the Confederate Government at the discretion of the States.”321
In Theodore Parker v. Charles Kaughman & Lieutenant Clark v. Robert C. 
Brady,322 the Georgia high court, in an opinion authored by Associate Justice Jenkins, 
affirmed its position on the grant of necessary powers.  Referring to their earlier 
decision in Thomas Barber v. William A. Irwin,323 the court again focused on the 
constitutional language that provided general grants of power within the appropriate 
spheres of government.  The court held “as we understand it, the philosophy of our 
system is to make the grant large enough to meet such contingencies, and to provide 
against abuse in the structure of the Government,” making clear even late into the war 
that the balance between limiting and empowering government would still be resolved 
by the implementation of the Necessary and Proper clause.324
Permanent Fundamental Law for A National Community
State supreme courts, through their careful and virtually consistent interpretation 
of constitutional provisions, their regular application of the Confederate Supremacy 
Clause to national wartime issues, and their articulation of national constitutional goals 
321 Ibid.
322 34 Ga. 136 (1865).
323 34 Ga. 27 (1864).
324 Ibid., 141.
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and purposes, made fundamental law, which provides for a framework of government 
and controls legislative power, both permanent and national in the Confederacy.  The 
doctrinal development of the Supremacy Clause established unequivocally the 
permanency of constitutional principles by placing them above mere statutory 
revision.325  With the rejection of assertions of states rights used in pleadings before 
their courts, the state supreme court justices enunciated a nationalist constitutionalism 
that diminished significantly the states’ rights constitutionalism that had characterized 
antebellum southern politics and facilitated secession.326 Confederate framers moved 
away from states’ rights constitutionalism in order to realize their awesome 
responsibilities: to create a new nation, to provide it with a sense of permanency and 
stability, and to empower it to fulfill its constitutional purposes.327 Robert Smith, a 
Confederate framer, arriving in Montgomery on January 31, 1861, expressed his awe 
over having to create a constitutional framework for the new nation.  He revealed to his 
wife that he was unsure of himself because the task that lay before him was more than 
the creation of a confederation of states.  It was “to determine in full council the final 
325 The Confederate Supremacy Clause is found in Article Six, Section 2.  It 
provides that “This Constitution, and the laws of the Confederate States made in 
pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of 
the Confederate States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every 
State shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the 
contrary notwithstanding.”
326 Fehrenbacher argued “states-rights constitutionalism was not so much an 
abiding faith as a convenient strategy of dissent from the current rulers of national 
affairs.” Fehrenbacher, Constitutions and Constitutionalism in the Slave-Holding South, 
42.
327 “The document is especially valuable as a testament of Confederate national 
purpose because it was written after the commitment of the lower South to 
independence but before the exigencies of war had made constitutionalism itself a 
luxury that could scarcely be afforded.” Ibid, 61, 80.
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form…of a Southern Confederacy…& organize with all dispatch the machinery of 
government.”  This machinery of government was to be national in scope with national 
purposes and goals and Smith confessed to his wife, “I still feel incompetent to fill the 
expectations and wants of the country.”328
The Confederate Supremacy Clause became an effective tool for shaping and 
guiding state supreme court adjudication and it also became an important tool for 
expressing the primacy of the national goals and purposes above those of the states or of 
individuals, diminishing the importance of states’ rights in Confederate constitutional 
government.  In Mississippi, Associate Justice Handy made clear that the states were 
under obligation to obey and follow the duties and responsibilities expressed in the 
Confederate Constitution.329  Handy held that “by the provisions of the constitution, the 
power to declare war belongs exclusively to the Confederate States Government” and 
“it was never contemplated that the separate States should carry on the war within their 
limits after public war was declared, except to repel invasions; and that only so far as 
might be done without detriment to the general power of the Confederate Government.”  
328 Robert H. Smith, Letter to “My dear Helen,” January 31, 1861, from 
“Autograph Letters and Portraits of the Signers of the Constitution of the Confederate 
States,” collected by Charles Colcock Jones, Jr., in Charles Colcock Jones, Jr. 
Collection, Special Collections Library, Duke University. The reason for the awed 
respect for this task of establishing a national charter were due to the long American 
tradition of reverence for written constitutive documents: “written charters were a 
familiar part of American colonial and revolutionary history and the late eighteenth-
century Western political thought was infused with the view that an ideal system of 
government was a Newtonian clockwork: structured, mechanical, reducible to rules and 
precepts.” Keller, “Power and Rights: Two Centuries of American Constitutionalism,” 
676; Stanley Pargellis, “The Theory of Balanced Government,” 37-49, in Conyers 
Read, ed., The Constitution Reconsidered (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 
1938), 37-49; and Forest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum, (Lawrence, KS: University 
Press of Kansas, 1985), 58-87.
329 David Simmons v. J.H. Miller, Enrolling Officer, 40 Miss. 19 (1864).
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The states or states’ rights advocates could not use the war as an excuse to emasculate 
constitutional provision or principles or to diminish the supremacy of the national 
government.  Handy rejected the assertion of states’ rights, stating “when the whole 
country is involved in a general war, it is a grave and dangerous error to suppose that 
any State has the right to engage in the war, or to institute measures of war, 
independently of the power of Congress and in opposition to the measures adopted by 
that body for carrying on the war, if they are constitutional.”330
The Georgia court affirmed this conclusion in Thomas W. Cobb v. William B. 
Stallings & B. A. Baldwin v. John West.  The court held that in any conflict between 
Confederate and Georgia law, the Supremacy Clause of the Confederate Constitution 
established that Confederate law “shall be the supreme law of the land” and added “So 
says the Constitution, and we can not [sic] say otherwise.”331 The issue in this case was 
whether Confederate Tax Assessors and Collectors in Georgia, engaged in their regular 
duties, were liable to militia service, under the laws of the state of Georgia, and subject 
“to be called by the Governor into actual service for the purpose of repelling 
invasion.”332  In support of its holding the court cited John Marshall’s opinions in 
McCulloch v. Maryland,333 Houston v. Moore,334 and Osborne, et al. v. U.S. Bank.335
330 40 Miss. 19, 26-27.  Two expressions of states’ rights constitutionalism--state 
concurrent power and nullification—were refuted by southern jurists in Ex Parte 
Coupland, 26 Tex. 386 (1862) and In Re Bryan, 60 N.C. 1 (1863).
331 34 Ga. 72, 77 (1864).
332 Ibid., 74.
333 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
334 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820).
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State supreme courts enunciated as a matter of constitutional doctrine that the 
Confederate Constitution possessed a strong national orientation and form designed to 
facilitate national objectives and purposes.  In fact, they were to make the achievement 
of national purposes a measure of constitutional orthodoxy.
The emphasis upon creating a permanent nation was evident in the Preamble to 
the Confederate Constitution where Confederate framers professed an express national 
purpose to form “a permanent and federal government.”  This was a significant step for 
the preamble identified the Confederate constitutional arrangement as a federal 
government, not a confederacy, implying the importance of divided responsibilities, 
powers, and authorities.  Permanency had been an objective since the earliest days of the 
secession crisis and James L. Orr, Commissioner from South Carolina to the Georgia 
State Convention recounted how he had been “instructed to ‘invite the seceding States 
to meet in convention…for the purpose of forming and putting in motion such 
provisional government…and that the same convention shall then proceed forthwith to 
consider and propose a constitution and plan for a permanent [italics added] 
government for such States, which proposed plan shall be referred back to the several 
State conventions for their adoption or rejection.’”336 The new nation was to be 
permanent, strongly suggesting that the framers intended that secession—the most 
extreme expression of the states’ rights philosophy--was not a valid theory under the new 
335 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
336 James L. Orr, Commissioner from South Carolina to George W. Crawford, 
President of the Georgia State Convention, January 16, 1861, Official Records of the 
War of the Rebellion, series IV, volume I, 57.
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constitutive document.337
The permanency of the national government rested upon the ability to establish 
the Constitution as permanent and controlling fundamental law and state supreme courts 
were to possess the primary role in this task through their enunciation of the Confederate 
Supremacy Clause.  State supreme courts manifested their intent to uphold the supremacy 
of the national government but did so without blindly favoring the national government 
because of wartime exigencies.  In 1863, the Georgia Supreme Court wrestled with the 
issue of concurrent jurisdiction over national statutory interpretation under Article 
Three.  In James L. Mims and James D. Burdett v. John K. Wimberly,338 Associate Justice 
Jenkins held that under Article Three, Section 2, state courts could exercise concurrent 
jurisdiction over statutory interpretation.  While the first paragraph of Section 2 defined 
“the extent of the judicial power of the Confederate States,” including, among others, 
“‘all cases arising under the laws of the Confederate States,’” the Constitution did not 
restrict jurisdiction to the Confederate courts as exclusive jurisdiction.  In support of his 
decision, Jenkins drew from John Marshall’s decision in Cohens v. Virginia endorsing 
337 Alexander Hamilton Stephens, A Constitutional View of the Late War 
Between the States, 2 volumes (Philadelphia, PA: National Publishing Company, 1870), 
2:335; Augustus Longstreet Hull, “The Making of the Confederate Constitution,”
Publications of the Southern History Association, IX (1905), 89; White, “The 
Constitution of the Confederate States of America: Innovation or Duplication?,” 11;
Robert H. Smith stated the express purpose of forming the Southern nation was to 
create a “close bond of union” between the seceded states: “Each state had seceded with 
the expectation of speedily forming a close bond of union with her sympathizing sisters, 
and the great object of the Convention was to bind together the broken fragments of a 
separated, but homogeneous people.” Smith, An Address to the Citizens of Alabama on 
the Constitution and Laws of the Confederate States of America by the Hon. Robert H. 
Smith, 4.
338 33 Ga. 587 (1863).
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concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts unless such jurisdiction was rendered 
exclusive under Article Three.339  Yet, Jenkins also made very clear the supremacy of 
the national government’s authority and, drawing upon the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Smith v. McIver, held that if Confederate courts exercised jurisdiction over a 
writ of habeas corpus case, the state courts were bound to withdraw any proceedings to 
“avoid a conflict.”340  Jenkins’ most compelling source, though, was the Supremacy 
Clause found in Article Six, Section 3 of the Confederate Constitution where, according 
to Jenkins, the judges of the several states were to be bound by the Constitution, and the 
laws made in pursuance thereof, as the supreme law of the land.341
The supremacy of the national charter was again addressed by the Georgia high 
court one year later in Daly & Fitzgerald v. Harris and Harwell v. Cohen,342 where 
Jenkins refused to characterize exemption as a contract because of the civic responsibilities 
which he identified as part of the Confederate social compact and implicit in the 
Confederate Constitution.  Jenkins held “that each member owes to all other members [in 
original], the duty of defending the State, as far as he is capable, and that governments 
instituted simply to administer the public affairs of organized society, are powerless to 
release him from this obligation…it is not true of all governments invested with legislative 
power for the common weal.”  The duty was owed to other members of the Confederate 
339 Ibid., 595.
340 Ibid., 596. Jenkins also referred to several cases in Kent’s Commentaries that 
had been decided by Chief Justice Kent of New York establishing  this principle. 33 Ga. 
587, 597.
341 Ibid., 598.
342 34 Ga. 38 (1864).  This case consisted of several jointly decided cases: Dennis 
Daly v. C. J. Harris; Phillip Fitzgerald v. C. J. Harris; and John M. Harwell v. Jonas L. 
Cohen.
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political community and the national government was precluded from trying to “divest 
either itself or its successors of any power necessary to the well-being of the State” and 
any belief that the Confederate government could contract itself out of its responsibilities 
was “contrary to first principles and subversive of all government.”  He added that “We 
need not go to remote antiquity nor inquire into first principles, upon which the social 
compact is founded…The solution is the question is found in a document, accessible to all, 
recognized as fundamental as supreme law, ordained but three years since, whereto we all 
were consenting.”343
Jenkins and his brother justices made very clear their intent to do justice and 
resolve political conflict for the citizens of Georgia but within the framework 
established under the Confederate Constitution.  Associate Justice Jenkins rejected any 
construction of the Confederate Constitution that resulted in the exercise of a power not 
expressly granted “in antagonism to another power expressly granted for the purpose 
vital [italics in original] to the Confederate States”344  The courts’ reliance upon the text 
manifested their belief that the Confederate Constitution was permanent, binding upon 
them, and became “a framework for action.”345
In 1864, the Alabama court considered the extent and operation of Supremacy 
Clause in the matter of Polinice Pille’s attempt to be discharged from the custody of 
Colonel William Graham, who held him as a second-class militia-man under the call of 
343 33 Ga. 38, 51-52.
344 33 Ga. 38, 55. See also Harwell v. Cohen, 33 Ga. 38 (1864).
345 Belz, A Living Constitution or Fundamental Law?, 31.
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the governor.346  The court held that, under the Confederate Constitution, the national 
government possessed a constitutional primacy to Pille that precluded any state 
interference or power to usurp the authority of the national government.  Chief Justice 
Walker held that the applicable statute for this holding came from the Conscription Act 
of February 17, 1864 which had declared “’From and after the passage of this act, all 
white men, residents of the Confederate States, between the ages of seventeen and fifty, 
shall be in the military service of the Confederate States.’”  From the above 
construction, Walker concluded that “this places every man, liable to conscription, 
constructively in the military service of the Confederate States; and a man in such 
service can not [sic] be taken into the military service of the State as a militia man.”
This conclusion represented the constitutional primacy of the national 
government in its war-making powers and the supremacy of Confederate law and the 
Confederate Constitution in providing a framework for resolving political differences.  
Any attempt by the states to usurp this authority would violate the provisions of the 
Confederate Constitution: “The claim of the State to the military service must yield to 
the conflicting claim of the Confederate States; for the constitution, and laws of the 
Confederate States passed in pursuance thereof, are the supreme law of the land”347  In 
this case, Walker stated that Pille was liable to conscription and to Confederate military 
service as long as he was domiciled in the Confederacy, even though he was a 
domiciled foreigner; he was not liable to state militia service while liable to Confederate 
service.  The constitutional order in the Confederacy was configured to facilitate the 
national welfare of a Confederate people, not just citizens of individual states.  
346 The State, ex rel. Graham, In Re Pille, 39 Ala. 459 (1864).
347 Ibid., 460.
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Concurrently, state courts enunciated that fulfilling the national purposes of the 
Confederacy might also require certain civic responsibilities that an individual citizen 
might owe to the national political community.
State supreme courts also made very clear that in any conflict over prioritizing 
the protection of the nation and that of an individual’s rights, the individual would 
always be precluded from asserting a better claim since the safety of the nation was 
established as a constitutional goal which the national government was duty bound to 
facilitate.  This question of whether individual rights should be protected above all other 
considerations was taken up by the Texas court in Ex Parte Turman.348  Here, the court 
recognized the importance of the issues raised in this case, that “the questions involved 
in the case are of great magnitude, and they cannot, by any means, be said to be free 
from difficulty.”  The court weighed carefully individual rights and national interests 
since the case involved “some of the most important rights of the citizen, some of his 
highest duties to the state, the public policy of the state in respect to the punishment of 
high crimes, and the relation between the state government and the Confederate 
government.”349  The protections afforded to the individual were not to be considered as 
348 26 Tex. 708 (1863).  In January of 1863, Turman was indicted for treason by 
a Texas grand jury for “’knowingly, maliciously and advisedly discouraging the people 
from enlisting into the service of the Confederate States of America, and did then and 
there knowingly, maliciously and advisedly discourage the people from enlisting into 
the service of this state, the said state of Texas, and then and there willfully and 
maliciously did dispose the people to favor the enemy.’” 26 Tex. 708, 709.  Turman 
claimed that he was held a conscript and illegally restrained of his liberty by 
respondent, S. M. Warner and he petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, which he 
received.  Turman argued that he was exempt from military service since he was under 
bond to appear on felony charges.
349 Ibid., 709.
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“supreme as to override all other considerations…They spring out of regard for the 
public welfare, and may be modified by considerations nearly touching the public 
safety.”350
Associate Justice Bell was compelled to conduct a balancing test between the 
public policy concerns and individual liberties, with the conclusion that the Confederate 
war-making power was held to be of higher priority than the state power to compel 
service in the state militia: “It is held that the right of the Confederate States to compel 
the citizens of the states to do military service is superior to the right of the state over 
her militia.”351  These principles were enunciated as part of the Confederate 
fundamental law, they were due to more than wartime exigency and became effective 
upon all citizens and indicate of the permanency and stability of the Confederate 
constitutional order.352
In the Texas case of Ex Parte Abraham Mayer, Associate Justice Reeves 
addressed the claim that conscripting Mayer after he had furnished a substitute could 
only be done after the Confederate government refunded the money Mayer paid to his 
substitute and that without such a provision, the act of January 5, 1864 was 
unconstitutional.  Mayer claimed that the January 5th act violated Article 1, section 4 
which protected private property from seizure for public use without making just 
350 Ibid., 710-711.
351 Ibid., 711.  Bell looked to the Texas Legislature’s recent act that prevented 
forfeitures of bonds issued to persons accused of misdemeanors while in military 
service. This act was designed to protect those in military service from unfair treatment 
and to encourage enlistments, not to provide a safe refuge in the military for felons. The 
legislature “did not think it proper to hold out any encouragement to persons accused of 
high crimes (felonies) to enter into the military service.”
352 Belz, A Living Constitution or Fundamental Law?, 1.
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compensation.  However, Associate Justice Reeves stated that “the right to take private 
property for public use is founded on the idea that private rights must yield to public 
necessity…The sovereign power, wherever it may be lodged, must judge of the
exigencies that will justify the exercise of power, and in our system of government that 
power has been conferred on congress.”353  Individual rights would have to yield to 
public interests, when necessary, though always within the framework of the 
Confederate Constitution.
The Confederate Constitution was also a more innovative document by adding a 
more democratic procedure for amending the national charter under Article V even 
though this more democratic process did not threaten the permanency or the 
fundamental nature of the Constitution.354  Confederate framers feared the broad 
interpretative power of Congress to use amendments to redraft the Constitution and, in 
Article V, Section 1 they created a more specified process in which the scope of 
constitutional amendments was limited to a consideration of only those amendments 
proposed by states that demanded a convention.355  The framers removed from the 
353 26 Tex. 715, 724 (1864).
354 Confederate innovations were not undemocratic since the popular election of 
the president continued unabated, there were no changes to the election process, and the 
terms of senators or congressmen were not lengthened. Nieman, “Republicanism, the 
Confederate Constitution, and the American Constitutional Tradition,” 216. This 
contrasted sharply with the Georgia secession convention which drafted a new state 
constitution and restricted democracy in several key provisions. The Augusta Chronicle 
and Sentinel, February 24, 1861; the (Atlanta) Gate City Guardian, op cit. in Augusta 
Chronicle and Sentinel, February 28 & March 8, 1861; Michael P. Johnson, Toward a 
Patriarchal Republic: The Secession of Georgia (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1977), 79-187; Robinson, “New Deal in Constitutions,” 460-461.
355 Article V, Section 1 reads: “Upon the demand of any three States, legally 
assembled in their several conventions, the Congress shall summon a convention of all 
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Congress the ability to initiate the amendment process and lowered the threshold for 
amending the Constitution so that any three states could demand a convention of states 
to consider amendments.  The Confederate ratification of amendments also differed 
from the U.S. Constitution in its requirement that two-thirds of the state legislatures or 
state conventions were required to ratify the amendment proposed by the constitutional 
convention instead of the three-fourths requirement in Article V of the U.S. 
Constitution.  Robert Hardy Smith, Confederate framer from Alabama, understood this 
as a significant improvement upon the U.S. Constitution, commenting, about the 
Amendment process in Article V “’[t] he substituted provision imparts a wholesome 
flexibility to our Constitution and, at the same time, assures us against an assembling of 
the States for light or transient causes, or hopeless purposes, and the consultative body, 
when convened, will be confined to action on propositions put forth by three States.’”356
In the winter and spring of 1861, southerners chose to leave behind what they 
considered as “the deterioration of American constitutionalism, a deterioration initiated 
and sustained by their political rivals in the North” and they sought to define a new 
form of government and re-structure government to facilitate the effective management 
the States, to take into consideration such amendments to the Constitution as the said 
States shall concur in suggesting at the time when the said demand is made; and should 
any of the proposed amendments to the Constitution be agreed on by the said 
convention, voting by States, and the same be ratified by the Legislatures of two- thirds 
of the several States, or by conventions in two-thirds thereof, as the one or the other 
mode of ratification may be proposed by the general convention, they shall 
thenceforward form a part of this Constitution.” White, “The Constitution of the 
Confederate States of America: Innovation or Duplication?,” 20.
356 Lee, The Confederate Constitutions , 119; White, “The Constitution of the 
Confederate States of America: Innovation or Duplication?,” 20.
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of political conflict.357 Their objectives and efforts resulted in partly-conservative and 
partly-progressive constitutive documents that represent a significant “development in 
representative government,” “the peak contribution of America to political science,”358 and 
“an interesting new chapter...in the history of constitutional government.”359  Confederate 
framers retained as much of the American constitutional system as they deemed 
appropriate and “many of the Confederate principles are indigenous to the American 
constitutional system of government...the Confederate Constitution is relevant because it 
raised, and continues to raise, pertinent questions that cannot be glossed over if American 
constitutionalism is to be placed on terra firma.”360  Confederate framers tried to preserve 
an older republican tradition while also moving forward in a new direction and these 
innovative developments were rooted in “popular political-constitutional attitudes and state 
constitutional practice” and these changes “anticipated the direction of constitutional 
change in post-Civil War America,”361 especially the attempts to strengthen state executive 
branches against legislative corruption and “activism,” including the item veto and 
357 DeRosa, The Confederate Constitution of 1861, 1. Regarding new ideas 
about the resolution of political conflicts and partisanship. Rable, The Confederate 
Republic.
358 Nieman, “Republicanism, the Confederate Constitution, and the American 
Constitutional Tradition,” 461.
359 Fehrenbacher, Constitutions and Constitutionalism in the Slave-Holding South, 
67; DeRosa, The Confederate Constitution of 1861, 2.
360 DeRosa, The Confederate Constitution of 1861, 3.
361 Nieman, “Republicanism, the Confederate Constitution, and the American 
Constitutional Tradition,” 204.
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expanding executive involvement or direction of state budgets.362
The wartime decisions of the state supreme courts were the result of the careful 
interpretation the provisions and principles of this Confederate Constitution (especially 
the Necessary and Proper clause and the Supremacy Clause) and they reveal the greater 
reliance upon managerial forms, a distinct focus upon government fulfilling national 
purposes and responsibilities, and a fundamental law framework national in scope and 
focus that challenged states rights as a national political philosophy.  These decisions 
point to a reliance upon constitutional principles and ideas rather than political exigency 
and a significantly diminished importance of states’ rights in Confederate constitutional 
and political thought.
In their wartime decisions, state court justices were compelled to analyze the 
text of the Confederate Constitution and to enunciate its key constitutive principles, 
which they did.  However, the state courts also defined the crucial federal relationship 
between the states and the Confederacy.  If states‘ rights was the constitutive political 
philosophy of the Confederate States of America, these wartime conscription and 
exemption cases provided an excellent political opportunity for individual state supreme 
courts—as state institutions—to enunciate principles that would limit the power and 
authority of the Richmond government and assert the supremacy of state governments.  
Instead, wartime jurists manifested a determined intent to interpret carefully the 
provisions of the Confederate Constitution. Consequently, they enunciated a doctrine 
of federalism that did not dispel the important role of states in Confederate 
constitutional governance, but it did undermine the preeminence of states’ rights in the 
362 Ibid., 212-213.
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Confederate political philosophy.  In these interpretations of the Constitution, we may 
find a “light” to reveal its “true meaning” on the relationship between national and state 
governments and gain insight into the implementation of “principles and purposes of 
those who established the Confederate Government.”363
363 Curry, The Southern States of the American Union Considered in their 




On July 16, 1862, only three months after the promulgation of the first 
Confederate Conscription Act, a young Texan, F.H. Coupland, sought a writ of habeas 
corpus under the claim that he had been arrested “without any order or process 
whatever, or any color of either” and that he was illegally restrained of his liberty by a 
Confederate officer, Colonel R. T. P. Allen.364  Coupland, like many other wartime 
litigants, claimed exemption from Confederate military service under a states’ rights-
oriented argument that the conscription statute—the Richmond government’s direct 
effort to raise a national army—was unconstitutional because it interfered with the 
authority and power of the states.365  Coupland claimed that this statute was in 
derogation of the “reserved rights of the states” to mobilize citizens via the militia and 
he argued that the states could assert a greater claim to call up individuals into military 
364 Ex Parte Coupland, 26 Tex. 387 (1862).  The first conscription act was 
passed by the Confederate Congress on April 16, 1862. Public Laws of the Confederate 
States, 1 Cong., 1 Sess., 1862 (Richmond, VA: R.M. Smith, 1862), Chapter XXXI, 
section 1. This act was entitled “An Act to further provide for the public defence [sic].”
365 At trial, Allen testified that Coupland was enrolled as a Confederate conscript 
under the April 1862 statute and, subsequent to his enrollment, had selected and joined 
his company. Chief Justice Royall T. Wheeler, sitting in vacation, concluded that 
Coupland had been properly enrolled under the conscription legislation and remanded 
him as a conscript back to the custody of Colonel Allen whereupon Coupland appealed 
Wheeler’s decision before the Texas Supreme Court, sitting en banc. An in vacation
decision is rendered by an individual justice who adjudicates independently in between 
the regular sessions of the court. Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed. (St. Paul: West 
Publishing Co., 1979), 1388.  In vacation decisions were considered authoritative and 
good law until such time as the entire court, sitting en banc during a regular session of 
the court, overturned the in vacation opinion.
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service, over that of the national government.366
A decision by the combined Texas court affirming Coupland’s claim and an 
explanation of the Confederate Constitution as embodying a states’ rights political 
philosophy—essential to Coupland’s claim—would have benefited Texas by giving the 
state the constitutional authority to nullify Confederate conscription.  In Texas, frontier 
defense was a major issue leading to secession and of concern to the state’s citizens 
throughout the war and state  officials would have had sufficient incentive to limit the 
authority and power of the national government in Richmond.  A decision by the state’s 
high court asserting the authority of the state to stop the removal of desperately needed 
men and resources to the eastern theater of operations would have allowed Texas to 
better protect state citizens and property from attacks by Indians and bandits.367
However, the Texas court focused upon its task of enunciating constitutional 
principles and clarifying provisions in the Confederate Constitution rather than local 
political issues.  Coupland’s legal claim required the Texas court, like many other 
southern state supreme courts during the war years, to determine the correct division of 
authority and power between the state and national governments under the Confederate 
366 26 Tex. 387, 392.
367 As early as 1862, anxious newspaper editors in Texas advocated greater 
attention to local military needs: “We used to think that Texas was always regarded as a 
little outside corner of the world by the U.S. Government. When in that Government we 
contributed our full share to its resources and glory; but whenever any of the benefits of 
a Government were wanted we had to rely on ourselves…If we wanted the Indians 
whipped we had to do that…In fact we were, to all intents and purposes, a neglected 
province.…On the inauguration of the new [Confederate] Government, we hoped, and 
had a right to hope for better things….” Houston Tri-Weekly Telegraph, May 9, 1862; 
the Austin State Gazette, May 18, 1861. “Texas has now 64 regiments in the field, a 
large proportion of which are out of the State.  She ought not to be deprived of any 
more men if it can be avoided.” The Houston Tri-Weekly Telegraph, Nov. 17, 1862.
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Constitution and to explain whether the Confederate national charter was premised 
solely upon a states’ rights political philosophy.  Cases like Coupland provided an 
excellent opportunity for individual state supreme court justices—as officers of state 
institutions and in response to the interests of their local and state constituencies—to 
enunciate principles that would have restricted the power and authority of the Richmond 
government and asserted the supremacy of state government.368
This 1862 Texas decision, the first state supreme court decision to address 
federalism and one of the most clearly enunciated pronunciations of the doctrine of 
federalism in the Confederacy, is important for it reveals two essential doctrinal 
principles in Confederate federalism that were enunciated by other southern state 
supreme courts during the war.369  The Texas high court fashioned a doctrinal 
development that rejected states’ rights as the preeminent configurative constitutional 
principle.  Writing for the court, Associate Justice George F. Moore vigorously asserted 
the federal nature of the Confederate nation, holding that the Confederate government, 
368 Political scientist Marshall DeRosa concluded very differently, arguing that 
the Confederate Constitution was premised upon two principles: “recommitment to state 
sovereignty” and institutional limitations upon the Confederate government. DeRosa, The 
Confederate Constitution of 1861, 133.
369 Texas was an interesting forum for examining national constitutive 
principles, especially federalism, because the state included a wide range of interests 
and loyalties, a diverse population, and it shared characteristics common to both the 
South and the West.  Moreover, because the state was so remote from the rest of the 
Confederacy, Texans’ understanding of the war, federalism, adherence to constitutional 
principles, and related issues was shaded by local factors such as geography, isolation, 
and group identity. David C. Humphrey, “A ‘Very Muddy and Conflicting’ View: The 
Civil War as Seen from Austin, Texas,” Southwestern Historical Quarterly, vol. 94, No. 
3 (January 1991):369-414, 370, 414.
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especially Congress, was more than the agent of the states.370  Moore was explicit in 
stating that states’ rights was not “the theory of our government, when properly 
understood” and his pronunciation would be repeated by other state supreme courts.371
Secondly, Coupland, and other southern state supreme court decisions, established the 
division of governmental authority and power as a normative feature of Confederate 
federalism.372  Both national and state governments possessed specific spheres of 
responsibility and grants of power under the Constitution and the conscription laws 
were consistent with a specific grant of power to the national government under Article 
I, Section 8 of the Constitution.  These courts held that the national government had 
been was invested with sovereignty directly, by the people, rather than by the states.
Recent historiography on Confederate political philosophy and legal 
developments has discounted the importance of political principles and concepts in the 
development of Confederate federalism.373  These writings largely neglect important 
370 26 Tex. 387, 398.
371 Ibid., 403.
372 Ex Parte Coupland, 26 Tex. 386 (1862); Jeffers v. Fair, 32 Ga. 347 (1862); 
In Re Bryan, 60 NC 1 (1862); Ex Parte Turman, 26 Tex. 708 (1863); Ex Parte Hill, in 
re Willis, Johnson, and Reynolds v. Confederate States, 38 Ala. 429 (1863); Ex Parte 
Tate, 39 Ala 254 (1864); Ex Parte Lee and Allen, 39 Ala. 457 (1864); Burroughs v. 
Peyton, 16 Va. 470 (1864); Thomas W. Cobb v. William B. Stallings & B. A. Baldwin v. 
John West, 34 Ga. 72 (1864); David Simmons v. J.H. Miller, Enrolling Officer, 40 Miss. 
19 (1864); Gatlin v. Walton, 60 NC 205 (1864); Ex Parte William A. Winnard, 
[unreported Texas decision] (1865).
373 Mark Neely argued that the necessities of complete wartime mobilization 
overshadowed adherence to constitutional principles. Southerners exaggerated their 
emphasis upon legal and constitutional principles during the antebellum period and the 
secession crisis and once war came, they abandoned these principles and became a 
mirror image of the consolidationist northern government they had earlier rejected. 
Unprincipled consolidation based upon wartime needs was so extensive that state 
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state supreme court decisions enunciating Confederate constitutional principles and 
contend that Confederate federalism was shaped either by wartime necessities or blind 
adherence to states’ rights rather than federalism principles found in the Constitution.374
In what has become the foremost study of Confederate federalism, Curtis Amlund 
argued, incorrectly so, that as the Civil War progressed, the constitutional commitment 
to any substantive federalism principles and doctrines, whether based upon states’ 
rights, state sovereignty principles, or dual federalism, became displaced by military 
exigencies.  He argued that “despite their firmly held states' rights beliefs, southerners 
were compelled by wartime exigencies to increase the powers of the central government 
far beyond what was intended originally.”  Wartime exigencies were so severe as to 
make it necessary, even popular, to support a consolidated and national Confederate 
government, in derogation to constitutional principles.375 Modern war had the effect of 
transforming the nature of the Confederate political revolution and “in this on-going
process of change a governmental system evolved that revealed a striking resemblance 
to the one from which the South had withdrawn.”376
judges and the state bars were “largely complicit with Confederate government power.” 
Neely, Southern Rights: Political Prisoners and the Myth of Confederate 
Constitutionalism, 45, 62-63, 79.
374 Amlund, Federalism in the Southern Confederacy. Daniel J. Elazar argued 
that the Confederate Constitution was a dual federalist document but the demands of the 
war made state-national cooperation virtually impossible. Following Owsley, Elazar 
believed that states’ rights dictated the adoption of a “doctrinaire attitude” by Confederate 
leaders and led to “state intransigence” and resistance to Confederate efforts to prosecute 
the war successfully. Elazar, American Federalism: A View From the States, 2nd ed., 
(New York, NY: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1972), 330-335.
375 Amlund, Federalism in the Southern Confederacy.
376 Ibid., v.
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However, the state supreme courts interpreted the Confederate Constitution 
based upon a strict construction of its provisions regardless of military exigencies.  
These courts resolved conflicts of authority between national and state governments by 
implementing the principles and the provisions of the Confederate Constitution since it 
“clearly defines the powers conferred upon the former, and as carefully and certainly 
secures the residuum to the latter.”  As the Georgia court would explain about the 
Confederate Constitution in 1864, “if that instrument be rightly understood and 
faithfully obeyed, conflict is impossible.  If, in the unguarded exercise of power by 
either, conflict ensue, there can be no difficulty in determining which shall yield.”377
As Jefferson Davis had stated in his Inaugural Address, judicial interpretation 
would become the “light which reveals [the] true meaning” of the Confederacy’s 
constitutional principles.378  The study of southern wartime state supreme court decisions 
reveals the central importance of federalism to Confederate constitutionalism and its 
important role in the political philosophy of the Confederacy.  In their wartime 
opinions, southern state supreme court justices discerned and declared whether the 
political purpose of the Confederacy was to create a weak national government to serve 
state interests or whether the Confederacy was founded upon a commitment to create a 
national and federal republic.  Though the sovereignty of the states was included in the 
Confederate Constitution, this concept was secondary to the national and federal
framework and possessed a limited role in defining or shaping Confederate constitutional 
377 Thomas W. Cobb v. William B. Stallings & B. A. Baldwin v. John West, 34 Ga. 
72, 76 (1864).
378 The Provisional Constitution was approved February 8th, 1861. The 
Permanent Constitution was approved just three weeks later on March 11th, 1861.
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doctrines, especially the doctrine of federalism.379 State supreme courts defined the 
extent of Confederate governmental power over its citizens, how political power was to 
be apportioned under the war powers of the Confederate Constitution, and how the 
constitutional government designed by the Confederate founders was to be 
implemented.
Historical Importance of Federalism
In its most basic form, American federalism is a specific “mode of political 
organization” and a constitutional doctrine in which administrative and governmental 
functions and “powers” are allocated or divided between national and state or local 
governments.  Each governmental entity usually possesses “a sphere of jurisdiction 
within which it is supreme.”380 Within the federal model,381 the national government 
379 Provisions that favored the states included the Article I, section 2, clause 5 
provision for impeaching federal officials and Article I, section 8 prohibitions against 
granting bounties, protective tariffs, and internal improvements. Fitts in “The 
Confederate Convention: The Constitutional Debate,” 198-200. Other provisions 
include Article VI, Sections 5 and 6, which correspond to the 9th and 10th Amendments 
in the U.S. Constitution. States were protected by the prohibition in Article III, Section 
2, clause 1 against a citizen of one state suing another state; the provisions in Article I, 
Section 10, clause 3 that gave the states the power to enact duties on ocean-going 
vessels for purposes of internal improvements to harbors and river passes without 
Congressional approval, and, again without Congressional approval to enter into 
agreements with other states on the navigation of common rivers. Hardaway, “The 
Confederate Constitution: A Legal and Historical Examination,” 18-31. Robinson 
argued that an underlying tenet of the Confederate Constitution was states rights and the 
framers’ great unwillingness to restrict the states. Robinson, Jr., “A New Deal in 
Constitutions,” 454.
380 See Martin Diamond, “What the Framers Meant,” 25; Robert K. Carr, 
American Democracy in Theory and Practice (rev. ed.; New York, NY: Rinehart and 
Co., 1955)), 78; William V. Holloway and Emile B. Ader, American Government (New 
York, NY: The Ronald Press Co., 1959), 13.  Despite his argument, Amlund conceded 
“Within a federal system there is a division of political authority between the national 
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exercises authority or jurisdiction over the “entire territory” of the nation, yet both 
national and state or local governmental entities are united “within an overarching 
political system by distributing power [and responsibilities] among general and 
constituent governments in a manner designed to protect the existence and authority of 
both.”382
Federalism was an important constitutional principle in the American colonial 
experience and to the framers of the Constitution of 1787 because the allocation of power 
and authority could result in the creation of energetic, efficient, and limited 
government.383  The experiences of the colonial era, revolution, and the Articles of 
government and the state governments, each one of which is more or less autonomous 
within its own sphere of action.” Amlund, Federalism in the Southern Confederacy, 13.
381 There are many forms of federalism within the American constitutional 
tradition including dual federalism, state-centered federalism, nation-centered 
federalism, creative federalism, cooperative federalism, pragmatic federalism, the New 
Federalism, marble-cake federalism, layer-cake federalism, and birthday cake 
federalism. Morton Grodzins, The American System (Chicago, IL: Rand-McNally, 
1966) and Elazar, American Federalism: A View From the States, 47.
382 Elazar, American Federalism: A View From the States, 2. Within each 
respective sphere of responsibilities, each governmental entity possesses primacy and 
complete authority. Paludan, “The American Civil War Considered as a Crisis in Law 
and Order,” 1016. Political scientist William Riker provided a similar definition in 
Federalism: Origins, Operation, Significance (Boston, MA: Little and Brown, 1964), 
11. Riker argued that a constitution was distinctly federal if it possessed three 
characteristics: “(1) two levels of government rule the same land and people; (2) each 
level has at least one area in which it is autonomous, and (3) there is some guarantee 
(even though merely a statement in a constitution) of the autonomy of each government 
in its own sphere.”
383 Federalist No. 15 (“The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to 
Preserve the Union”); Federalist No. 21 (“Other Defects of the Present Confederation”); 
Federalist No. 22 (“The Same Subject Continued: Other Defects of the Present  
Confederation”); Federalist No. 23 (“The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as 
the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union”); Federalist No. 41 (“General View 
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Confederation made clear the benefits of a national government with limited powers co-
existing and balanced by state or local governmental entities that retained residual 
powers.384 The Articles of Confederation, “the work of a confederation loosely linked 
commonwealths seeking to free themselves form an imperial central authority,” failed 
because its emphasis on state sovereignty made for a weak national government and it 
was replaced by the Constitution of 1787.385
Despite the fundamental definition of federalism and its important role in 
American constitutional governance, the framers of 1787 never clearly defined it as a 
doctrine in the U.S. Constitution and ambiguity over its meaning led to a great divergence 
of interpretations, fueling some of the most prominent, intense, and enduring debates 
over governmental power in American history.386  The Constitution had “at is core…a 
of the Powers Conferred by the Constitution”);  and Federalist No. 44 (“Restrictions on 
the Authority of the Several States”) in The Federalist, edited by Jacob E. Cooke.
384 The importance of federalism in the American colonial constitutional 
experience is explained by Lutz in The Origins of American Constitutionalism and Jack 
P. Greene in Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended 
Polities of the British Empire and the United States, 1607-1788 (New York, NY: W.W. 
Norton & Co., 1986).  Federalism was a critical issue at the Constitutional Convention 
and became a focus of both Federalists and Antifederalists in the debate over 
ratification. Elazar, “Introduction: The Meaning of American Federalism,” in Politics of 
American Federalism, xvi.  Defining the balance of power between state and national 
governments was an integral issue in the creation of the Confederate Constitution. 
DeRosa, The Confederate Constitution of 1861, 3 and Journal of the Confederate 
Congress.
385 Paludan, “Federalism in the Civil War Era,” 27. DeRosa, The Confederate 
Constitution of 1861, on the Antifederalist influence in Confederate constitutionalism.
386 Elazar, “Introduction: The Meaning of American Federalism,” in Politics of 
American Federalism, xvi.
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calculated ambiguity regarding the balance of power between state and nation.”387  In 
the absence of any consensus over the proper definition and form of federalism, protests 
such as the Virginia Resolutions of 1798 declared that the states, as co-equal 
governmental entities, formed a compact in which individual states could determine 
whether the federal government had exceeded its constitutional powers and decide upon 
the constitutionality of federal acts and legislation.388  The resulting political and 
constitutional crises in America “evolved not as a challenge to the Constitution itself 
but as an impassioned, sustained, and intricate conflict among varying constitutional 
387 Paludan, “Federalism in the Civil War Era,” 27. Paludan argued that the 
framers had to appeal “to as broad a spectrum of opinion as possible on fundamental 
issues; and nothing was more fundamental than the issue of how much power would 
yield to the new national authority.” See also Kilpatrick, “The Case for States’ Rights,” 
92. Grant McConnell argued “The founders of the American federal system were…not 
entirely clear in their intentions.  What they created was partly an inheritance from their 
recent past, partly a pragmatic compromise of contemporary issues, in which different 
men among them saw different virtues.” Grant McConnell, Private Power and 
American Democracy (New York, NY: Knopf, 1967), 92, op cit. Richard H. Leach, 
American Federalism (New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1970), 5.  
Leach concluded that “in the end, the Constitution merged with no real clues as to what 
was in the framers’ minds as they voted on the several resolutions before them or how 
they expected the federal system they had brought into being to work in practice...they 
failed to make clear what should be the precise relationship between them or how either 
level might relate to local or private sources of power. ” Ibid., 7-8.  For more on the lack 
of agreement on the meaning of federalism, see Federalist No. 9 and No. 16 (Hamilton), 
and Nos. 39 and 40 (Madison).  Alpheus T. Mason and Richard H. Leach, In Quest of 
Freedom: American Political Thought and Practice (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice 
Hall, 1959), 152-155.
388 The Virginia Resolutions read “the states who are parties thereto, have the 
right, and are in duty bound to interpose for arresting the progress of the evil, and for 
maintaining, within their respective limits, the authorities, rights, and liberties, 
appertaining to them.” The Annals of America, volume 4 (Chicago, IL: Encyclopedia 
Britannica, Inc., 1968), 62-67; Amlund, Federalism in the Southern Confederacy, 8.
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interpretations.”389
Consequently, the first century of American nationhood was “dominated by 
conflict over the relative powers of the states and the national government” in a series 
of “conflicts over internal improvements, banking, currency, the tariff, the public lands, 
and ultimately, secession and slavery were defined and fought out primarily in terms of 
the constitutional powers of the nation and the states.”390  National government powers 
were limited and generally weak while state governments exercised great power within 
their jurisdictions and, at times, even the precise extent of state sovereignty was 
uncertain.391
389 Keller, “Power and Rights: Two Centuries of American Constitutionalism,” 
682; Ericson, “The Nullification Crisis, American Republicanism, and the Force Bill 
Debate,”  251. The Confederate Constitution was “a restoration of the original federal 
order” that had been corrupted and the “disregard” for federalism as provided for in the 
Constitution of 1787. DeRosa, Confederate Constitution of 1861, 121.
390 Keller, “Power and Rights: Two Centuries of American Constitutionalism,” 
676; Amlund, Federalism in the Southern Confederacy, 3.
391 Ralph K. Huitt, “Congress: Retrospect and Prospect,” The Journal of 
Politics, vol. 38, Issue 3, (August 1976): 209-227, 211.  Southern state government 
exercised considerable power and authority within the U.S. federal system and, with the 
advent of secession, southern states would be able to continue the normal business of 
the state without much interruption.  According to Bensel, “in 1860 the weak American 
state did not have the will or capacity to play a mediating role between the great free-
and slave-state sections…the federal government contained no statist-bureaucratic 
element that could prepare for the secession crisis.” Bensel, Yankee Leviathan, 36-37, 
85.  According to Ericson, the belief in divided sovereignty existed during the debate 
over nullification and the Force Bill in Congress. Rives of Virginia “made it a matter of 
theory, of divided sovereignty between the states and the nation, of a balance of power 
between the federal and the state governments, and of dual citizenship in his beloved 
Virginia and the United States. Rives envisioned a true compound republic in America, 
and he placed himself squarely within a ‘Partly federal, partly national’ republican 
tradition of discourse.” Ericson, “The Nullification Crisis, American Republicanism, 
and the Force Bill Debate.” Ericson argues, “Ellis is wrong to distinguish these two 
states-rights traditions [Rives (federalists) and Calhoun] in terms of the strength of their 
commitments to democracy rather than to federalism.” Ericson, “The Nullification 
Crisis,” 266-267; Kilpatrick, “Case for ‘States’ Rights,” 92-93.
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In March of 1861, when the framers of the Confederate Constitution met in 
Montgomery, Alabama to draft a permanent constitutive document for their new 
southern nation, they did so with the challenge and purpose to address this antebellum 
ambiguity and to provide greater clarity and specificity with respect to federalism.392
The principal distinction between the U.S. and the Confederate Constitutions was the locus 
of sovereignty and in the Confederate Constitution, the framers provided for “sovereignty 
within a federal framework.”393 When the Confederate framers convened in 
Montgomery in 1861 to discuss and to make decisions about “powers and privileges,”
there were several attempts to inject states’ rights, and its most extreme expressions—
nullification and secession—into the Confederate constitutional order.394 Among the 
Confederate framers, both Rhett and T.R.R. Cobb favored strengthening state authority
392 Fitts, “The Confederate Convention: The Constitutional Debate,” 194-204; 
DeRosa, The Confederate Constitution of 1861, 1, 9, 16-17.
393 DeRosa, The Confederate Constitution of 1861, 121.  According to DeRosa, 
this idea was an eighteenth century idea borrowed from the Antifederalists.
394 Many delegates were determined to prevent what they considered “abuse” of 
the former federal system that had caused such irreconcilable problems. “To understand 
the Constitution of the Confederate States of America, one must realize that the 
Confederate founders were not dissatisfied with the United States Constitution.  Rather, 
they were dissatisfied with the federal government’s interpretation of the Constitution 
during the years before the Civil War” and that “the States withdrew not from the 
Constitution, but from the wicked and injurious perversions of the compact.” Curry, 
Civil History of the Government of the Confederate States, 11-41, 50; White, “The 
Constitution of the Confederate States of America: Innovation or Duplication?,” 5.  
Charles E. George argued that in the drafting of the Constitution and the establishment 
of the Confederate judiciary, the framers were determined that states’ rights were to be 
protected from the central government and the doctrine of states’ rights was to become 
constitutive to the Confederate nation. According to George, the states retained their 
independent and sovereign throughout the war. Charles E. George, “The Supreme Court 
of the Confederate States of America,” 592-599; T.R.R. Cobb to Marion Cobb, 
February 4, 1861, T.R.R. Cobb Papers, University of Georgia, Athens.
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and eliminating the General Welfare clause, especially because of the implications of 
such a move toward expanding national taxing powers.  Rhett’s South Carolina Plan 
would not be adopted completely, but that his idea about amending the Constitution via 
convention when three of the states demanded the assembling of a convention 
incorporated Calhoun’s ideas from the South Carolina Exposition &Protest and was 
added to Article V, Section 1, Part I of the Constitution.  This, together with the 
removal of diversity jurisdiction, was used as “a weapon against the enlargement of 
federal power by judicial action and, with these innovations, the “Montgomery 
convention drew the lines between state power and federal power more clearly.”395
James Chestnut also proposed that nullification be recognized as an appropriate remedy 
but this was rejected.  Hill of Georgia tried to introduce secession as remedy for 
disputes between states and the Confederate government after a period of waiting and 
Chestnut sought to amend this to provide for a simple right of secession but both were 
tabled and never raised again.396  The attempt to fashion a state-centered federalism397
395 Fitts, “The Confederate Convention: The Constitutional Debate,” 204.
396 Ibid., 195-204.
397 “State-centered federalism” is premised upon the belief that state action 
created the U.S. Constitution especially state representation in Philadelphia and state 
ratification.  The emphasis upon limited national government and the sovereignty of the 
states includes maintaining vigilance to protect the states from encroachment by the 
national government.  The enumerated congressional powers provided in Article I, 
section 8 were designed to limit the power of the national government and to safeguard 
the power of the states by preventing the subsequent expansion of national government 
power.  Specific delegations of power to the national government were to be construed 
narrowly.  The principle of limited government in American constitutionalism and 
politics was important and long a part of the historical tradition. Saul Cornell, The Other 
Founders: Anti-Federalism and the Dissenting Tradition in America, 1788-1828
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 178-181, 276-277, 265-
266 and the letters of the Anti-Federalist, “Agrippa,” especially those letters addressed 
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was rejected in favor of implementing a federal system with authority and power 
balanced between the state governments and a strong national Chief Executive leading 
an efficient and lean national bureaucracy.398
When war came in 1861, though, it was uncertain whether state jurists, 
adjudicating within state courts and accountable to state constituencies would inject 
states’ rights into their interpretation of national legislation or the Constitution.  
Southern state supreme court justices possessed a diversity of social, educational, and 
political backgrounds and they could be swayed by various local influences.  These men 
often would have to balance the influences of “political sectionalism and legal 
nationalism” in their unique roles as “guardians of constitutional principles.”399
Wartime jurists manifested a determined intent to interpret carefully the provisions of 
the Confederate Constitution.400  Consequently, they enunciated a doctrine of federalism 
to the people of Massachusetts on December 3, 11, 14, 18, 1787; Herbert J. Storing, ed., 
The Anti-Federalist: Writings By the Opponents of the Constitution (Chicago, IL: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1985), 234-242. Calhoun claimed that states had been 
vested with and retained sovereignty.  Since the Constitution was a mere compact 
amongst the states, an individual state could assert their own interests over that of the 
Union, even to the point of nullifying national laws that did not produce any benefit for 
the state. Calhoun, The South Carolina Exposition and Protest; Richard B. Ellis, The 
Union At Risk: Jacksonian Democracy, States’ Rights and the Nullification Crisis (New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1987); William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War 
:The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836 (New York, NY: Harper 
and Row, 1965, 1966), 159-176, 183-186, 205-213, 226-259.
398 The careful balance of authority between Confederate and state governments 
is an important key to understanding Confederate federalism. Fitts, “The Confederate 
Convention: The Constitutional Debate,” 194.
399 Huebner, The Southern Judicial Tradition, 1, 2, 4, 6-7.
400 Maxwell Bloomfield, American Lawyers in a Changing Society, 1776-1876
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), 271-301; Kermit Hall, “West H. 
Humphreys and the Crisis of the Union,” Tennessee Historical Quarterly 34  (1975),48-
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that did not dispel the important role of states in Confederate constitutional governance, 
but did undermine the preeminence of states’ rights in the Confederate political
philosophy.401
In the 1920s, Frank Owsley presented his influential thesis that states' rights was 
such a powerful configurative concept in the Confederacy that blind adherence to it 
during the war inhibited Confederate efforts and reduced the military capability of the 
Confederacy.  He argued “that the governmental system was destroyed through 
69; B. Patricia Dyson, “Contract Stability in Wartime: The Example of the 
Confederacy,” American Journal of Legal History 19 (1975), 216-231; Robinson, 
Justice in Grey, 625; Zant, “Confederate Conscription and the North Carolina Supreme 
Court,” 75.
401 According to Paul Finkelman, there were four general applications of “states’ 
rights”: the assertion of “independent or state concurrent power,” “the denial of 
interstate cooperation and comity,” “state noncooperation with…or nullification of 
federal law,” and secession, as explained in “States’ Rights North and South in 
Antebellum America,” in Hall and Ely, An Uncertain Tradition: Constitutionalism in 
the History of the South, 126.  Two of these, state concurrent power and nullification, 
would be refuted by southern jurists in applying Confederate federalism. David 
Simmons v. J.H. Miller, Enrolling Officer, 40 Miss. 19 (1864); Ex Parte Coupland, 26 
Tex. 386 (1862); In Re Bryan, 60 NC 1 (1863).  James Chesnut’s amendment providing 
for a right of nullification was defeated as well as the proposal to provide constitutional 
language providing for right of secession. William C. Davis, A Government of Our Own: 
The Making of the Confederacy (New York, NY: Free Press, 1994), 228, 248, 250 and 
Journal of the Confederate Congress. Confederate federalism in no way was intended to 
reduce the power of the states. The framers of the Constitution introduced several 
measures which supplemented state powers such as the right of impeachment of federal 
officials (Article I, section 2, clause 5), the simplified system of amending the 
Constitution (Article V), the prohibitions against bounties, protective tariffs, and 
internal improvements (Article I, section 8, clause 1). Fitts, “The Confederate 
Convention: The Constitutional Debate,” 195-204.  However, state jurists in the South 
were not generally willing to assert state sovereignty as a constitutive doctrine or “a 
constitutional article of faith.” Huebner, The Southern Judicial Tradition, 6-7. Donald 
Nieman maintains that the focus on states’ rights has obscured an appreciation of the 
relevancy and importance of the innovations made in1861 and to the configurative 
effect of the document. Nieman, “Republicanism, the Confederate Constitution and the 
American Constitutional Tradition,” 201.
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adherence to these rights” and that the Confederacy’s “preoccupation with such rights 
so obstructed Richmond’s prosecution of the war that the Confederacy failed.”402
According to Owsley, so strong was this political philosophy that the Confederacy 
“Died of State Rights.”403
Owsley contended that this commitment to establishing the preeminence of the 
states over the national government was so pervasive that the states “assumed or tried to 
assume functions whose exercise must of necessity devolve upon the central 
government” and “this assumption by the states of the power of the central government 
and the controversies that ensued extended to practically every field of activity 
connected in any way with the conduct of the war.”404 State and local concerns 
dominated wartime efforts to the extent that southerners thought more in terms of their 
states than the Confederate nation and that state rights thwarted the national goal to win 
independence.  Subsequent histories of the Confederacy perpetuated Owsley’s 
argument, contending that the original intent of the Confederate Constitution and its 
system of federalism was to serve the states’ rights political philosophy.405
402 Owsley, States Rights in the Confederacy.
403 Ibid., 1-2.
404 Ibid., 1-3.
405 E. Merton Coulter, The Confederate States of America, 1861-1865 (Baton 
Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1950); Thomas, The Confederate 
Nation:1861-1865; Paul D. Escott, After Secession: Jefferson Davis and the Failure of 
Confederate Nationalism (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1978); 
Robinson, “A New Deal in Constitutions,” 454.  Lee, in The Confederate Constitutions, 
argued that the Confederate Constitutions (Provisional and Permanent) “represent the 
ultimate constitutional expression of state rights philosophy and the state sovereignty 
concept in nineteenth century America” (150).  States were an important and vital 
governmental entity in the nineteenth century.  Phillip Paludan, emphasizing this 
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However, the extent to which states’ rights shaped the political philosophy of, or 
the importance of this doctrine as a constitutive concept within the Confederate States 
of America, may not be as extensive or significant as Owsley suggested.406 Owsley 
failed to consider the importance of the body of wartime state supreme court decisions 
and the opinions of the state court justices who enunciated the principles of the 
Confederate Constitution.  His omission is significant for the wartime state supreme court 
decisions reveal that states’ rights was not the configurative concept shaping either the 
Confederate Constitution or the constitutional doctrine of federalism in the Confederacy.
Separating Spheres and “Balanced” Federalism
Confederate framers attempted to make their national charter more precise and 
specific than the Constitution of 1787 with regard to the powers delegated in the 
Constitution and the scope and extent of state and national governmental authority and 
power to act.  Subsequently, the doctrine of federalism enunciated by state courts 
rigorously divided state and national spheres of governmental power and responsibility 
into “areas of action.”  State supreme courts preserved the constitutional division of 
importance and vitality of the states, argued that the Union went to war with the specific 
goal of preserving “a union in which states were expected to play vital and important 
roles.” Paludan, “Federalism in the Civil War Era,” 28.
406 Richard Bensel argued that once secession was completed, states’ rights 
ceased to be a major shaping concept in the political philosophy of the Confederacy, 
that “out of the Union, the South jettisoned states’ rights and built a central state much 
stronger than either the antebellum or post-Reconstruction federal governments.” 
Bensel, Yankee Leviathan, 13.
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government power into separate spheres that largely resembled dual federalism.407
Under the doctrine of dual federalism, both governmental entities are coequal and the 
individual states retain sovereignty.  The national government is one of “enumerated 
powers” and the states retain the residuum of powers as a co-equal and sovereign entity.  
Each governmental entity possesses specific responsibilities and the powers to fulfill their 
responsibilities, within its own respective “sphere of authority.”  Each entity is limited to 
its respective sphere and may not usurp power and authority from the other nor intrude 
into the sphere of the other entity.408 However, in their wartime decisions, state supreme 
407 The dual federalism model--with each governmental entity (national and state 
governments) operating within its own separate sphere of responsibilities--was 
characteristic of the nineteenth century, as argued by Lord Bryce in The American 
Commonwealth. Morton Grodzins argued that the nineteenth century was “the 
preeminenet period of duality in the American system.”  The U.S. Supreme Court never 
really adhered to a “separatist doctrine” nor had to confront “the issue of cooperation 
vs. separation as such,” it did, as was the case with the state courts of the Confederacy, 
concern itself with “defining permissible areas of action for the central government and 
the states; or with saying with respect to a point at issue whether any government could 
take action.” Morton Gordzins, “The Sharing of Functions,” in The Politics of 
Federalism, edited by Daniel J. Elazar (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath  and Company):11-
14.
408 Dual federalism is based upon an understanding of the Constitution as a 
“compact” among states that retained their sovereignty, delegating to the national 
government specific enumerated powers necessary to fulfill a limited number of 
responsibilities and purposes. Harry N. Scheiber, “Dual Federalism,” in Kermit L. Hall, 
ed., The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States (New York, NT: 
Oxford University Press, 1992), 236. Constitutional historian Edward S. Corwin labeled 
this idea of divided sovereignty “dual federalism” explaining it as doctrine in which 
“the purpose and scope of the delegated powers of Congress are impliedly limited by 
the existence of the reserved powers of the states.” A “basic assumption” of dual 
federalism is “that the reserved powers of the states are intended to be a fixed bundle of 
powers, subject to change only by formal constitutional amendment.” Edward S. 
Corwin, The Twilight of the Supreme Court: A History of Our Constitutional Theory
(New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1934), Chapter One; as discussed in Walter H. 
Bennett, American Theories of Federalism (University, AL: University of Alabama 
Press, 1964), 180.  Dual federalism was an important feature of nineteenth century 
political and constitutional ideas. R. Kent Newmyer, The Supreme Court Under 
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courts rejected the state-oriented dual federalism, refusing to allow state governments 
general supremacy over the national government or co-equal status in national 
governance.
Despite significant state interests, the Texas justices articulated that division of 
power and authority under Confederate federalism, and held that conscription laws did 
not contradict constitutional grants of power because the power to raise armies was 
granted specifically to the national government.  Associate Justice Moore explained that 
states’ rights was not “the theory of our government, when properly understood” and 
that any states’ rights interpretation of the Constitution would necessarily eviscerate the 
specific grant conferred upon the Confederate Congress, reducing “its authority” within 
its sphere.409   Within this federal system, an assertion of state sovereignty violated 
constitutional orthodoxy since both governments were vested with sovereignty—each 
within its own sphere—that neither could alter. 410  According to the court, “nothing is 
Marshall and Taney (Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1968), 82-83, 116-118; 
Bennett, American Theories of Federalism, 180-181.  Examples of judicial 
pronouncement of the doctrine of dual federalism can be found in Cohens v. Virginia, 
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821); Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 
Pet.) 519 (1839); and Cooley v. Pennsylvania Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 
(1851).
409 26 Tex. 387, 398.
410 Ibid., 403 Chief Justice Royall T. Wheeler concurred with Moore’s decision 
in Coupland while Associate Justice James H. Bell, a Unionist from West Texas, 
dissented from the majority decision.  Bell’s lengthy and much-publicized dissenting 
opinion included Bell’s Unionist views and would later play a part in Bell’s failed re-
election bid in 1864.  For more on Texas politics and the judicial election of 1864 see 
Nancy H. Bowen, “A Political Labyrinth: Texas in the Civil War—Questions in 
Continuity,” (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rice University, 1974), 255-282 and 
James Marten, Texas Divided: Loyalty and Dissent in the Lone Star State, 1856-1874
(Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1990), 51.
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better established than that neither of these governments is inferior or superior to the 
other…each of them represents the sovereign, and both have within their mutual 
spheres of action just such powers and functions as have been conferred upon them by 
the constitution creating them.”411
Interpreting the Confederate Constitution carefully and stringently, Moore 
rejected Coupland’s claim that Texas retained undivided sovereignty and would 
therefore have had to confer upon the Confederate government the specific power to 
conscript.  The justices held that the powers of the Confederate government should not 
“be construed in subordination to those of this immediate representative of the 
sovereign state“[of Texas] [italics in original].  Both governments possessed 
“‘sovereign powers,’ neither of them are themselves sovereign, but each of them 
represents the sovereign, and both have within their mutual spheres of action just such 
powers and functions as have been conferred upon them by the constitution creating 
them.”412
The Texas court, like its sister courts, preserved what it understood to be a 
constitutional “division of political power” (and responsibilities) between state and 
national governments.  Moore stated that governmental power and authority had been 
constitutionally created and allocated to state and national governments according to 
their respective spheres.  The sovereignty of the people was divided between both state 
411 26 Tex. 387, 403.  Interestingly, one year after the court’s decision in 
Coupland, Bell, whose staunch Unionism and opposition to secession was widely 
known, authored the court’s opinion in Ex Parte Turman (26 Tex. 708 (1863)) and 
upheld the doctrine of federalism he had dissented from earlier in Coupland.  Ex Parte 
Turman also appears as Ex Parte E.M. Turner in Robards, Synopses of the Decisions of 
the Supreme Court of the State of Texas, 8-9.
412 26 Tex. 387, 402-403.
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and national governments.413  Consequently, there could be no alteration of these 
spheres, except by amending the Confederate Constitution. The constitutionality of the 
conscription legislation was beyond question, according to Moore since the war-making 
power was an explicit grant of power conferred by the people upon the Confederate 
Government in the Constitution: “the war-making power is given directly to the agents 
of the people, who can only be supposed to act under their directions, and to speak their 
sentiments, even if there had been no express grant of power given to congress [sic] to 
raise and support armies.”414  Two years later, in Ex Parte Abraham Mayer,415 the court 
affirmed the court’s enunciation in Coupland that the people had been the source of that 
sovereignty vested with the Confederate government and the court specifically rejected 
any belief that the Confederacy was the creation of the states.  
Soon after Texas issued its decision in Ex Parte Coupland, other state supreme 
courts in the South declared that the conscription laws did not violate dual federalism’s 
division of governmental authority into separate spheres because the power to raise 
armies was granted specifically to the national government in the Confederate 
413 Amlund argued that as in 1776 external sovereignty passed from the British to 
the Americans, so too, then, did it in 1861.  If the same powers were transferred to the 
Federal Constitution of 1787, then these same powers were also transferred to the central 
Confederate government and “states did not retain their sovereignty intact” because the 
body politic divided sovereignty as had occurred in the Union.  This made the 
Confederacy's system of federalism little different from the Union since sovereignty of the 
people meant that “the Confederacy was a union of people rather than one of sovereign 
states.” Amlund, Federalism in the Southern Confederacy, 130.
414 26 Tex. 387, 394.
415 26 Tex. 715 (1864).
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Constitution.416  In Alabama, the state’s high court held that not only did such power 
fall within the national sphere of authority under the Constitution but that this grant in 
the Constitution would work as a permanent bar against state claims to concurrent 
authority over this power.  In 1862, three young men, Asa J. Willis, E. P. Johnson, and 
Calvin Reynolds all claimed exemptions from Confederate service due to their physical 
disabilities but were captured and kept in custody as conscripts.  They petitioned the 
Montgomery County probate judge for writs of habeas corpus, which were granted.  
Thereupon, the Confederate enrolling officer, L. H. Hill, applied for writs of prohibition 
to enjoin Alabama courts from any further interference with his detention of recusant 
conscripts.  Hill raised the question of whether Alabama state courts possessed the 
jurisdictional authority to discharge individuals being held under the authority of the 
Confederacy.  Alabama’s Supreme Court preserved the doctrine of federalism and held 
not only that state courts could not exercise such jurisdiction but in fact were precluded 
from doing so because it interfered with a specific constitutional grant of power to the 
national government to raise armies.  In the court’s opinion, Chief Justice A.J. Walker 
emphasized the important configurative role of federalism, holding that though “the 
Confederate government exists by virtue of delegated authority, its powers, within their 
appropriate boundary [italics added], are not subordinate to those of the States.”417
416 26 Tex. 387, 398; see also Jeffers v. Fair 32 Ga. 347 (1862); James L. Mims 
& James D. Burdett v. John K. Wimberly, 33 Ga. 587 (1863); Ex Parte Stringer, 38 Ala. 
457 (1863); Burroughs v. Peyton, 16 VA (Gratt.) 470 (1864); Daly & Fitzgerald v. 
Harris, 33 Ga. 38 (1864); Ex Parte Lee and Allen, 39 Ala. 457 (1864); Theodore Parker 
v. Charles Kaughman, 34 Ga. 136 (1865); and Ex Parte Ainsworth, 26 Tex. 731 (1865).
417 Ex Parte Hill, in re Willis, Johnson, and Reynolds v. Confederate States, 38 
Ala. 429, 435 (1863).
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In a concurring opinion in Ex Parte Hill, in re Willis, Alabama Associate Justice 
George W. Stone, echoed the language of other state courts by stating that under the 
Constitution, both state and national governments were limited by “constitutional 
authority” to specific powers “within their sphere of operation” and he added that such a 
division could not be modified due to wartime necessities or at the insistence of the 
states.418  Stone had supported secession in 1861 and even advocated state sovereignty 
as a justification for disunion.  However, here he held that the Confederate 
constitutional order and the principle of federalism were fixed and “[t]he jurisdictional 
area of each government should be kept distinct—restraining the Confederate 
government within the boundaries of its delegated authority, and not allowing the State 
governments to trespass on Confederate jurisdiction.”419  The Confederate Congress had 
been granted specific powers to act directly upon individuals and “to raise armies by 
direct means, without calling to its aid State authority.”420
The courts’ vigorous preservation of divided governmental authority led to a 
rejection of states’ rights as the political philosophy of the Confederacy by limiting the 
capability of states to enlarge their governmental power beyond the separate spheres 
provided for in the Constitution.  As confrontations between state and national entities 
continued during the war over control for administrative personnel, courts adjudicated 
claims about which government could exercise a better claim for these men under the 
418 Ibid., 456. See also Chief Justice Pearson’s decision in Wood v. Bradshaw, 60 
NC 269 (1864) and his dissent in Gatlin v. Walton, 60 NC 205, 229, 232 (1864).
419 Ibid.
420 Stone also discussed the restrictions upon states, that the Constitution also 
imposed “several restraints upon State authority.” 38 Ala. 429, 446, 454.
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Confederate Constitution.  In Ex Parte Lee and Allen,421 the Alabama court continued 
its earlier discussion, outlining further the division of national and state government 
powers and limiting the court’s own power to utilize the writ of habeas corpus as a tool 
for extending state court jurisdiction over national issues.  Justice Stone opposed any 
interference with national government powers within its appropriate sphere, even when 
the petitioner used the writ of habeas corpus as a shield.  Stone held that since both 
Solomon and Allen were sworn into Confederate service “no court of this State is 
authorized to discharge them” under Alabama statutory law.422
The rigidity of the jurists’ application of federalism principles may seem 
unusual set against the broad application of congressional war powers, which seems 
inconsistent with the goal of creating limited government in the Confederacy.  In 
Thomas Barber v. William A. Irwin, Associate Justice Jenkins provided a framework for 
explaining this doctrinal development.  He explained that the Confederate government 
was created in reaction to the ambiguity of federalism during the antebellum period and 
the abuses resulting from expansive government powers.  Moreover, he added, “the 
philosophy of our system is, to make the grant large enough to meet such contingencies, 
and to provide against abuse, in the structure of the government.”  Jenkins here 
explained how unlimited powers could be consistent with limited government.  The 
framers of the Confederate Constitution removed the general welfare clause as a way of 
preventing the expansion of the federal grant of authority, as had occurred during the 
antebellum period.  National authority came in the form of explicit delegations, as in the 
421 Ex Parte Lee and Allen, 39 Ala. 457 (1864).
422 39 Ala. 457, 459.
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case of congressional war powers.  Concurrently, the framers retained the necessary and 
proper clause to give government broad powers within the limitations of its 
constitutional authority under the specified delegations.423
In Virginia, in 1864, when litigants challenged the exercise of the war power as 
a usurpation of state authority and power, the state’s Supreme Court of Appeals, like the 
courts in Alabama and Georgia, found the answer to this challenge in the Confederate 
Constitution.  In Burroughs v. Peyton, the Virginia high court considered whether 
Congress possessed the constitutional authority to conscript individuals under the 
conscription acts or whether this authority was “retained” by the states.424  Burroughs 
and his fellow appellant L.P. Abrahams had provided substitutes for military service but 
after the repeal of substitution, they were arrested and sought exemptions by 
challenging Confederate constitutional authority to conscript.  In their appeal, they 
argued that Congress possessed no power to compel “citizens of a state” into the 
Confederate Army and “[t]hat a power so to do, would be despotic in its nature” and 
“inconsistent with the rights of the state; putting their very existence at the mercy of the 
Confederate government.”425
Associate Justice Robertson recognized that the case raised the fundamental 
question of which government—state or Confederate—possessed the authority to call 
individuals into military service.  This question required a determination as to “the 
423 34 Ga. 27, 37-38 (1864).
424 Conscription Acts of April 16 and September 27, 1862.  See also Burroughs 
v. Peyton, 16 Va. 470, 472, 473 (1864).
425 Ibid, 473.
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proper distribution of political power between the two governments.”426 Robertson 
stated that such “a power so vast and dangerous” would have been prohibited in the 
Constitution if it was not specifically intended.  He referred to the care taken to 
construct the Confederate Constitution and the history of federalism-related problems 
during the nineteenth century.  For Robertson, that these powers were specifically 
included in the Confederate charter “shows that the framers of the constitution of the 
Confederate States did not agree in opinion with those who think that the power in 
question is fraught with danger to the liberties of the citizen or the rights of the states, 
or they would have taken care to use language which would leave no doubt that they did 
not intend to confer it, instead of retaining that which had been construed, by many of 
the wisest statesmen under the government of the United States, to give it.”427
In support of his decision he referred to the language in Federalist No. 23
calling for energetic national government and held the same rationale guided the 
provisions and spirit of the Confederate Constitution.428  Robertson reflected upon the 
rationale provided in Federalist No. 23, that the United States required energetic 
national government so that it might fulfill the duties and responsibilities for which it 
had been created.  Drawing upon the language from Federalist No.23, Robertson stated 
“such was the construction of the constitution in the papers of the Federalist, written 
with the view of inducing the people of the states to adopt it; and recommending it to 
them because it invested the Federal government "with full power to levy troops; to 
426 Ibid, 474.
427 Burroughs v. Peyton, 16 Va. 470, 478-479.
428 Ibid, 478-480.
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build and equip fleets; and to raise the revenues which will be required for the support 
of an army and navy, in the customary and ordinary modes practised [sic] by other 
governments.”429 The court held that “[t]he true interpretation of the constitution in 
reference to this matter would seem to be, that the power to use the whole military force 
of the country was conferred upon Congress…it might be done by taking men from the 
militia either as volunteers or as conscripts—the action in either case being upon the 
individual citizen, and not upon the militia as an organized body.” 430  As in Alabama, 
Virginia’s justices held constitutional the exercise of national war powers as a power 
within the separate sphere of the national government.
That same year the Georgia high court also rejected the expansion of state 
authority or power beyond its constitutional sphere.  In Thomas W. Cobb v. William B. 
Stallings & B. A. Baldwin v. John West,431 the court addressed the issue of whether 
Confederate tax assessors and tax collectors in Georgia, engaged in their regular duties, 
were liable under the laws of the state of Georgia for militia service.  Attorneys for the 
state argued that this power was a fundamental right and power retained by the State of 
Georgia and that all state citizens were liable “to be called by the Governor into actual 
service for the purpose of repelling invasion.”  However, Associate Justice Jenkins 
refused to expand state powers beyond its respective sphere, despite the military 
emergency that Georgians faced along the Atlanta front, because constitutional 
429 Ibid., 479.
430 Ibid., 483.
431 34 Ga. 72 (1864).
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principles had to be preserved.432  Jenkins stated that both governments had their 
respective areas of responsibility which were to be respected, even in wartime [italics 
added], yet both governmental entities were to be “coordinate within the territorial 
limits of any State; they operate upon the same persons, and are intended, by their 
separate but harmonious action, to accomplish the grand results of security against 
wrongs, external and internal, and progress in civilization.”433
In a unique development in Mississippi in 1864, the court declared the 
preservation of the national government’s sphere a matter of state policy.  When the 
court was called upon to determine whether state militia laws could be used to enlist 
men who were already liable to Confederate military service, Chief Justice Handy 
examined the legislative intent behind the state militia enlistment statutes.  He stated 
emphatically that “It is clear by the 4th section of the act of January, 1863 [state act], 
that the legislature intended not to interfere with persons liable to the Confederate 
service as conscripts, by claiming their services in the militia, but that they should be 
surrendered to the service of the Confederacy…[t]hus the State establishes a policy not 
to interfere [emphasis in original], for her own service, with persons liable to 
Confederate service, recognizing the right of the Confederacy to the service of her 
citizens, embraced in the acts of Congress, and affording her aid to that government in 
enforcing that right”434
432 Thomas W. Cobb v. William B. Stallings & B. A. Baldwin v. John West, 34 Ga. 
72, 74 (1864).  This case was decided during the court’s November Term in Milledgeville.
433 Ibid., 76.
434 40 Miss. 19, 22 (1864).
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Mississippi’s state high court, consistent with its sister states, enunciated this 
division of powers by rejecting petitioner David Simmons’ claim that the state was 
vested with the authority and power to enlist men into the state militia “to the exclusion 
of the right of the Confederate States to their military service, when required by that 
[state] government.”435  Simmons argued that Mississippi had the paramount claim to 
him since the power to raise armies given to Congress was not an exclusive but a 
concurrent power which empowered the states to also muster troops via the state militia.  
Handy, writing for the court, dismissed this reasoning, stating that the national 
government’s war powers were enumerated powers and specified in the Confederate 
Constitution as a power within the national sphere of authority and responsibility.  
Where the Confederate Constitution enumerated national authority over specific 
matters, the states were to defer.  Handy held that “the power of a State, in such cases, is 
subordinate to that of the Confederate States Government; and, whenever it is exercised 
by the latter, it excludes the power of the State over the subject-matter.”  In Mississippi, 
the exclusivity of the national government’s enumerated powers under Article I, Section 
8 of the Confederate Constitution was established clearly.  Going even farther, though, 
the Mississippi court stated plainly that when the Constitution enunciated specific 
powers within the national government’s sphere of authority and responsibility, the state 
was prohibited from interfering, rejecting the notion that concurrent powers might exist 
unless explicitly provided for in the national charter.436
State supreme court justices repeatedly held that within the system of 
435 David Simmons v. J.H. Miller, Enrolling Officer, 40 Miss. 19, 21 (1864).
436 Ibid., 24-25.
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Confederate federalism there were specific and separate spheres of power and 
responsibility for state and national governments and, in this, they enunciated a doctrine 
that strongly resembled balanced federalism.  This was a crucial distinction to make if 
the Confederacy truly was a federal government for “the essential federal characteristic 
is the ‘division of political power,’ a division of supremacy (sovereignty, as used to be 
said) between member states and a central government, each having the final say
regarding matters belonging to its sphere.”  According to Diamond, “a federal system 
combines states which confederally retain sovereignty within a certain sphere, with a 
central body that nationally possesses sovereignty within another sphere; the 
combination is thought to create a new and better thing to which is given the name 
federalism.”437
Rather than applying a firm dividing line based upon states’ rights or abstract 
notions of powers and authority, the measures by which state courts considered 
carefully the provisions of the Confederate Constitution were the purposes and 
responsibilities to which each governmental entity was held to fulfill.  State courts 
defined the “areas of action” in which each could operate and the extent to which they 
were to cooperate in support of these purposes and responsibilities.  In so doing, they 
emphasized the qualitative element of dual federalism, making Confederate federalism 
a substantive and purposive constitutional doctrine.
437 Diamond, “What the Framers Meant,” 26.  Diamond said, “a confederacy and 
a nation are seen as the extremes. The defining characteristic of a confederacy is that the 
associated states retain all the sovereign power, with the central body entirely dependent 
legally upon their will; the defining characteristic of a nation is that the central body has 
all the sovereign power, with the localities entirely dependent legally upon the will of 
the nation. In this view, then, federalism is truly the middle term, for its defining 
characteristic is that it modifies and then combines the best characteristics of the other 
two forms.”
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The demise of states’ rights as an influence upon Confederate federalism was also 
evident in the state supreme courts’ rejection of concurrent powers to make war and field 
military forces.  The Texas high court was the first state court in the Confederacy to 
address this issue, adjudicating the more immediate legal question of whether the Texas 
and the Confederate government could hold equal claims for military service on a Texas 
citizen.  In Coupland,438 the court stated that the Confederate government had been 
vested with “the sole power to determine upon the questions of war and peace, and that 
it has consequently made it the duty of that agent [the Confederate government] to 
protect the state itself and its local agency from attacks from both domestic and foreign 
foes” and the government had been “clothed…with the power to do this by authorizing 
it to raise and support armies, and to provide and maintain a navy, to the extent that in 
its judgment it should deem necessary.”439 National needs could be prioritized higher 
that state interests.  
Within its respective sphere of responsibility, the Confederate government could 
restrict the local use of the state militia or any state restrictions on the national 
government’s use of the state militia because the Confederate sphere of responsibility 
included the defense of the entire nation.  Furthermore, the range of powers provided 
with this authority to make war was quite extensive and Richmond was “further 
authorized to call upon the other agency [the state government] to bring to its aid, if 
necessary, all of the arms-bearing -population it had left still under the control of the 
local agent, for whose organization it was required to provide, that the local agency, 
438 26 Tex. 386, (1862).
439 Ibid., 403-404.
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might be thus prepared to meet the call that these sudden emergencies might 
occasion.”440  Regardless of the state’s interest in restricting the national government’s 
use of state militia troops, the Texas court held that such interests could not blur the 
separate spheres within the Confederate system of federalism nor could it bar the 
Confederate government from fulfilling its constitutional responsibility to provide for 
the defense of the nation.  Nor could the state use the appointment power to name state 
civil officers as a means to exempt men from national military service.
Even by 1864, despite military demands, growing political opposition in the 
states, and popular disaffection for the war, federalism was still a vibrant doctrine.  In 
Ex Parte William A. Winnard,441 Texas Associate Justice Oran M. Roberts iterated the 
fundamental principles from Coupland and Turman and refuted the claim that the 
national government could expand its own powers, pointing out that the federal and 
state governments were created with an “established division of powers.”  Neither was 
“competent to absorb the others…In the formation of the State and Confederate 
Governments, it was contemplated that the two should harmoniously co-exist, as long as 
the system of government remained unchanged by the people, who made both, and 
delegated to them their separate or concurrent powers.” The constitutional limitations 
on government power applied also to state government, precluding the Texas 
Legislature from asserting any right “to take a soldier, regularly enrolled, from the 
440 Ibid.  Keller, “Power and Rights: Two Centuries of American 
Constitutionalism,” 681.
441 Robards, Synopses of the Decisions of the Supreme Court of the State of 
Texas, 20.
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control of the Confederate States, and retain him as a civil officer.”442  The Texas court 
preserved the principle that the Confederate government was a federal government in 
which the division of powers and responsibilities was to be taken seriously and 
enunciated vigorously.  State claims for an individual’s service as a civil officer would 
not exempt him from conscription under Confederate authority.
While state courts maintained the separate spheres of federalism, their wartime 
cases led them to reject concurrent jurisdiction and the understanding that state and 
national governments were co-equal.  This represented a significant break from 
traditional dual federalism.  In Coupland, the Texas court delivered a stunning blow to 
proponents of concurrent jurisdiction, holding that not only were these separate spheres 
to be maintained, but each sphere was not co-equal.  The question of which government 
enjoyed primacy over the other was dependent upon the particular tasks and spheres 
within the exercise of authority was being made.  As the Texas court made clear in 
Coupland, there was a specific hierarchy of powers and authorities contained within the 
Confederate Constitution which had been ordained by the people of the Confederacy.  
National and state governments possessed “distinct powers,” they were required “to 
look for their performance to the citizens,” and the political will of the people was to be 
manifested in the nation’s constitution.  Even when they might exercise jurisdiction 
over the same issues or individuals and this might “at times…present seemingly 
conflicting grants of power,” the court made clear that “the limited and subordinate 
must yield to the general and superior” and “such as usually pertain to or are indices of 




Edward White argued that Article I of the Confederate Constitution was a 
document of limited national authority and power since the legislative powers of the 
national government were delegated rather than granted.  He drew upon J.L.M. Curry’s 
statement that “’[t]he permanent Constitution was framed on the States rights theory, to 
take from a majority in Congress unlimited control, and to give effective assurances of 
purity and economy in all national legislation.’”444  White went on to argue that 
Congress became the “agent of the individual states” and that “the states could 
withdraw the power they had given Congress whenever the need arose.”  But, between 
1862 and 1865, state supreme court justices across the Confederacy rejected the 
preeminence of the states’ rights ideology in Confederate federalism and specifically 
rejected such a doctrinal holding in their wartime decisions.445
The Confederate framers may have been conservative in terms of attempting to 
preserve the essential tenets of American constitutionalism but they were not interested 
in re-instituting national governance on the model of the Articles.  The specific goal of 
dividing sovereignty and establishing more clearly those separate spheres of action for 
national and state governments was not to facilitate any purpose of creating a state-
centered and weak federal governmental arrangement for the Confederacy.
443 26 Tex. 386, 404.
444 Curry, Civil History of the Government of the Confederate States, 69.
445 White, “The Constitution of the Confederate States of America: Innovation 
or Duplication?,” 11; Hardaway, “The Confederate Constitution: A Legal and Historical 
Examination,” 23.
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Governmental authority and powers were to be divided between both state and national 
government to effect more efficient and representative governance of the political 
communities and to facilitate both local and national interests and goals.  The war and 
local pressures both presented significant challenges to state supreme courts for the 
preservation of these principles.  Yet, these courts rejected the state- centered model of 
the Articles of Confederation in their wartime decisions and rendered constitutional 
decisions in conformity to the provisions and principles of the Confederate charter and 
enunciated a substantive and purposeful doctrine based upon national goals and purposes 
provided for in the Confederate Constitution.446 The decisions of the state high courts 
contradict an understanding of the Confederacy as a loose confederation of states, each 
acting independently.
By enunciating that sovereignty had been vested by the people of the 
Confederacy in both state and national governments at the funding, state supreme court 
justices made the principle of federalism a vibrant constitutional doctrine—partly state 
and partly national in orientation—designed to facilitate specific national objectives 
provided for in the Confederate Constitution.  The state supreme courts enunciated a 
balanced form of federalism in which government would possess the full range and 
scope of powers to fulfill the duties and responsibilities it had been authorized in the 
Constitution to achieve.  During the war, the enunciation of Confederate federalism 
446 Moore argued that the supremacy of the Confederate government seemed to 
contradict the state sovereignty emphasized by secession and the founding period.  He 
argued that the courts enforced a powerful national government which bore a striking 
resemblance to the government from which southerners had seceded, that “the principle 
of State sovereignty apparently never established itself as firmly on the bench as it did 
in the councils of state and in the norms of political philosophy.” Moore, Conscription 
and Conflict in the Confederacy, 162-163.
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became increasingly important because it addressed the issue of the importance of 
states’ rights in defining the goals and the creation of the Confederate nation, it laid 
down a doctrinal structure for Confederate governance, and it articulated a philosophy 
about the national purposes of the Confederacy.  Even more importantly, these state 
supreme courts articulated these principles as matters of national constitutional doctrine, 
making it less likely that these principles could be easily ignored after the war.447
447 Weidner argued that “Federalism sets severe limitations on the authority of 
central government officials in dealing with the lower governmental units.  
Constitutionally, they are forbidden to alter in any way the power of officials in lower 
units to act.” Weidner, “Decision-Making in a Federal System,” 212-213.  Under the 
Confederate Constitution and federalism principles, Confederate officials were 
prohibited from altering the authority of the state officials, including state court justices, 
and the state supreme courts ensured that the general government did not intrude upon 
the sphere of authority of the state governments.
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Chapter Five
Federalism and National Purposes
In the Confederacy, the division of governmental power was a normative 
principle and the state supreme court justices rigorously enforced this tenet of 
Confederate constitutionalism.  However, in early 1862, it was not clear whether the 
Confederate government would fulfill its obligations, under the Confederate Constitution, 
to mobilize, marshal resources, and prosecute a successful war in the interest of national 
mission and preservation.  If the doctrine of federalism merely limited government by 
dividing authority and powers, then it could be shaped by state supreme courts to assert 
states’ rights, elevate the interests of the state above those of the nation, and limit the 
national government’s effectiveness and capability to realize national goals and 
purposes.  As the state supreme courts enunciated in their wartime decisions, federalism 
in the Confederacy was “a means, not an end,” a doctrine with certain specific 
components and features and designed to facilitate effective governance for the 
Confederate nation.448
In its decision in Coupland, the Texas court, looking to the text of the 
Confederate Constitution as a guide on the extent of national government authority and 
power, focused upon national and constitutional rather than local political purposes and 
interests.449  The Constitution identified a common union of southern states and the 
articulation of common political purposes.  The common purposes and goals of the 
448 Morton Grodzins, “The Federal System” in Goals for Americans: The Report 
of the President’s Commission on National Goals (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 
1965), 265.
449 Ex Parte Coupland, 26 Tex. 387 (1862).
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nation naturally would be prioritized above those of the state as a matter of 
construction.  In the state supreme court decisions, the justices articulated, that the states 
were to be sometimes supreme and other times subordinate to the national government, 
depending on the sphere of governmental responsibility.  As John Marshall had done in 
Cohen v. Virginia in 1821, the courts also made very clear that within its sphere, the 
national government’s authority and power to fulfill its constitutional duties was 
supreme.450  Even though the state supreme court justices interpreted Confederate 
federalism as possessing a strong element of nation-centered federalism, particularly 
enunciating as essential the Supremacy Clause of the Confederate Constitution, the 
courts preserved the doctrine as a doctrine of balanced federalism.  This weakened the 
importance of states’ rights as a principal configurative theory in Confederate 
constitutionalism and proved to enable more effectively the task of facilitating national
purposes.451
450 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 414-415. Marshall wrote “The American people are 
one; and the government which is alone capable of controlling and managing their 
interests in all these respects is the government of the Union…. America has chosen to 
be, in many respects, and to many purposes, a nation; and for all these purposes, her 
government is complete; to all these objects, it is competent.  The people have declared, 
that in the exercise of all powers given for these objects, it is supreme…These states are 
constituent parts of the United States.  They are members of one great empire—for 
some purposes sovereign, for some purposes subordinate…. We think that in a 
government acknowledgedly supreme, with respect to objects of vital interest to the 
nation, there is nothing inconsistent with sound reason, nothing incompatible with the 
nature of government, in making all its departments supreme, so far as respects those 
objects, and so far as it is necessary to their attainment [italics added].” 19 U.S. (6 
Wheat.) 264, 414-415; G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change, 
1815-1835. Abridged Edition (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1991), 504-
524.
451 Nation-centered federalism emphasizes national power and is premised upon 
the belief that the Constitution was created and ratified by the American people, not the 
states.  It is the national government that bears the primary responsibility for addressing 
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The Preamble, Sovereignty, and National Purposes
The purposes for which the Confederacy had been created were identified in the
document’s Preamble and merit important consideration.452  While the preamble lacks a 
prescriptive character and “strictly speaking, is not part of the Constitution,” it is, 
according to Edward S. Corwin, reflective of the purposes for which the nation is 
created.  Corwin stated that the Preamble provides two critical pieces of information 
since “it indicates the course from which the Constitution comes, from which it derives its 
claim to obedience, namely, the people” and “it states the great objects which the 
Constitution and the Government established by it are expected to promote: national 
unity, justice, peace at home and abroad, liberty, and the general welfare” [this last 
purpose was omitted in the Confederate Constitution].453
When the Provisional Congress, convened as a constitutional convention to draft 
the preamble to the Confederate Constitution, their debate and their final version 
the needs of the nation and in furtherance of these goals the national government may 
obligate the state governments.  A focal point for nation-centered federalism is the 
supremacy clause found in Article I, section 2 of the Constitution. Leach. American 
Federalism,10-12.
452 The Confederate preamble stated “We, the people of the Confederate States, 
each State acting in its sovereign and independent character, in order to form a 
permanent federal government, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, and secure 
the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity invoking the favor and guidance 
of Almighty God do ordain and establish this Constitution for the Confederate States of 
America.”
453 Corwin, The Constitution and What It Means Today, revised by Harold W. 
Chase and Craig R. Ducat, 13th edition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1973), 1-3.
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represented a decisive move away from states’ rights.454  The original draft language of 
the Preamble from the “Committee on [the] Permanent Constitution” read “We, the 
people of the Confederate States, each state acting for itself.”455  The obvious statement 
of state autonomy in this phrase did not articulate the common purpose for which the 
Confederacy was being created and so the framers struck “each state acting for itself” 
from the Preamble.456  Simultaneously, the framers refused to remove the phrase, “We the 
people,” from the nation’s constitutive document.457  Like the United States Constitution, 
the Confederate charter began with the declaration that it was created by the intent of the 
people of the entire Confederacy and reflects the intention of the people of the nation at 
the time of the drafting to come together and create a common framework of government 
that would reflect the principles, ideas, and purposes of the people as a nation.458
454 Charles Lee stated that although there was no constitutional provision for 
secession, that this was “implied” by the “phraseology” of the preambles of the 
Confederate Constitutions. Lee, The Confederate Constitutions, 145. Interestingly, Lee 
did not include any analysis of the discussions or proposals by the Confederate framers as 
to the language and intent of the preamble.
455 Journal of the Confederate Congress, 1:851.
456 Existing historiography on Confederate federalism contends that the original 
intent in the preamble was not to form “a more permanent federal government” but to 
safeguard state sovereignty. Robinson, “A New Deal in Constitutions,” 454.
457 Thomas Jefferson Withers of South Carolina was a member of the 
Provisional Confederate Congress a former Circuit Solicitor and member of South 
Carolina’s Secession Convention sought to increase state power and authority in the 
Preamble with his February 28, 1861 motion to amend the Preamble by removing the 
phrase, “We, the people of….”  His motion was rejected. Ibid.
458 Joseph Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution, expressed a similar 
rule for interpretation, stating that the “true office” of the Preamble “is to expound the 
nature and extent an application of the powers actually conferred by the Constitution, 
and not substantively to create them.” Story, Commentaries on the Constitution, 
(Cambridge, MA, 1833), 462.
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The result was a revised second phrase of the Preamble (“each State acting in its 
sovereign and independent character”) which has been interpreted, ironically enough, as a 
strong statement of states’ rights ideology.459  In actuality, the Confederate framers here 
rejected states’ rights as the preeminent constitutional principle, choosing instead to 
recognize and affirm the importance of the state, as a unit of political organization and 
political activity at that time, which was necessary for the ratification or adoption of the 
Confederate Constitution.460  This revised language in the Preamble reflected the political 
reality existent at the time of the creation of the Provisional Confederate Constitution 
since the states had seceded from the Union as political units.  Following secession, 
southern political leaders who met to form a common national government did so as “the 
Deputies of the Sovereign and Independent States of South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, 
Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, invoking the favor of Almighty God” that they 
might, “in behalf of these States, ordain and establish this Constitution for the 
Provisional Government of the same.”461  The framers seemed intent on eliminating 
459 Lee argues that this phrase “affirms the state sovereignty concept of its 
framers” but the genesis of the language of the preamble and the preamble, read, in its 
entirety as a statement of constitutional purpose, suggests otherwise. Lee, Confederate 
Constitutions, 89; DeRosa, The Confederate Constitution of 1861, 20-21.
460 This phrase, according to Alexander H. Stephens, actually Stephens, writing 
after the war, stated, “’In this, the words ’each State acting in its Sovereign and 
Independent Character’ were introduced to put at rest forever the argument of the 
Centralists, drawn from the old Constitution, that it had been made by the people of all 
the States collectively, or in mass, and not by the States in their several Sovereign 
character.’” Stephens, A Constitutional View of the Late War Between the States, 2:335; 
op cit. Lee, Confederate Constitutions, 89. Lee argued that the viewpoint of Stephens 
was shared by Curry. Hull, “The Making of the Confederate Constitution.” Hull was the 
grandson of Confederate framer and general, Georgian T.R.R. Cobb.
461 Journal of the Confederate Congress, 1:899; see generally, 899-909.
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ambiguity about federalism in the Confederacy by clarifying the role and authority of the 
states at the time the national government was formed.462
Doctrinally, state supreme court justices rejected the understanding that the 
nation had been created by the states rather than directly by the people, rejecting a 
states’ rights conception of Confederate constitutional forms as well as the proposition 
that the states exercised a general supremacy over the national government.  In the 
Confederacy, sovereignty emanated from the people, a principle that reflected nation-
centered more than state-centered federalism.  In the 1862 case of Jeffers v. Fair,463 the 
Georgia Supreme Court defined the divided spheres within Confederate federalism and 
how sovereignty had been vested by the people in both state and national governments for 
the performance of the respective goals by each.  The court held that the national 
government possessed the authority to call into national military service a state official, 
even when judged by the state to be necessary for the proper operation of state 
governance.  Associate Justice Jenkins, looking to the form and purposes under the 
Constitution and the structure of Confederate federalism, stated that sovereignty 
emanated from the people from the states and that Confederate constitutional 
government was created by the people of the Confederacy in order to serve national and 
462 DeRosa stated that “the C.S.A. framers were determined to avoid ambiguity 
regarding the status of the states within the Confederacy.” However, their intention, 
according to DeRosa, was not to assert the supremacy of the states over the national 
government but to protect the states from national government consolidation; in other 
words, their intention was to preserve the federal arrangement from corruption. DeRosa, 
Confederate Constitution of 1861, 20.
463 32 Ga. 347 (1862).
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common purposes.464 Two years later, in Cobb v. Stallings, Associate Justice Jenkins 
pointed out the fallacy inherent in allowing the states to interfere with the exercise of 
national governmental authority.  Such state actions would interfere with “the 
unobstructed operation of the machinery of their common Government, established by 
consent of all.”465
The Preamble identified the people and not the states as the source of sovereignty 
in the Confederacy and the creators of the nation, representing the weakening influence of 
states’ rights as the configurative political philosophy of the Confederacy.  The phrase in 
the Confederate Constitution, “We the people of the Confederate States” emphasized 
the people of the nation as the creators of the national purposes of Confederate 
government also influenced some understanding of sovereignty in the Confederate 
government.  In North Carolina, in 1862, Chief Justice Richmond M. Pearson, 
traditionally held out by historians as “captious” and obstructionist to the government in 
Richmond, declared that the Confederate government was “distinctive,” that 
sovereignty had not been vested solely with the state, and that philosophical principles 
about divided sovereignty had been given specific form in the Constitution when “all 
these states were compelled to give up a portion of their former respective 
sovereignties, and to invest the newly created government with them.”466  Two years 
464 Ibid., 366.
465 34 Ga. 72, 76 (1864).
466 In Re Bryan, 60 N.C. 1, 10 (1862).  This principle was not a dry question of 
law but a matter of public discussion.  The Salisbury Carolina Watchman noted the 
limitations upon state government, based upon the sovereignty that had been vested in 
the national government by the people: “The State has delegated to the Confederate 
Government the sole right to declare war and make peace.--While in the Confederacy...the 
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later, Pearson’s brother justice William Battle echoed this idea in Gatlin v. Walton,467
explaining in his examination of the Federal (and implied, the Confederate) Constitution 
that the central government was formed as states surrendered a portion of their 
sovereignty.468 In 1864, the Texas Supreme Court again rejected any belief that the 
Confederacy was the creation of the states.  Associate Justice Reeves held that the 
Confederate government was the creation of the people of the Confederacy, that “the 
government of the Confederate States, like the government of a state, is derived from 
the same source, the people, and founded on their authority; that the constitution and 
laws of the Confederate States are the supreme law of the land, and not in any sense 
dependent on the constitution of a state for their authority.”469
The Preamble to the Permanent Confederate Constitution, though similar to the 
preamble in the United States Constitution, differs significantly because of its emphasis 
on creating a federal national republic.  Confederate framers replaced the U.S. 
Constitution’s objective to create “a more perfect Union” with the more specific 
objective in their Constitution, to create “a permanent federal government.”470  This 
phrase identified the people of the Confederate nation, acting through their states, as 
State cannot make peace or negotiate for it.  To do this...the State must first recall the 
rights of sovereignty which she has vested in the Confederate Government.” The Salisbury 
Carolina Watchman, May 2, 1864.
467 60 N.C. 205 (1864).
468 Ibid., 208-209.
469 Ex Parte Abraham Mayer, 26 Tex. 715 (1864).
470 George Anastaplo argued that the specific use of new phrases emphasizes the 
“importance of words” and the importance of changes. Anastaplo, The Amendments to 
the Constitution: A Commentary, 133.
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fulfilling a national purpose to come together and to form “a permanent and federal
government.”471  This was a significant step for the preamble identified the Confederate 
constitutional arrangement as a federal government, not as a confederacy, stressing the 
importance of divided responsibilities, powers, and authorities rather than a loose 
collection of autonomous states.472  The new nation was also established to be permanent, 
strongly suggesting that the framers intended that secession—the most extreme 
expression of the states’ rights philosophy—was not a valid political or constitutional 
theory or option under the new document.473
Superior Duty to Fulfill National Purposes
While the Preamble provided several specific national goals, to “establish 
justice, insure domestic tranquility, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and 
471 Preamble. Nieman, “Republicanism, the Confederate Constitution, and the 
American Constitutional Tradition,” 203 and Fitts, “The Confederate Convention: The 
Constitutional Debate,” 189-210.
472 Joseph  Story, A Familiar Exposition of the Constitution of the United States, 
(Boston, MA: Marsh, Capen, Lyon, and Webb, 1840; reprint, Lake Bluff, IL: Regenery 
Books, 1986), 58-60.
473 Diamond, “What the Framers Meant,” 27.  An idea raised by Diamond is the 
inaccuracy of modern understandings of nineteenth-century terms.  According to 
Diamond, federalism in the nineteenth century meant then exactly what we mean now 
by confederalism (“a sort of association or league of sovereign states”). Diamond, 
“What the Framers Meant,” 27 (the sources Diamond drew upon included Samuel 
Johnson's Dictionary of the English Language, 2 vols. (Heidelberg: Joseph Englemann, 
1828). John Walker's Pronouncing Dictionary and Expositor of the English Language 
(Philadelphia: Ambrose Walker, 1818). White argued that a secession clause was 
unnecessary in the Confederate charter because “they [the framers] were committed to 
the compact theory,” that any restriction or rejection of the right to secede would have 
“contradicted” it, and that the right of secession was “evident” in the language of the 
preamble to the charter. White, “The Constitution of the Confederate States of America: 
Innovation or Duplication?,” 8.
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our posterity,” it would fall, ironically, to state institutions, the state supreme courts, to 
overcome the assertions of theories and ideas that might inhibit the national 
government’s fulfillment of these constitutional goals.  This principle was established in 
1862, early in the war, in two major decisions in Texas and Georgia.  Writing for the 
Texas court in the case of Ex Parte Coupland, Associate Justice George F. Moore 
vigorously asserted the federal nature of the nation, holding that the Confederate 
government, especially Congress, was more than simply an agent of the states.474 In the 
Georgia case of Jeffers v. Fair, Associate Justice Jenkins refused to allow the state 
government to interfere with the “instrumentalities of the national government which 
were necessary for the fulfillment of its responsibilities and duties to the nation.”  Under 
Article Four, section 3 of the Confederate Constitution, the national government 
guaranteed to the states a republican form of government, but Jenkins asked “can a 
republican form of government be maintained without the necessary instrumentalities?”  
Moreover, Jenkins stated that it was equally unacceptable to have any interference with 
or abdication by the national government of its duty to employ its full powers to provide 
for such constitutional goals and purposes: “if…such instrumentalities, whilst in the 
exercise of their proper functions, within any State, were forcibly withdrawn, would not 
that act violate the constitutional guaranty?”475
The constitutional obligations of the Confederate government and of 
Confederate citizenship were more specifically pronounced later that year in another 
Georgia decision, Thomas Barber v. William A. Irwin, et al., a decision arising from 
474 Ex Parte Coupland, 26 Tex. 387 (1862).
475 Asa O. Jeffers v. John Fair, 33 Ga. 347, 368 (1862).
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five separate cases.476  Against the claim that the conscription acts were 
unconstitutional, the Georgia court, with Associate Justice Jenkins writing for the court, 
reaffirmed its holding in Jeffers v. Fair,477 in which it had held the conscription acts to 
be constitutional as a valid exercise of constitutional power and added here that this 
specific action by the national government was consistent with its constitutional “duty” 
to “’protect each of the States against invasion.’”478 In Cobb v. Stallings, this principle 
was more completely explained by the Georgia Supreme Court.  The national 
government in Richmond was more than the common agent of state interests because of 
the common purposes for which the national government had been created.  Because of 
these national purposes, the national government was supreme within its sphere of 
power and authority.479
The duties of the national government were taken seriously and preserved from 
usurpation by state governments attempting to exercise concurrent jurisdiction, chiefly 
state government attempts to exercise concurrent war powers.  In December of 1864, 
North Carolina’s Associate Justice Manly handed down his opinion in Smith v. Prior480, 
addressing the question of whether the defendant, Robert H. Smith, was entitled to 
exemption from military service due to his position as watchman in Salisbury even though 
476 34 Ga. 27 (1864).  The five jointly-decided cases were Thomas Barber v. 
William A. Irwin; E.T. Jones v. Nathaniel F. Mercer; E. T. Jones v. Isaac B. Brinson; 
Isaac Dennis, et al. v. Willis B. Scott; E.T. Jones v. William Warren.
477 33 Ga. 347 (1862).
478 34 Ga. 27, 31.
479 Cobb v. Stallings, 34 Ga. 72 (1864).
480 60 N.C. 267 (1864).
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his military enrollment was prior to his appointment. Manly, writing for the court, stated 
that “His enrollment, prior to such appointment, put Smith in military service, and he could 
not be elected out of it into a city watch.  It is not necessary that one should be in the field, 
as we conceive, to constitute him a soldier.  If he has been enrolled by legal authority, and 
put on furlough, his status is as firmly fixed as if he were in the trenches, confronting the 
enemy.”481  Manly rejected the state’s right to provide such exemptions from Confederate 
service and remanded Smith back into the custody of the Confederate Army:  “We can 
conceive of no greater reason why the State should have the power to take away from the 
Confederate States persons appointed to places of duty than the reverse of the proposition.  
Neither, in our opinion, is necessary, and neither is constitutional...especially when we 
consider the paramount powers and duties of the General Government in respect to 
war.”482
Another significant development in the enunciation of the Confederate doctrine of 
federalism was the high priority afforded to national purposes and the authority of the 
Confederate Constitution in determining this prioritization.  In North Carolina in Gatlin v. 
481 Ibid., 268.
482 Ibid.  Amidst local citizens, the substitution provisions of the conscription 
laws caused a great deal of anger and frustration amongst North Carolinians, as it did 
for other southerners. By the end of 1863, the ability to escape conscription by hiring a 
substitute was a “chief cause” of discontent amongst troops already in Confederate 
service.  Under the provisions of the substitute law, “many able bodied young men were 
left undisturbed at home to carry on private business on their own account....”  The 
substitute law “guaranteed exemptions to speculators, while the equivalent service 
contemplated by the furnishing of a substitute was seldom rendered.” Writers from the 
Carolina Watchman interviewed troops in December of 1863 and wrote “we verily 
believe that unless they are appeased on this subject by the faithful execution of the law 
bearing upon it, we shall witness in the Spring more fearful demoralization in the army 
than ever before.” Richmond Whig, in Salisbury Carolina Watchman, February 15, 
1864.
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Walton483 Associate Justice Battle explained that the national purposes for which the 
federal arrangement had been created could not be altered since doing so would violate the 
constitutive reasons for which the national charter had been created.  When the national 
government’s power to make war was challenged by the state sovereignty argument, 
Associate Justice Battle explained that such a power had been vested by the people as part 
of the public trust and “it [the national war power] cannot be abdicated, contracted away, 
or encumbered, but should be kept as a trust to be used for the public safety when there is 
need for it, unembarrassed by claims of private right…The Government is but the 
representative of the people, and it has, therefore, in substance, the right which the people 
have to call upon one another for aid.”  He further explained that this idea was ensconced 
in constitutional principles and provisions: “These principles are reasonable, consist with 
natural law and with the law of the land, and should be present in the minds of all citizens
making contracts among themselves or with the Government.”484
483 60 N.C. 205 (1864).
484 Ibid., 216. Walton was conscribed in August of 1862 under the act of April 
1862, obtained a substitute (as provided for under section 9 of the act), and was 
discharged from service. Walton was later conscribed under the act of January 5, 1864 
but claimed that by virtue of his obtaining a substitute for conscription under the first 
Conscription Act, he was discharged from any further military duty for the war. 
Associate Justice Battle referred to the language of the April 1862 act which addressed 
substitution, “Persons not liable to duty may be received as substitutes for those who 
are, under such regulations as the Secretary of War may prescribe.” 60 N.C. 205, 217-
218.  The issue for the court was clear, whether the act of Congress of January 5, 1864, 
entitled “An act to put an end to the exemption from military service of those who have 
heretofore furnished substitutes” was constitutional?  At the root of this issue was the 
question of whether Walton, by furnishing a substitute under the April 16, 1862 act and 
obtaining a discharge from service, had entered into a binding contract with the 
Confederate government, a contract which the Congress possessed no authority to 
impair. The court held that “If a contract were made between the Government and the 
conscript, by which the latter furnishes a substitute, under section 9 of the act of 16 
April, 1862, the Government has a right to annul the contract by virtue of the power 
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Battle maintained that the superior duty lay in the central government’s duty to 
protect the population and that the war power wielded by the central government was a 
significant grant of power: “Let it be remembered that the Government had the absolute 
power to control the citizens for military duty, limited only by the exclusion of State 
officers…a service was thus demanded of him, which he owed, and from which he had no 
escape as a matter of right…it has unlimited authority to use his personal service.  It has 
but to command, and he must obey.”  To consider substitution as an irrevocable contract 
with the principal would result in the “weakening and fettering its military power” and 
“must diminish the force of the Nation— [it] cannot augment it.”485
The national government’s constitutional duty to protect the nation by 
implementing its war powers would be maintained even when the state supreme courts 
came into direct conflict with state military authorities over the issue of home defense.  In 
Ex Parte Tate,486 the Alabama court established the primacy of the national 
government’s claim to men and material in constitutional terms.  The court held that 
“the war-and-peace power, conferred on the congress of the Confederate States by the 
constitution, is the highest and most vital trust confided to that government; because 
upon its proper exercise the maintenance and protection of every valuable right, 
whether of individuals or the body politic, and involving the very existence of both, 
inherent in all governments whose organic law does not expressly deny to them that 
power.” 60 N.C. 205.
485 Ibid., 219.
486 39 Ala 254 (1864).
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must, in case of insurrection or foreign invasion, ultimately depend.”487  The justices 
held that under the Confederate Constitution, “there are certain attributes of 
sovereignty--certain high functions of government--which the legislature has no right to 
give or grant away” and concluded that, because of the high importance of this trust and 
delegation of authority upon the national government, the Congress could not surrender 
its obligations but that they “must be kept and held by the legislature, entire and 
undiminished, for the benefit of the people—the nation—as public functions and 
attributes of sovereignty.”488  Furthermore, that “to execute this high trust, it is the 
imperative duty, as it is the manifest right of that government, to exhaust, if it becomes 
necessary, the entire military force of the country, in men, money, and every other 
available material of war; but especially to hold under its control and to employ all the 
males of the country capable of bearing arms, or of performing other military 
service.”489 The act of Congress which limited exemptions were “not violative of any 
constitutional provision, but are valid, and within the scope of the powers conferred on 
the general government.”490
In North Carolina, in Wood v. Bradshaw,491 the state supreme court had to decide 
whether Thomas S. Wood, the owner and manager of more than fifteen able-bodied slaves, 





491 60 N.C. 269 (1864).
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bonded exempt under that law, could be made to perform military service in the Home 
Guards of the state.  The case raised a federalism issue and whether Wood could be 
considered, by an act of Congress, in the service of and performing duty for the 
Confederate Government when he was arrested by the defendant, John A. Bradshaw, for 
service in the Home Guard.  This required the court to consider whether Congress was 
empowered by the Constitution to conscript Wood for other services of a military nature.  
Battle concluded that the Confederate Congress did possess the power to conscript for 
services other than a military kind under the authority to raise and support armies 
conferred by the Confederate Constitution.  Battle added that when the government should 
find itself in need of money and supplies to support its armies, then there should not be any 
reason to prevent the government from compelling individuals, who might otherwise be in 
the field as soldiers, to furnish provisions and munitions for the army.  Battle concluded
that if this authority would be challenged by the state governments, “The supremacy of the 
war power of the Confederate over that of the State Government cannot be disputed.”  
Battle went to establish clearly the primacy of the Confederate government in fulfilling its 
war-making responsibilities: “The personal service which the Confederate Government 
has a right to demand, and has demanded, of the petitioner is inconsistent with that which 
the State demands of him; and, such being the case, the latter must give way to the 
former…The Confederate Government cannot exempt from the service of the State any 
person who is not called into its own service; but every one who is doing service for it 




Pearson concurred with Battle, upholding the principle that the war provided a 
broader construction of the power of the central government, that “in case of necessity, the 
power of the Confederate States is unlimited so far as the citizens are concerned.  It is my 
duty to conform to that decision.”  With regard to the question of the power of the states to 
infringe upon the power of the central government and that the central government was 
thusly limited, Pearson stated “I think not, for the reason that the States have, by the 
provisions of the Constitution, subordinated the State war power to that of the Confederate 
States.  ‘No State shall engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger 
as will not admit of delay’…So the war power of the State is secondary, and imposes no 
limitation on that of the Confederate States.”493
In rendering decisions about the nature of Confederate federalism, Southern 
state supreme jurists manifested their intent to preserve national constitutional 
principles through a strict construction of the Confederate Constitution.  In Ex Parte M. 
C. Talkington and Ex Parte Randle, the Texas court enunciated the supremacy of the 
national government, under the Confederate Constitution, within its respective sphere 
of authority, refusing to allow state law to become supreme over Confederate law.494
Following an earlier decision, Moore refused and rejected the argument that affirmed 
that decision: “A party who has furnished a substitute in the provisional Army of the 
Confederate States, under the Conscript Laws, is not thereby exonerated from military 
service as a militia man, under the laws of the State; nor is he thereby excused from a 
493 Ibid., 272.
494 Ex Parte M. C. Talkington, [unreported decision] (1863).  Robards, Synopses 
of the Decisions of the Supreme Court of the State of Texas, 12.  Ex Parte Randle
[unreported decision] (1863) appears in Robards, Synopses of Decisions, 10.
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draft ordered by the Governor, in response to a call made upon him for a part of the 
militia for Confederate service” since the commanding general would be acting “by the 
direction and in obedience to the orders of the President.”495
In Simmons v. Miller, the Mississippi court vitalized the Supremacy clause of 
the Confederate Constitution, holding that there was no other conclusion to be reached 
since “this results necessarily from the constitution, and the laws made by the 
Confederate States in pursuance of it, being the supreme law of the land.”496  The 
Confederate supremacy clause and the specificity contained within the Confederate 
Constitution precluded the primacy of the state to interfere with Confederate 
responsibilities or to subsume into state authority the responsibilities and powers to be 
exercised by the national government.497  Borrowing from Marshall’s opinion in Sturges 
v. Crowninshield,498 Chief Justice Alexander Handy stated “that ‘whenever the terms in 
which a power is granted to Congress, or the nature of the power, require that it shall be 
exercised exclusively by Congress, the subject is as completely taken from the State 
legislatures as if they had been expressly forbidden to act on it.’”499
When state governors, state agencies, and litigants asserted state concurrent 
jurisdiction over military affairs or state troops, state courts refused to accept such ideas 
because of constitutional provisions, especially the Supremacy clause in the 
495 Ibid. 12-13.
496 40 Miss. 19, 24-25.
497 Ibid.
498 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
499 40 Miss. 19, 25.
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Confederate Constitution.  In Alabama, the justices held that there were distinct spheres 
of responsibility granted to state and national governments and any attempt by either to 
assert itself within the jurisdiction of the other would be unconstitutional.500  In Ex 
Parte Hill, In Re Willis, Johnson, & Reynolds v. Confederate States, the Alabama State 
Supreme Court restricted the expansion of its own state court jurisdictional authority
over issues belonging within the Confederate sphere by invoking the supremacy clause 
of the Constitution.501
National Purposes and Defining Citizenship
National purposes enabled the Confederate government to make demands upon a 
national citizenship, even for foreigners or when state interests conflicted with national 
interests.  When state governments asserted a right to call up and retain state militia 
troops, conflicts arose with the national government as to which entity possessed better 
authority over the state troops.  In wartime decisions, state supreme courts turned to the 
Confederate Constitution and the doctrine of federalism for the resolution. Although 
500 In the Plan of a Provisional Government from 1861, the language of the 
document had empowered the President to call up the militia and assume command 
over them until such time that the Congress had provided for this in legislation: “The 
President shall be, ex officio, Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy, and also of 
the Militia of the States, when called into service.  He shall have power to call into 
service any part of the Militia or regular troops of any State, and to organize and 
employ the same for the proper defence [sic] of the Confederacy, or of any State of the 
same until other regulations shall be made by the Congress.” Plan of a Provisional 
Government, 5.
501 38 Ala. 429, 454. Article VI, sections 3 through 6, established the 
Confederate Constitution as the  “supreme law of the land” and also included the 9th and 
10th amendments of the U.S. Constitution. White, “The Constitution of the Confederate 
States of America: Innovation or Duplication?,” 21.
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Frank Owsley argued that “each state insisted upon the right to maintain ‘troops of 
war,’” especially after the February 17, 1864 law that removed state troops to 
Confederate service, in reality, state supreme courts held this type of state power to be 
unconstitutional and they ruled against the states.  Owsley’s conclusion that “practically 
every state arrayed itself against the central government on the conscription question”502
fails to consider the decisions by the state supreme courts.
The attempts by states to exercise control over state militia troops and thereby 
frustrate Confederate conscription raised issues about the larger purposes for which a 
national government existed and whether it was intended that the state governments 
should retain sovereignty, even at the expense of the national government.  In Ex Parte 
Coupland, the Texas court addressed whether the state could exercise a better right to a 
state citizen as a member of the state militia than the Confederate government’s claim to 
the same individual as a conscript under the conscription legislation.  Although 
Coupland’s legal strategy was to attack the constitutionality of the act and claim that the 
national legislation was in derogation of the rights of the state government to its 
citizens, the Texas court said no, that the national government’s claim to Coupland, 
made in accordance with constitutional powers and in furtherance of the national 
purpose for which the constitutive document had been created, was superior to Texas’ 
claim to Coupland.  Here, the court held that “when the citizen goes into the army raised 
by congress, either voluntarily or in obedience to the law requiring him to do so, he 
does this as a citizen and not as a militiaman” and the even though the Congress was 
limited to the exercise of constitutional powers within its own sphere, “the citizen, when 
502 Owsley, States Rights in the Confederacy, 204.
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placed in its [Confederate] service, is temporarily withdrawn from the control of the 
state as a militiaman” and “the right of the state, or more properly speaking, the right of 
the state government over him, must yield to the more pressing and important demand 
for his services by the Confederate government, to enable it to discharge the duties for 
which it has been authorized to raise and support armies.”503
In Mississippi, attorneys representing David Simmons decided to pursue a 
unique legal strategy that relied upon the preeminence of state citizenship.  Unlike 
claims filed in other cases that had challenged conscription by asserting state 
supremacy, state concurrent war powers, or state court concurrent jurisdictional 
authority, Simmons claimed that Mississippi possessed a prior right to his services 
because of “the power [of Mississippi] to place her citizens in her military service [the 
militia] before they are taken for Confederate service, and to the exclusion of the right 
of the Confederate States.”504  However, Chief Justice Handy, writing for the court, 
stated that “the power of a State, in such cases, is subordinate to that of the Confederate 
States Government; and, whenever it is exercised by the latter, it excludes the power of 
the State over the subject-matter…This results necessarily from the constitution, and the 
503 26 Tex. 387, 397-398. When the petitioner owed obligations to both the state 
and the Confederate governments, it was clear which government must yield, even if the 
state asserted that it would not be able to find another qualified person. The North Carolina 
court held “The State must, in such a case, yield to the prior claim of the General 
Government, and select some other man to fill its office...the General Government may not 
be able to procure another fit person for a soldier.” In Bridgman v. Mallett, the court 
determined that Bridgman was not essential to the administration of the state government, 
as recognized by the state Constitution. Therefore, Associate Justice Battle reversed his 
earlier decision and remanded the petitioner to the enrolling officer, Major Peter Mallett. 
Bridgman v. Mallett, 60 N.C. 321, 326.
504 David Simmons v. J.H. Miller, Enrolling Officer, 40 Miss. 19, 21 (1864).
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laws made by the Confederate States in pursuance of it, being the supreme law of the 
land.”505   Handy then made it clear that the tradition being drawn upon in Mississippi 
was that of the Federalist Papers (Federalist No. 22) and not the Articles of 
Confederation.  Rejecting a states rights interpretation of the Constitution, Handy 
referred to the want of effective leadership and power under the Articles of 
Confederation to address national concerns.  He dismissed Simmons’ claims because it 
would have rendered the national government “wholly inefficient in time of war, and 
throw the Confederate Government back to the inconveniences under the articles of 
confederation.”506
Chief Justice Handy, a firm believer in states’ rights and secession,507 drew from 
John Marshall’s opinion in Sturges v. Crowninshield,508 proving that even secessionist 
justices could proudly draw from John Marshall in order to uphold these constitutional 
505 Ibid, 24-25.
506 Ibid, 26. According to Martin Diamond, “the delegates, Madison argued, 
knew that the creation of a union adequate to the achievement of all these things in their 
fullness was the real task of the Convention. Here was where all were agreed. Now the 
delegates must surely see that no federal system could accomplish the desired ends. If, 
as under the Articles, coercion was denied, the ends would go by default; it would be as 
if there were no union.” Diamond, “What the Framers Meant,” 40; Documents 
Illustrative of the Formation of the Union of the American States, ed. C. C. Tansill 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1927), 229.
507 Along with Alexander H. Handy, the Mississippi wartime bench consisted of 
William L. Harris (1858-1867), Cotesworth Pinckney Smith (1851-1863), David W. 
Hurst (1863-1865), and Henry T. Ellett (1865-1867). The latter two served as 
representatives to the Mississippi Secession Convention, and Ellett assisted in drafting 
the state’s ordinance of secession.
508 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
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principles.509  Handy dismissed the idea of concurrent war powers, adding “if each State 
has the right to withhold from Congress any portion of her citizens fit for military 
service and subject to it, she has equally the power to withhold all such persons
whenever she may think fit to do so…this is ‘absolutely and totally contradictory and 
repugnant’ to the provisions of the constitution referred to, and would render the war-
powers granted in the constitution nugatory…It would, in effect, paralyze the war-
power of the Confederate Government at the discretion of the States.”510  Mississippi’s 
high court made clear that despite the Confederate nation’s origins in secession, state 
sovereignty could not be asserted to diminish a constitutional grant.
The courts were also called upon to define the extent of national authority and 
power to conscript citizens, even when these citizens were claimed by the state as 
necessary for the proper functioning of state government and were “of two separate and 
distinct sovereigns, to both of which they owe duty and allegiance citizens.” In North 
Carolina, Associate Justice Battle refused to accord the state governments with any parity 
of authority or power due to the Supremacy Clause in the Confederate Constitution.511
509 The legal and constitutional opinions of the United States Supreme Court 
played a significant role in state jurisprudence of Confederate constitutional issues, 
however, what is questionable is Moore’s argument that it should not be surprising that 
state jurists supported the central Confederate government in Richmond since most of 
these jurists were “grounded” in the opinions of John Marshall and considered themselves 
bound by the doctrine of stare decisis.  However, Moore’s premise is that the Confederate 
Government was “fundamentally a replica of the Federal Government,” as he stated in 
Conscription and Conflict, 163.
510 40 Miss. 19, 26.
511 In Bridgman v. Mallett, the North Carolina court reaffirmed the supremacy of 
the national government by pointing out that the Confederate Constitution “asserts the 
supremacy of the Confederate States, as to the powers conferred upon the Government, by 
declaring that ‘this Constitution, and the laws of the Confederate States made in pursuance 
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Battle pointed out that the authority of the Confederate government to wage war was due 
to the delegation of power from the states to the central government.  However, the 
resolution required an analysis of the applicable constitutions and “If the constitutions
upon which their respective governments are based be rightly construed, and rigidly 
adhered to, there will be little or no danger of their clashing or interfering with each other 
in their respective demands of service from the people.”  In any conflict over the right of 
the Confederate States to conscribe men also claimed by the states for militia or other 
duties, there could be only one conclusion: “In the distribution of the powers of 
sovereignty it is conceded that the States have conferred upon the Confederate 
Government the war power; that is, the power to declare war and to raise and support 
armies.  It has been held by all the greatest statesmen and judges of the country that this 
power is, with a slight exception, unlimited.”512 Displaying a remarkable adherence to 
national constitutional principles, state supreme courts—as state institutions—played a 
critical role defining the authority of the national government within the national sphere 
within the Confederate Constitution and under the Supremacy Clause.
thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound 
thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary, 
notwithstanding.’”  60 N.C. 321, 324.
512 60 N.C. 321, 324. In the Alabama case of Ex Parte Bolling, In Re Watts, 39 
Ala. 609 (1865), the court upheld the primacy of the Confederate over the exercise of 
state war powers (authority to call up the militia), even in 1862 when prospects were 
good for the Confederacy.  Moore wrote that “the claim and call of the Confederate 
States must prevail over the claim and call of the State government, on the ground that 
the constitution of the Confederate States, and laws made in pursuance thereof, are the 
supreme laws of the land.”
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Invocation of the Supremacy Clause
  State supreme courts enunciated a strong national purpose in the Constitution 
and held that the Supremacy Clause was a vital provision designed to elevate national 
needs and priorities above purely state interests.  This clause gave full authority and 
power to the national government to fulfill its constitutional duties.  In the wake of 
secession and the powerful assertion of states rights in 1860-1861, this represented a 
significant constitutional development which, ironically, was provided through judicial 
review by state supreme courts. In Georgia, North Carolina, and Texas, the courts held 
that sovereignty was divided and delegated to state and national governments, a feature 
common to dual federalism, yet, the prominence of achieving national purposes raised 
serious doubts about a purely dual federalist understanding of or the preeminence of 
states’ rights and state-centered federalism in the Confederacy.
The invocation of the Supremacy clause was due to both an emerging emphasis 
upon war-related national purposes and objectives and an increasing attempt by 
petitioners to wield states’ rights as a bar against national powers.  As a result, state 
courts were compelled to consider their enunciation of the doctrine of Confederate 
federalism more broadly, in terms of the effect of their decisions upon national goals 
and objectives identified in the Constitution.  In May of 1862, J.C. Bryan was liable to 
Confederate service but hired a substitute to take his place.  After his substitute was 
conscripted for service, Bryan was seized as a conscript and sought a writ of habeas 
corpus and exemption from Confederate service.  Although Pearson could have asserted 
a North Carolina statute that required state courts to hear habeas corpus cases, he 
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instead turned to the Alabama decision in Ex Parte Hill.513  Chief Justice Pearson held 
that state courts were bound to observe the then-congressional suspension of the writ, 
and “as the acts of Congress made in pursuance of the Constitution are the supreme law 
of the land, it follows that such an act [observance of the suspension] would be as 
imperative on the State courts and judges as on the tribunals of the Confederate 
States.”514  He added that the supremacy of national law was foundational in the 
Confederacy and furthered “the purpose of forming a new and distinct government.”  
The Chief Justice observed that sovereignty was not vested solely with the state and that 
the philosophical principles on federalism had been given specific form: “all these states 
were compelled to give up a portion of their former respective sovereignties, and to 
invest the newly created government with them.”515  This included the ability of the 
national government to now bypass the states and reach individuals directly in the 
fulfillment of constitutional responsibilities and duties.516
While the state supreme courts upheld the supremacy of the national 
government, they did so within the sphere of national authority and power.  In Georgia, 
Associate Justice Jenkins established the primacy of Confederate law over Georgia law, 
drawing upon the decisions of John Marshall, and pointing out that in any conflict 
513 38 Ala. 429 (1863).
514 60 N.C. 1, 7.
515 Ibid, 10.
516 Thomas Barber v. William A. Irwin, where Associate Justice Jenkins refuted 
the view that “the unlimited power to place in the army of the Confederate States all 
citizens capable of bearing arms is incompatible with the sovereignty of the several 
States.”  This interpretation of the Confederate Constitution, claimed Jenkins, would 
render the national government incapable and “too weak to accomplish the ends for 
which it was instituted [italics added].” 34 Ga. 27, 36-37 (1864).
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between the two, the supremacy clause of the Confederate Constitution, provided in 
Article Four, section three established that Confederate law “shall be the supreme law 
of the land.”  As precedent for his decision under the Confederate Constitution, Jenkins 
referred to McCulloch v. Maryland,517 Houston v. Moore,518 and Osborne, et al. v. U.S. 
Bank.519  On the supremacy of Confederate law, Jenkins concluded, “So says the 
Constitution, and we can not [sic] say otherwise.”520
National purposes enabled Confederate government to make demands upon a 
national citizenry that included foreign residents of the Confederacy.  In The State, ex rel. 
Graham, In Re Pille,521 the Alabama court asserted the primacy of national government 
authority over state authority within its respective sphere.  Walker stated that the 
February 17, 1864 legislation that called into national military service “all white men, 
residents of the Confederate States, between the ages of seventeen and fifty” placed 
every male “liable to conscription, constructively in the military service of the 
Confederate States.”522  Any attempt by Alabama to usurp this authority would go 
beyond the scope of the Confederate Constitution and “the claim of the State to the 
military service must yield to the conflicting claim of the Confederate States; for the 
constitution, and laws of the Confederate States passed in pursuance thereof, are the 
517 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
518 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820).
519 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
520 34 Ga. 72, 77.
521 39 Ala 459 (1864).
522 Ibid., 460.
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supreme law of the land.”523  Walker concluded that Pille was liable to conscription and 
to Confederate military service as long as he was domiciled in the Confederacy, even 
though he was a domiciled foreigner.
In Mississippi, Associate Justice Handy made clear that the states were under 
obligation to obey and follow the respective duties and responsibilities of each sphere of 
government under Confederate federalism and the Confederate Constitution: “By the 
provisions of the constitution, the power to declare war belongs exclusively to the 
Confederate States Government…It was never contemplated that the separate States 
should carry on the war within their limits after public war was declared, except to repel 
invasions; and that only so far as might be done without detriment to the general power 
of the Confederate Government, and consistently with the support which it is the high 
duty of each State to give to all the constitutional measures of that government for the 
prosecution of the war.  And, when the whole country [italics added] is involved in a 
general war, it is a grave and dangerous error to suppose that any State has the right to 
engage in the war, or to institute measures of war, independently of the power of 
Congress and in opposition to the measures adopted by that body for carrying on the 
war, if they are constitutional” [italics added]524
State supreme court justices could have been influenced by local officials or 
local politics, yet they did not because they adjudicated according to the principles 
found within the Confederate Constitution.  When confronting a clash between national 
and state government authority over the same subject, they adjudicated according to 
523 Ibid.  Pille was not liable to state militia service while liable to Confederate 
service.
524 David Simmons v. J.H. Miller, Enrolling Officer 40 Miss. 19, 26-27 (1864).
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divided spheres of national and state authority and, when the power lay within the 
national sphere, they invoked the Supremacy Clause of the Confederate Constitution, 
upholding the supremacy of Confederate over state government within the appropriate 
sphere of authority.525
One of the important goals of the framers in 1787 was to “create a political 
system that would protect the people from despotic governments, whether they be large 
or small, democratic or not.”  The mechanism for “checking the despotic tendencies, 
majoritarian or other” was a system of federalism in which the sovereign powers were 
to be exercised by the general and state governments.  Yet “the interdependence of the 
national and the state governments was to ensure their ability to check one another 
while still enabling them to cooperate and govern energetically.”526  This did not mean 
for the Confederacy that the powers delegated to the general government were to be 
restrictive or limited to the point of restricting its efficacy to govern and fulfill its 
responsibilities to the people of the nation.  Rather, the powers delegated to the general 
government were to be adequate to meet the responsibilities within the appropriate 
sphere, including the division of the “decisions and functions of government,” the 
ability of each governmental entity to operate directly upon individual citizens, a “final 
525 Confederate public policies were maintained possibly because of the 
professionalism which resulted from consensus on shared values between Confederate 
and state officials.  Edward W. Weidner, “Decision-Making in a Federal System,” in 
Elazar, Politics of American Federalism, (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 
1969):202-216, 214.
526 Elazar, “Introduction: The Meaning of Federalism,” in Politics of American 
Federalism, xi.
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reference, usually a judiciary,” and “a willingness both to cooperate across 
governmental lines and to exercise restraint and forebearance in the interests of the 
entire nation.”527  The determination of adequacy, however, would be a measure 
requiring adjudication and evaluation according to the principles enunciated in the 
Confederate Constitution and according to the purposes for which the nation had been 
formed.528
When state jurists enunciated principles of federalism and enforced the war 
powers of the Confederate government, they facilitated the implementation not the 
alteration of constitutional principles.  Contrary to the limited historiography on 
Confederate federalism, state court justices articulated a national doctrinal development 
in which the supremacy of the national war powers resulted neither from military 
necessity nor political exigency.529  In their decisions, justices articulated principles at 
odds with states’ rights but derived from the Constitution, and, most notably, the 
creation of “a more perfect federal government,” even amidst war, one more balanced, 
more efficient, and more clearly defined that that under the Constitution of 1787.530
527 Grodzins, “The Federal System,” 265; Leach, American Federalism, 1-2.
528 Ibid., xii.
529 Existing historiography on Confederate federalism contends that the original 
intent in the preamble was not to form “a more permanent federal government” but to 
safeguard state sovereignty as in Robinson, “A New Deal in Constitutions,” 454.  In 
Federalism in the Southern Confederacy, the principal study of Confederate federalism, 
Curtis Amlund argued that as the war progressed, constitutional principles became 
displaced by military exigencies and a balance of power between state and national 
governments was replaced by a consolidated Confederate government.
530 This is a significant development. Charles Lee argued that “the greatest 
constitutional question in the United States between 1787 and 1861 was: ‘What was the 
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Ironically, like the federalism articulated by John Marshall, the doctrine of 
federalism that southern state supreme courts enunciated possessed the following 
characteristics: 1) an emphasis upon distinctly national goals, objectives, and 
responsibilities, as provided for in the nation’s Constitution; 3) the competency of the 
national government to address its responsibilities within its sphere; 4) supremacy 
within the federal structure depended upon in which sphere—state or national—the 
powers were to be exercised; 5) sovereignty emanated from the people, not the states; 
and 6) within its sphere of responsibilities, there was to be no question that the national 
government was supreme.531  In the Confederacy, federalism operated as a rather 
dynamic procedural system for the general and state governments, rather than a 
theoretical end in and of itself.
In the process of enunciating and implementing federalism principles during 
war, the justices also began to enunciate a national purpose.  The constitutional order in 
the Confederacy was configured to facilitate the national welfare of a Confederate 
people, not just citizens of individual states.  The national government was vested with 
sovereignty to fulfill its responsibilities to the people of the nation, rather than to the 
states.  State jurists understood the Confederate Constitution as something substantive.  
Operating as a de facto supreme court, they considered its text and principles seriously.  
They upheld the exercise of constitutional Confederate war powers, within a system of 
federalism, to facilitate distinctly national purposes.  And, in their decisions on the 
nature of the Union under the Constitution?’” and “Basic to this question was the location 
of sovereignty in the Federal Union.” Lee, Confederate Constitutions, 141.
531 G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change, 1815-1835, 
504-524.
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Confederate Constitution and the doctrine of federalism, we may have another light “to 
reveal its true meaning.”
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Chapter Six
Separating Functions to Fulfill National Goals
During the Civil War, the repeated demands within the Confederacy to mobilize 
men and material for prosecuting America’s first modern war compelled the national 
government to become increasingly active in the lives of its citizens.  The Confederate 
Congress initiated America’s first draft in April of 1862 and shortly thereafter the 
Confederate War Department began issuing a series of wartime regulations and 
guidelines that attempted to shape the implementation of these acts and restrict statutory 
exemptions and discharges from the Confederate military.  Passage of Confederate 
conscription532 and exemption laws533 raised many legal and constitutional challenges 
from litigants who alleged the War Department’s usurpation of the judicial function to 
interpret statutory meaning and congressional intent and to determine whether the 
statutory requirements for exemption had been satisfied.  In the resulting cases, state 
supreme courts in North Carolina, Alabama, Virginia, Georgia, and Texas were 
compelled to define the separation of powers under the Confederate Constitution and to 
address the challenge imposed by the war of defining secondary delegations of legislative 
power made by the Congress to the War Department.  Such delegations were necessary 
due to the increasingly complex circumstances of the Civil War and the need to create
532 The first Conscription Act (“An Act to further provide for the public defence 
[sic]”), passed by the Confederate Congress on April 16, 1862, conscripted men 
between the ages of 18 and 35. Public Laws of the Confederate States, 1 Cong., 1 Sess., 
1862 (Richmond, VA: R.M. Smith, 1862), Chapter XXXI, Section 1. This was followed 
by a second act on September 17, 1862 (“An Act to amend an act entitled ‘an act to 
provide further for the public defense,’ approved 16th of April, 1862.”), which 
expanded the age liable to military service to 45, see Public Laws of the Confederate 
States, 1 Cong., 2 Sess., 1862, Chapter XV.
533 See Chapter 1, footnote 99, ante.
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regulations and procedures necessary for implementing conscription and exemption.534
The expansive governmental power was challenged by men who desired to be 
exempt from Confederate military service and they raised their challenges in wartime 
litigation.  These litigants argued that the expanding scope of governmental power 
during wartime threatened to overshadow the preservation of constitutional principles 
such as limited government, the separation of governmental powers and functions, and 
the protection of political liberty.  In these cases, critical questions were raised about the 
political priorities and purposes of the nation and which government branches were 
empowered to legislate, modify legislation, or interpret its meaning.  State supreme 
courts were forced to balance two seemingly conflicting constitutional goals, that of 
separating government power in order to preserve political liberty and another to 
establish and maintain an effective national government with the necessary powers to 
preserve the Confederate nation during war.535
What resulted was a corpus of cases across many southern jurisdictions in which 
state supreme court justices confronted this “constitutional tension” and enunciated the 
534 State-specific historiography on this topic includes Memory F. Mitchell, 
Legal Aspects of Conscription and Exemption in North Carolina, 1861-1865 (Chapel 
Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1965) and David P. Smith, 
“Conscription and Conflict on the Texas Frontier, 1863-1865,” Civil War History, vol. 
XXXVI, no. 3 (1986):250-261.
535 The Confederate Constitution provided for three specific branches of 
government with specific delegations to the legislative, executive, and judicial branches 
in the first section of Article I, Article II, and Article III, respectively, in the 
Confederate charter. The Confederate government was also under a positive duty to 
preserve the Confederate nation under Article IV, Section 3, clause 4 whereby it was 
declared that “The Confederate States shall guarantee to every State that now is, or 
hereafter may become, a member of this Confederacy, a republican form of 
government; and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the 
Legislature or of the Executive when the Legislature is not in session) against domestic 
violence.”
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Confederacy’s doctrine of the separation of powers as meaningful, workable, and 
purposeful.  Despite this tension, they upheld a doctrine of separation of powers that 
was rigid enough to separate and limit government powers from usurpation of another 
branch’s functions and powers and to preserve political liberty yet flexible enough to 
maintain a national government with considerable powers for prosecuting modern 
war.536  Simultaneous with the focus on separating government functions and the 
challenge of enunciating how limited government could also be effective government 
during wartime, the state supreme courts also preserved a focus on national goal and 
national purposes, as provided for in the Confederate Constitution.
A Bar Against Usurpation
The separation of powers is a constitutional doctrine in which government 
possesses the primary responsibilities of making and enforcing laws but each branch of 
government is distinct and charged with different functions and responsibilities.537 An 
536 Mark Neely has focused on the subject of individual civil liberties and 
concluded that “In the case of the Confederacy, it appears that modernization went hand 
in hand with proscription of civil liberty.” Neely, Southern Rights: Political Prisoners 
and the Myth of Confederate Constitutionalism, 10. Richard Bensel argued that 
mobilization transformed the Confederacy, that “in terms of mobilization of national 
material and manpower resources, however, it was the Confederate state…that was by 
many measures the modern response to the political economic challenge of war” and 
the “all-encompassing economic and social controls of the Confederacy were in fact so 
extensive that they call into question standard interpretations of southern opposition top 
the expansion of federal power both in the antebellum and post-Reconstruction 
periods.” Bensel, Yankee Leviathan, 95.
537 The mechanisms for doing so include bicameralism, a system of checks and 
balances in government, and the limitation upon the executive branch to enforce and 
administer the law only. With the separation of powers, there is a focus on balancing 
governmental powers and not social classes and the separation of powers doctrine 
rejects the mixed theory of government in which the political and social authority are 
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“essential” part of  a “pure” separation of powers doctrine is the division and vesting of 
governmental power in three separate and independent branches—the executive, the 
legislative, and the judicial branches—in order “to effect a system of checks by each 
department on the other two.”538 The purposes for this “necessary element” in the 
doctrine are “to balance the freedom of the individual citizen with the necessary 
exercise of governmental power,” to prevent “arbitrary abuse of power by officials,”
and to establish and maintain political liberty.539  Political liberty results from the 
creation of divisions between the three branches of government which prohibits its 
domination by any single group or government branch.  Of constant concern was this 
balance between too little division, by which one branch might dominate the other two, 
and too much division, by which the branches might become too restricted, leading to 
weak and ineffective government.  Corresponding to each branch is an “identifiable 
function of government, legislative, executive, or judicial” and each branch “must be 
confined to the exercise of its own functions and not allowed to encroach upon the 
assumed to be identical. Kelly, Harbison, and Belz, The American Constitution: Its 
Origins and Development, 7th ed., vol. 1, 71-73. Like the progressives decades later, 
Confederate framers understood that there was a fundamental difference between 
politics and the administration of government in the following ways: (1) policy-making 
and legislation belong to the popularly-elected branches; (2) the executive only 
proposes policies; (3) the legislature disposes of policies, providing an element of 
accountability; and (4) once the sovereign will is enacted, its implementation depends 
on the administration (which was believed to be outside of the sphere of politics). Ibid., 
vol. 2, 414.
538 M.J.C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers, 2nd edition, 
(Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, Inc., 1998), 14.
539 Arthur T. Vanderbilt, The Doctrine of the Separation of Powers and Its 
Present-Day Significance (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1963), 35.  See 
also Michael Conant’s Introduction to the 1963 edition, Ibid., especially v-vi for more 
on “purposes” and the “ambiguity” understanding and defining the doctrine or key 
terms such as “power.” Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers, xi.
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functions of the other branches.”540  In the spring of 1862, the Confederate founders 
created a permanent national constitution apportioning the national governmental 
power, creating national legislative, executive, and judicial branches.541
When southern state supreme courts rendered wartime constitutional decisions, 
they vigorously preserved the separation of powers doctrine, chiefly as a bar against 
executive usurpation of legislative functions by the War Department, because of the 
belief that Congress was best able to fulfill representative functions and promote 
political liberty and representative government, even during wartime.542  The purpose 
for the doctrine is “to assert the supremacy of the people's representatives in lawmaking 
and, by denying the executive branch any share in the highest and most important 
power of government, to confine him to merely an administrative function.”  In a 
republican form of government, the separation of powers established a measure of 
“popular control,” elevating the people’s representatives to a dominant role in contrast 
540 Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers, 14.  John Adams 
stated that “It is by balancing each of these three powers against the other two that the 
efforts in human nature toward tyranny can alone be checked and restrained, and any 
degree of freedom preserved in the Constitution.” John Adams, The Works of John 
Adams, Second President of the United States: With a Life of the A uthor, Notes and 
Illustrations, by his Grandson Charles Francis Adams, vol. 4 (Boston, MA: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1850-1856), 185-186), op cit. Vanderbilt, The Doctrine of the 
Separation of Powers and Its Present-Day Significance, 4.
541 DeRosa, The Confederate Constitution of 1861: An Inquiry into American 
Constitutionalism, 81-82; Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution and Other Political 
Essays (New York, NY: D. Appleton & Co., 1877), 47, 82, 84.
542 William Riker has pointed out that in Federalist No. 47, Madison wrote: “’No 
political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value or is stamped with the authority of 
more enlightened patrons of liberty” than the “maxim that the legislative, executive, and 
judiciary departments ought to be separate and distinct.” William H. Riker, “Sidney 
George Fisher and the Separation of Powers During the Civil War,” Journal of the 
History of Ideas, vol. 15, Issue 3 (June, 1954):397-412, 397.
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to the executive and vesting in them the sole responsibility for lawmaking.543
It was the wartime state supreme courts, in the doctrine they enunciated, that 
guarded against usurpation of the powers and function of Congress to enact legislation 
on behalf of the nation, as provided in Article I, Section 2 of the Confederate 
Constitution.  Just one year after the creation of the Permanent Confederate 
Constitution, in Texas, the supreme court highlighted the important legislative role and 
functions assigned to Congress to create laws on behalf of and for the benefit of the 
nation.  Associate Justice Reeves stated in his opinion that “The sovereign power, 
wherever it may be lodged, must judge of the exigencies that will justify the exercise of 
power, and in our system of government that power has been conferred on congress.”544
This vigilance in protecting legislative functions resulted from the understanding that 
“the legislative power is a sovereign power to make general rules of conduct for the 
political community enforceable in the future by the physical force of the state.”545  The 
force of the state became embodied in wartime legislation on April 16, 1862, when the 
Confederate Congress passed its first conscription act.
That summer, a young North Carolinian, J.C. Bryan, who was liable to 
conscription, hired a 39-year-old substitute to take his place in the Confederate military.  
543 Kelly, Harbison, and Belz, The American Constitution: Its Origins and 
Development, 7th ed., vol. 1, 71-73. In the Federalist No. 70, Publius wrote that the 
legislative powers are plural “since ‘deliberation and wisdom’ in the legislative process 
demand ‘ a numerous legislature.’” Riker, “Sidney George Fisher and the Separation of 
Powers During the Civil War,” 397.
544 Ex Parte Abraham Mayer, 27 Tex. 715, 724 (1864).
545 Vanderbilt, The Doctrine of the Separation of Powers and Its Present-Day
Significance, ix. In a modern nation, the “’negative’ approach to the checking of power” 
was balanced by a need to have legislation created in accordance with the wishes of the 
people, see Ibid., x.
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On July 29, 1862, enrolling officers received Bryan’s substitute at Camp Holmes in 
Raleigh and Bryan was given a discharge for the war.  The following year, on June 16, 
1863, Bryan was arrested as a conscript under the Conscription Act of September 1862
(which expanded the age of the draft to age 45) after Bryan’s now 40-year-old substitute 
was conscripted.  Bryan petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under the claim that he was 
being unjustly detained since he had been discharged from conscription for providing a 
substitute, as required under section 9 of the April 1862 Conscription Act, and therefore 
could not again be enrolled as a conscript under the September 1862 act.  Bryan raised the 
separation of powers issue when he questioned whether the War Department possessed the 
power under the Constitution to interpret the September act and create regulations that 
contradicted what he argued was the intent of the Congress in the April 1862 act to exempt 
him for the duration of the war.
In North Carolina, preservation of liberty fell to the courts and, in the case of In 
Re Bryan, the court held that it could exercise jurisdiction “to discharge a citizen by the 
writ of habeas corpus whenever it is made to appear that he is unlawfully [italics in 
original] restrained of his liberty by an officer of the Confederate States.”  Such an 
important charge for the court had been “confided to it ‘as a sacred trust,’” [italics in 
original] and the court was to maintain its vigilance over this liberty regardless of 
wartime necessity.546 Liberty is an essential goal in the separation of powers doctrine
546 Pearson's attention to constitutional principles included his careful vigil 
against the excesses of executive power.  After Governor Vance had ordered the state 
militia to arrest Confederate deserters, the militia had attempted to do so in Yadkin 
County.  But after a brief skirmish in which state militia troops were killed and deserters 
subsequently jailed, Pearson stated that he “could find no clause in the Constitution, no 
Ordinance of the Convention, and no act of Congress or the Legislature conferring such 
power on the Governor....”  Pearson seemed to be irritated by Vance's willingness to 
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and Americans who lived between the time of “the adoption of the Constitution until at 
least the Civil War…believed—if they believed in their system of government at all—
that the separation of powers assured their liberty”547 The court had “no discretion and 
no right to be influenced by considerations growing out of the condition of our country, 
but must act with a single eye to the due administration of the law, according to the 
proper construction of the acts of Congress.”548
Among southern states, the importance of contract principles to legal reasoning 
was perhaps strongest on the North Carolina Supreme Court which was noted for a 
characteristic emphasis upon the individual.  North Carolina was the only southern state 
in which slaves were subject to the fellow servant rule and were even held to be “fully 
formed human beings with....‘moral qualities.’”  The North Carolina court was also 
distinguished by a rigid application of rules of construction and doctrines in private and 
public law, a quality which helps to explain Chief Justice Pearson's particular style of 
jurisprudence and his wartime opinions so closely focused on individual liberty.549
Because of its focus on individual liberty and contract principles, the North Carolina 
came into direct confrontation with the War Department and Chief Justice Pearson 
comply with a request from Secretary of War Seddon, asking Vance to call out the 
militia for this purpose.  Pearson also seemed irritated by the Legislature's ensuing 
passage of the legislation which gave Vance the authority to call out the militia “for 
local and temporary service.” “Explanatory Letter from Judge Pearson,” Salisbury 
Carolina Watchman, June 22, 1863.
547 Riker, “Sidney George Fisher and the Separation of Powers During the Civil 
War,” 397.
548 60 N.C. 1, 9 (1863).
549 Reuel E. Schiller, “Conflicting Obligations: Slave Law and the Late 
Antebellum North Carolina Supreme Court,” Virginia Law Review 78 (August 1992), 
1240.
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began to assert more frequently between 1862 and 1864 the authority of the judiciary 
against the national government in order to prevent usurpation of the judicial powers. 
Pearson's jealous guarding of judicial independence and a more rigid balance of powers 
between branches of government may have been influenced by his political perspective.  
Pearson was an old-line Whig, but, with the advent of the war, his political ideology led 
him to join the new Conservative party in North Carolina.  The Conservatives, who 
emerged from the ranks of the old Whig party, maintained that, though the war should 
be conducted efficiently, its direction and objectives should never impinge upon the 
civil liberties of individual North Carolinians nor should military power and authority 
threaten to supersede that of the civil authorities.550
Pearson’s expansive understanding of the need to promote liberty interfered with 
the War Department’s needs to mobilize Confederate manpower and brought him into 
constant conflict with Richmond.551  The Assistant Secretary of War, J.A. Campbell, a 
former Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, emphasized for Colonel Peter 
550 Most of the Whigs in North Carolina opposed secession and campaigned 
against it in 1860-1861. Thomas E. Jeffrey, State Parties and National Politics: North 
Carolina, 1815-1861 (Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 1989), 305. The 
party also incorporated into its ranks those who had supported remaining in the Union 
up until the time of Lincoln's proclamation. Marc W. Kruman, Parties and Politics in 
North Carolina, 1836-1865 (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1983), 
236-37. At the 1860 Whig state convention in Raleigh, “Old Whigs” dominated in the 
drafting of the party platform. It included a denouncement of the “’unusual and 
dangerous powers in the hands of the executive.’” Jeffrey, State Parties and National 
Politics, 273.
551 Pearson was reportedly an ardent opponent of secession but during the war 
was known for his decisions on conscription and exemption where he liberally 
dispensed exemptions.  He “...stood as a symbol of freedom to many soldiers who 
appealed to him for discharge and his decisions caused consternation to both state and 
Confederate military authorities.” Mitchell, Legal Aspects of Conscription and 
Exemption, 4.
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Mallett, the commandant of conscripts in North Carolina, his duty to apply the 
Secretary’s General Order No. 84 (issued September 8, 1862) which stated that “’a 
substitute becoming liable to conscription renders his principal also liable, unless 
exempt on other grounds’” and General Order No. 82 (issued November 3, 1862) which 
directed that “’In all cases in which a substitute becomes subject to military service, the 
exemption of the principal by reason of the substitute shall expire.’”  Campbell also 
noted that “’The opinion of Chief Justice Pearson is not regarded by the Department as 
a sound exposition of the act of Congress and you will not regard it in your official 
action as such.’”  North Carolina newspapers made public the Confederate position that 
Pearson’s opinions were not authoritative and would not be regarded as having the force 
of law.552
State supreme courts could be adamant about preserving judicial authority to 
interpret statutes because of their interest in securing individual liberty and preserving 
their “sacred trust” to protect the rights of citizens.553  When P.P. Meroney was arrested 
in North Carolina without much regard for the court’s earlier decision in In Re Irvin,554
because the Secretary of War considered the construction of the act given by the court 
in that case to be an unsound exposition, Chief Justice Pearson castigated the Secretary 
for usurping the judicial function.  In the case of In re Meroney,555 Pearson challenged 
the Secretary's ability to challenge their ruling, stating “Who made the Secretary of War 
552 Hamilton, “The North Carolina Courts and the Confederacy,” 370-371.
553 John B. Weems v. Joseph H. Farrell, 33 Ga. 413 (1863).
554 60 NC 60 (1863).
555 60 NC 64 (1863).
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a judge?” and questioned the Secretary’s assignment to the War Department of the 
judicial function to construct the conscription.  The court felt that the War Department’s 
regulations for conscription officers created a new legislative intent and, in so doing 
they had usurped the power of the courts to interpret Congressional acts, which was 
wholly unacceptable.556 The North Carolina court had affirmed the importance of the 
statutory law and the judiciary’s role in interpreting its meaning according to the 
separation of powers doctrine.557
In John B. Weems v. Joseph H. Farrell,558 the Georgia court adjudicated the 
limitations upon statutory exemptions.  It enunciated several principles about national 
interest and individual duties owed to the nation that would later be drawn upon in the 
substitution cases.  In Weems, Associate Justice Jenkins considered whether the Secretary 
of War’s April 29 regulations limiting statutory exemptions under the conscription acts 
were consistent with the intent of the Congress in the Conscription Act of April 16, 
1862.  The Secretary’s regulations anticipated the direction that the Confederate 
Congress would take in amendatory acts and the court considered these subsequent acts 
when examining congressional intent.  If they were not consistent with congressional 
556 60 N.C. 1, 22-25.  The citation for In re Meroney is the same as In Re Bryan
because it was never reported as a separate opinion but was printed as a lengthy 
footnote in Bryan.
557 The tension between preserving liberty and mobilizing men for the Confederate 
war effort would perpetuate the battle waged between the War Department and North 
Carolina high court for another year. In May of 1863, Secretary of War James A. Seddon 
wrote to Governor Vance asking the governor to “retrain the too ready interposition of the 
judicial authority in these questions of military obligation.” The War of the Rebellion: A 
Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, 
Volume 51, Part 2, 715-716.
558 33 Ga. 413 (1863).
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intent, the court then had to decide whether the exercise of this authority amounted to a 
usurpation of judicial authority to interpret statutes and was therefore beyond the intent 
of Congress.559  Jenkins, delivering the opinion of the court, explained that “the first 
section of the [April 16, 1862 Conscription] Act imposes upon all persons therein 
described a legal duty—one of perfect obligation” and this duty was owed to the nation, 
with the national government representing the nation.560
Jenkins went on to explain the strong public interest and common good of the 
nation as essential to congressional intent behind the conscription acts and that this intent 
was manifested in “the ninth section [of the Conscription Act which] provides a 
conditional exemption from that duty.”561 Jenkins stated that while individual rights were 
important, the results whereby individuals could easily avoid military service through 
manipulation of the statutory language would contradict the interest in safeguarding the 
public service.  Yet, Jenkins made clear that the court was not contriving the legal 
principles to fit into a particular outcome beneficial to the war effort.  Rather, “as 
expounders of the law” they asked “whether it consists with the intent and meaning of 
Congress as expressed in the ninth section of the Act of April 16.”  The court held “that 
the second section of the Secretary's order of April 29, is a better, more faithful 
exposition of that intention, and in this we are sustained by the subsequent course of the 
559 Throughout the war, state courts were vigilant in protecting their role in 
judicial review, especially War Department regulations on the scope and application of 
statutory exemption which appeared to be interpretations of statute and a usurpation of 
judicial review.  This is discussed more in Chapter Five, supra.
560 33 Ga. 413, 419-420.
561 Ibid.
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Congress.”562 In Georgia, the state high court held that substitution was not a contract but 
a “gratuitous privilege...subject to the will and discretion of Congress.”563
In Tyson v. Rogers,564 Associate Justice Lyon of Georgia held that the legislative 
role was absolutely critical for operationalizing the intent of the Confederate people and 
in the absence of any legislative enactment, military necessity was an inadequate reason 
for military authorities to impress slaves as military laborers in military hospitals. Lyon 
wrote, “It is no answer to this that the public service required that all able-bodied 
soldiers should be sent to the field; because it was the duty, or rather the province, of 
Congress to declare what was for the good of the public service, and not the 
commanders in the field or at posts.”565  The protection being afforded here was the 
individual right to property and the court held that seizure of property could not be 
made “no matter how great may be the public exigency, so long as the law affords 
protection, unless such seizure be especially authorized by law, and then only upon just 
compensation made of which the impressing officer, the Government, nor its agents 
must judge.”566
The court was also called upon to address another separation of powers issue, 
distinguishing executive from judicial functions.  In 1863, Bell urged military and 
562 33 Ga. 413, 420-421 and Wiley A. Moncrief v. William L. Jones, 33 Ga. 450 
(1863).
563 John B. Weems v. Joseph H. Farrell, 33 Ga. 413 (1863).




judicial authorities to cooperate and for military authorities to respect the judicial 
authority of the Texas courts.567  But, by 1864 the military situation west of the 
Mississippi had become serious and military exigency was becoming an important 
factor in determining the actions of many military officials.  In March, an interesting 
series of events in Austin resulted in a major conflict between the court and the military 
in Texas and a sequence of cases in which the court had to arrest executive usurpation 
of judicial functions. 568
In The State v. J. H. Sparks, Associate Justice Moore characterized the abrupt 
arrest and seizure by the Army of five recusant conscripts, who were in the custody of 
the court under writs of habeas corpus, as an “outrage committed upon the authority of 
the court.”   The act violated the constitutional authority of the court and undermined 
the sanctity of legal procedure, especially since the individuals had already been 
567 In Ex Parte Turman (26 Tex. 708 (1863)), Bell reminded the court of the 
necessity of cooperation between military and civil authorities.  Moore insisted that 
there was a major constitutional issue to be resolved here, that the court would be 
“derelict in the discharge of the high trust committed to us by the constitution and the 
laws, if we should permit to pass unquestioned so palpable and glaring an outrage upon 
the law and the mandates of the court in which we have been called to preside.” 26 Tex. 
708, 713 (1863).
568 The principal case was The State v. J. H. Sparks, 27 Tex. 627 (1864). Major 
J. H. Sparks, a Confederate Army officer and commandant of the post in Austin, 
ordered his men to remove Richard R. Peebles, D. J. Baldwin, O. F. Zinke, Reinhart 
Hildebrand, and Ernest Seeliger from the custody of the sheriff of Travis County.  
Major General John Bankhead Magruder, commander of the military district of Texas, 
New Mexico, and Arizona, had ordered their arrest under charges that they had 
committed treason and conspiracy against the Confederacy.  Major Sparks stated that 
the prisoners were arrested under orders from Magruder, who acted under orders from 
Lieutenant General Kirby Smith, commander of the Trans-Mississippi Department, and 
that they were held as prisoners under the “recent” congressional suspension of habeas 
corpus.   Sparks believed that although the court had refused his request to place the 
prisoners in his custody, his duty was to capture them in obedience to his superiors. 27 
Tex. 627, 628-630.
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charged under the Constitution and Texas law.  What was most contemptible about the 
action taken by the general officers here was the indignation shown the court. Military 
authority in Texas was still subject to the law and such an “illegal act” could not be 
justified, even when orders were issued from the highest Confederate official in the War 
Department: “Military officers are bound to obey all legal orders of those by whom they 
are commanded...the soldier is still a citizen, and as such is always amenable to the civil 
authority.” Yet, despite the outrage by members of the court, propriety and procedure 
suggested that the court proceeded cautiously, with a due regard for evidentiary 
standards and with all fairness to General Magruder, “the principal offender.”  Although 
Moore wanted to compel Magruder to appear to answer the contempt charge, the court 
decided against such a move, wishing to afford him all rights of citizenship and the 
opportunity to respond to the complaint.  The court ordered Magruder to answer the 
complaint and to show cause for contempt when the court convened in Tyler in April.569
Moore’s condemnation of the military was premised upon constitutive principles 
rather than political motives.  Magruder had not only disregarded the authority of the 
court but, as an agent of the Executive Branch, he had exceeded his role and 
transcended the executive responsibility to enforce the laws.  Magruder had “’turned the 
instrument against the power that ought to wield it; for it is the civil government alone 
that stands for the state, and the military is only an instrument that it uses as its 
judgment requires’” and that this was “a vital blow at the constitution, and the principle 
upon which our government is organized.”  Moore added that it would have been better 
“for the prisoners who are in custody of the court, though doubly guilty beyond all that 
569 27 Tex. 627, 632, 634, 631, 632, 634 .
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has been charged against them, to go unwhipped of justice than for the civil authorities 
of the state to be subordinated to [the] military.”570
When the court considered the case in Tyler, it wanted to afford Magruder the 
opportunity to defend himself “from so disreputable an imputation, and the court from 
the painful duty of pronouncing the highest military officer of this department guilty of 
using the authority with which he has been entrusted for the public welfare and the 
defense of the state, as a means of violating the law.”  However, the court was “wholly 
disappointed” with Magruder’s return in which the general argued that “the court does 
not acquire jurisdiction of the persons of the applicants for a writ of habeas corpus.”571
It was Magruder’s disregard for the legal and constitutional order that became so 
objectionable to the members of the court; the court condemned Magruder for 
“interfering with and contemning [sic] the authority and princess of its courts, and thus 
violating social order [italics added], which he should have been the first to have 
upheld and sustained.”  An officer in Magruder’s position was often called upon to 
protect people and property and that “it is not expecting too much of him, if ignorant of 
the plainest and simplest principles of the administration of the law, that he should 
inform himself in respect to them before undertaking to interfere with and control the 
judicial tribunals of the country.”572  Moore also intended to prevent any further 
executive usurpation of court authority by eradicating any legal grounds for Magruder’s 
assertions.  Moore rejected Magruder's claim that he acted in pursuance of the 
570 27 Tex 627, 633.
571 27 Tex. 705, 706-707.
572 The State v. J. H. Sparks and J. Bankhead Magruder, 27 Tex. 705, 709 
(1864)).
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congressional act suspending the writ of habeas corpus.  Although the court would have 
been fully justified if it fined or imprisoned Magruder, it did not do so for two reasons.  
It would not improve the military situation in Texas and the removal of Magruder was a 
political question that the governor would have to address.  The court forwarded a copy 
of the entire proceedings to the governor and a judgment, including costs, was rendered 
against the defendants.573
One year later, the Georgia court affirmed its earlier holding when James Cody 
tried to secure a discharge from military service due to medical incapacity.  On March 
5, 1863 a surgeon, Dr. G. B. Powell, certified Cody’s incapacity for discharging the 
duties of a soldier.  But the trial court judge ruled the certificate issued by Dr. Powell to 
be insufficient to exempt Cody from service because it came from one doctor only 
rather than the board of surgeons as required by law and he remanded Cody to the 
custody of the enrolling officer.  Upon appeal, Chief Justice Lumpkin held that Dr. 
Powell’s certificate was insufficient to certify Cody’s incapacity for discharging the 
duties of a soldier.  Lumpkin concluded that “The act vacating all previous exemptions
required rules to be prescribed by the Secretary of War. He required a medical Board
[italics in original] to act in case of alleged physical disability. It was competent for the 
Secretary of War to make the rule, and therefore the certificate of a single physician will 
not answer.”574
In deference to the legislative function and the protection of that function from 
executive usurpation by the War Department, state supreme courts applied a strict 
573 Ibid, 711.
574 James M. Cody v. Radford C. Rhodes, 34 Ga. 66, 67 (1864).
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construction to the statute and refused to permit the War Department from expanding 
the scope of its secondary delegation of legislative power as contravening the intent of 
Congress. In a “disorganizing opinion” in Bryan, the North Carolina court refused to 
allow the War Department to usurp the legislative function, regardless of the exigencies 
facing the nation.575  Both Battle and Pearson agreed that under the April 1862 act, certain 
rights had been vested and with the War Department's construction that substitutes in the 
age group mentioned in the September 1862 act were now liable themselves for 
conscription thereby causing their principals to become liable for conscription was 
essentially a retrospective law affecting those rights.  Battle held that the Congress alone
possessed the authority to pass retrospective laws and giving the War Department 
discretion here would constitute executive usurpation of the legislative function.576  He
added that it was not contemplated at the time that the First Conscription Act was passed 
that another act might be passed which would alter the previous provisions for substitutes.  
However, this did not matter since the court could only interpret what Congress had 
legislated and the court denied the War Department any power to legislate.  In so doing, 
Battle wrote, “it was a casus omissus, for which Congress neglected to provide, and it is 
575 This decision was described as a “disorganizing opinion” and became the 
subject of frustration in a letter from Assistant Secretary of War Campbell to North 
Carolina‘s governor, Zebulon Vance.  In the War Department, Robert Kean read of this 
case and concluded that “The local judiciary [in North Carolina] are doing what they 
can to defeat the conscription and encourage desertion in many places.” Robert Garlick 
Hill Kean, Inside the Confederate Government, Edward Younger, ed. (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 1957), 64.
576 “The Secretary of the War had no power afterwards to make an order to have a 
retrospective operation to affect rights already attached.  The Legislature may pass 
retrospective laws, but it is very certain that no other department of the Government can.” 
60 N.C. 1, 22-25. General Order No. 29.
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too late for the War Department to attempt to remedy the mischief by assuming to legislate 
under the name of regulations.”577
In some cases, the courts seemed so determined to preserve the separation of 
powers and functions that they employed strict construction to hold Congress to their 
poorly-worded legislation and poorly expressed intent, preventing the War Department 
from expanding the scope of conscription beyond the statutory language. In October of 
1863, in an vacation opinion, In Re Prince,578 Chief Justice Pearson did just that.  Miles 
H. Prince obtained a substitute who entered military service on March 5, 1862 but since 
the substitute was under the age of 18 years when received, the colonel receiving Prince’s 
substitute issued him a certificate of exemption.  While the colonel insisted that Prince was 
exempted only until the substitute reached 18 years of age, Pearson, combining the statute 
and the War Department regulations of October 1861, stated that Prince’s exemption was 
for the war. Before the court, the issue was whether the provisions for exemption, as set 
out in the certificate of acceptance provided when Prince’s substitute was received, 
modified the construction of the conscription act.  Pearson stated that in looking to the 
statute, age seemed immaterial, “at any time, there was no act of Congress in force having 
reference to any particular age or making the age of the substitute at all material, and, of 
course, the colonel could not vary or annul the legal effect of the fact of substitution, and 
there was no act of Congress which could, by reference, vary the legal effect.”  Pearson 
held that “where the substitution is made before the passage of the conscription acts, under 
the regulation of the War Department…there being no act of Congress in force making 
577 60 N.C. 1, 25.
578 In re Prince, 60 N.C. 116 (1863).
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citizens, either presently or prospectively, liable to service in the Confederate Army, the 
age of the substitute is immaterial.”  Pearson focused on what he considered as “the only 
essential requirement” and that was “that he [Prince] is ‘an able-bodied man, fit for 
military service in the field’” and “it is the law which discharges the principal, and not the 
colonel or captain.” Pearson refused to allow any modification of the provisions of the 
War Department regulations of October 1861 and vigorously asserted that the proper 
conclusion of law was to exempt Prince for the war, regardless of the age of his substitute, 
and he was discharged from service.579
Secondary Legislative Functions
Under the conscription and exemption legislation, the War Department was 
charged with the creation of regulations—including procedures for adjudicating claims 
for exemptions under the statutes—for the efficient administration of enrollments and 
statutory exemptions.580 The courts followed the rigid lines separating the branches, 
refusing to allow litigants to seek legal remedies before they had exhausted these
579 60 N.C. 116, 117.
580 “An Act to exempt certain persons from enrollment for service in the Armies 
of the Confederate States,” Chapt. LXXIV in The Statutes at Large of the Confederate 
States of America, Passed at the First Session of the First Congress; 1862.  Public Laws 
of the Confederate States of America, Passed at the First Session of the First Congress; 
1862. The legislation provided “that all persons who shall be held to be unfit for 
military services under rules to be prescribed by the Secretary of War [italics added].” 
Note the provision in the first phrase providing that exemptees must held as unfit 
according to the rules and regulations established by the War Department.  This 
distinction and whether the Executive Branch could interpret both the statutory intent of 
the Congress and the duties and responsibilities contained with the Confederate 
Constitution would become material issues and prompt many of the state supreme 
courts to enunciate a constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers. Hamilton, 
“State Courts and the Confederate Constitution,” 431, footnote 29.
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procedures provided by the War Department under the exemption legislation.581  As the 
state supreme court justices made clear in their decisions, these delegations were not 
unlimited and there were significant differences between “non-delegable legislative 
power” and “delegable secondary legislative functions”582
Under the conscription and exemption legislation, the War Department was 
specifically charged with the delegable legislative function of creating and 
implementing regulations and procedures . In Alabama, in a jointly decided separation 
of powers case, Ex Parte Hill, In Re Armistead v. Confederate States & Ex Parte 
Dudley,583 the state supreme court addressed whether a state court could overrule 
decisions by the commandant of conscripts and the Secretary of War refusing a 
conscript’s appeal under its regulations and these delegable legislative functions.  W. B. 
581 Mann v. Parke, 16 Va. (Gratt.) 443, 449, 452-453 (1864); Ex Parte Hill, In Re 
Willis, et al., 38 Ala. 429 (1863); Ex Parte Hill, In Re Armistead v. Confederate States & 
Ex Parte Dudley, 38 Ala. 458 (1863); Ex Parte David S. Read (1863), reported in 
Robard’s, Synopses of the Decisions of the Supreme Court of the State of Texas, 11-12; 
Ex Parte Richard R. Peebles, and Others (1864), reported in Ibid.; and Ex Parte 
Mitchell, 39 Ala. 442 (1864).
582 Vanderbilt, The Doctrine of the Separation of Powers and Its Present-Day 
Significance, xi. Such delegations did not diminish the doctrine since the complex 
demands of a modern war and conscription would require a certain degree of flexibility 
in the formulation of detailed operational guidelines: “The doctrine of the separation of 
powers is a general constitutional principle, and it was neither conceived nor has it ever 
operated as a rigid rule. The special cases where one branch performs some particular 
function of another branch are both explicit and implied by the very nature of 
government.  But the special cases are determinable and limited, for the rule of 
separation of powers is meaningless if it can be circumvented completely.” Michael 
Conant’s reading of Vanderbilt regarding that the doctrine was never intended to be 
meaningless by design nor was it intended to be rigid, that delegation was consistent 
with the flexibility of the doctrine. “In our technically complex society, the legislature 
may lack the skill to develop the detailed rules that will carry out a general regulatory 
policy.” Ibid., ix, 50, x.
583 38 Ala. 458 (1863).
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Armistead, a newly conscripted soldier, sought release from the custody of an enrolling 
officer on the ground that he had obtained a discharge from military service in August 
of 1862 by virtue of his placing a substitute over the age of 35 in his place and under the 
proscribed War Department regulations.  In adjudicating Armistead’s claim, the court 
considered whether the legal effect of that discharge should be to exempt Mr. Armistead 
from conscription under the Second Conscription Act and whether the officer was 
capable of interpreting the statute as to the effect of the substitution and discharge.584  In 
Charles H. Dudley’s case, he had provided a substitute but was ordered back to camp 
when it was determined that his substitute had been obtained through fraud and duress.  
Dudley then applied to the Secretary of War for leave to examine witnesses, and to 
cross-examine those against him.  Later, when pressed to proceed, he again applied to 
the Secretary of War to open and extend the time for the examination of witnesses, but 
his application was refused, with the Secretary ruling that the substitution was set aside 
for fraud.585
Despite the claim that such procedures usurped legislative functions by adding 
additional criteria to the statutory requirements enacted by Congress, Associate Justice 
Stone looked to the War Department regulations that implemented the conscription acts, 
namely General Order No. 37, passed on May 19, 1862 and General Order No. 64, 
passed September 8, 1862 as delegated secondary legislative functions.586  Stone 
584 38 Ala. 458 (1863).
585 Ibid.
586 The April 16, 1862 Conscription Act conveyed a statutory authority upon the 
War Department by providing that the statute was to be implemented “’under such 
regulations as may be prescribed by the secretary of war.’”  General Order No. 37 also 
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affirmed the delegable secondary legislative function that Congress had conveyed to the 
War Department and rejected any interference with this delegation, even by the 
judiciary, and he imposed a restriction even on the Alabama high court’s ability to 
interfere.587
Although the right to appeal to the Secretary of War was unquestionably logical, 
Stone refused to allow any further appeal before the state courts due to the bar imposed 
by the separation of powers doctrine under the Confederate Constitution and because to 
do so would violate the specific delegation made by Congress.  The issue here was 
purely one of law and Stone stated that the Secretary of War and the commandant of 
conscripts had addressed the issue of fraud in their study of the available evidence: 
“give to the courts of the State government appellate jurisdiction over the commanding 
officers, commandant of conscripts, or the secretary of war; officers who receive their 
appointments from the Confederate government, and who are specially charged, by that 
government, with the performance of these functions.”588  Here, Stone, borrowing from 
McClung v. Silliman589 and Ableman v. Booth590 made the distinction here between 
copied the language of the first exemption statute and provided that “’No persons, other 
than those expressly named, or properly implied in the above act, can be exempted, 
except by furnishing a substitute exempt from military service, in conformity with 
regulations already published’” and General Order No. 64 provided that “’A substitute 
becoming liable to conscription, renders his principal also liable, unless exempt on other 
grounds.’” Ex Parte Hill, In Re Armistead v. Confederate States & Ex Parte Dudley, 38 
Ala. 458, 472, 475 (1863).
587 The court imposed the same restriction again in Ex Parte Hill, In Re Willis, et 
al. 38 Ala. 429 (1863).
588 38 Ala. 458, 466, 469-470.
589 6 Wheat 598 (1821) [5 L.Ed. 340].
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usurpation through the wrongful exercise of power and the erroneous exercise of 
authority.  The exercise of power, without the appropriate authority to do so, was to be 
regarded as a serious wrong to which the state courts might respond, while the wrongful 
exercise of power within the range of authority granted was to be addressed within its 
respective branch.  Stone, like Pearson in North Carolina, held Congress accountable 
for its legislation, and he stated that if “the commandant of conscripts, or the secretary 
of war, in violation of the plain rules of law, cancelled the substitution…on evidence 
furnished by ex parte affidavits, or refused to require notice of the time and place of 
taking the testimony, or did not afford to Mr. Dudley an opportunity to cross-examine 
the witnesses against him” then such actions should be considered as “an erroneous 
exercise of rightful authority—not usurpation.”  This delegation might also include the 
ability to entertain appeals and render final decisions.  The delegation here had done 
just that: “The redress, if there be any, must be invoked from the authorities of that 
government which created the offer, and clothed him with his functions and his motion 
was rightfully denied.”591
The longstanding feud between the North Carolina court and the War 
Department again flared up with the court’s decision in In Re Huie.592 Huie was a 29 
year old overseer of more than 20 slaves on his family’s plantation, which he shared with 
his aged mother and 19-year-old sister.  The two women were the only white persons on 
the plantation.  On October 11, 1862, Huie reported to the camp of instruction, but was 
590 21 How. 506 (1858) [16 L.Ed. 169].
591 38 Ala. 458, 470-471.
592 In re Huie, 60 N.C. 92 (1863).
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sick and after it was determined that he had bronchitis, he was ruled unfit for field service 
and returned home.  He was later arrested at home as a recusant conscript under the theory 
that his reporting at the camp of instruction on October 11, 1862 had worked as a 
constructive enrollment and hew ceased to be considered as an overseer on that day.  Here, 
the North Carolina court, with Pearson writing for the court, gladly took up the issue of 
whether the War Department could exercise jurisdiction over Huie by applying a 
construction of the conscription and exemption acts.  Pearson refused any such 
understanding as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine, holding that “The 
construction of the conscription and exemption act, like other acts of Congress, so far as 
they concern the rights of a citizen, as distinguished from military regulations and rules 
which the Secretary of War is authorized to prescribe…is [a] matter for the courts, and any 
construction put on the acts by the officers of the executive department, as to who is liable 
as a conscript or who is entitled to exemption, is subject to the decision of the judiciary.  
This principle of constitutional law is so clear that I suppose it will be conceded by every 
one.”593 Pearson rejected usurpation of a judicial role by the Secretary of War, stating 
“whether a man is entitled to exemption or not depends on the construction of the act, 
which it is the privilege of the courts to make” and he restricted the War Department to 
creating regulations only, explaining “the authority of the Secretary of War is simply to 
prescribe rules and make regulations in order to have the fact determined whether a man is 
or is not fit for military service in the field.”  The other role of creating legislation was the 
task “for which purpose alone the representatives of the people in Congress assembled, to 
whose wisdom is confided the trust of making laws, had declared it necessary to take 
593 Ibid., 93.
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citizens from their homes against their consent.” Pearson held the War Department bound 
to the statute and exempted Huie under the conclusion that “The act exempts all persons 
held to be unfit for ‘military service in the field,’ and clearly no rule prescribed by the 
Secretary of War could defeat this express provision.”594
In In Re Bryan,595 the North Carolina court took up the issue of usurpation of the 
legislative powers and the court had to consider the propriety of granting of Bryan’s 
application for the writ and whether any judicial branch—state or Confederate—could 
usurp the legislative function by ignoring the legislation suspending the writ that had been 
promulgated by the Confederate Congress for the good of the nation.  Bryan’s attorneys 
argued that congressional suspension of the writ did not apply to state courts and state 
tribunals to which Mr. Strong, the Confederate District Attorney pointed to the power 
given to Congress to suspend the writ of habeas corpus under Article I, section 9, clause 
3596 and asked the court “Now, if the courts of the States can issue writs of habeas 
corpus, in all cases where parties are detained under Confederate authority, and if 
Congress cannot suspend those writs, is not the right of Congress, which is recognised 
[sic] in the above clause of the constitution, nullified? Why suspend the privilege of the 
writ as exercised through a Confederate Judge, when, in the very same case, it may be 
exercised through all State Judges, which, in this State, number eleven?”597
594 Ibid., 94.
595 In Re Bryan (60 N.C. 1 (1863).
596 Article 1, section 9, clause 3, of the Confederate Constitution declared “the 
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in case of 
rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it.”
597 60 N.C. 1, 21-22.
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Pearson also referred to a series of applications for writs submitted to him 
during the spring of 1863 in which he said he applied the necessary regulations of the 
War Department, as required under the Exemption Act, and had rejected several 
applications for exemptions “on the ground of being ‘unfit for military service in the 
field by reason of bodily incapacity,’ because by the proper construction of the 
exemption act, only those persons are exempted, who shall be held ‘unfit for military 
service in the field, by reason of bodily incapacity under rules to be prescribed by the 
Secretary of War.’”  Pearson refused to intervene in the matter because the War 
Department regulations required “that the party should be examined by a surgeon, or 
board of surgeons appointed for that purpose, and the certificate of the surgeon or board 
of surgeons, was the only evidence of bodily incapacity that could be acted on as 
evidence of the fact.”  Pearson refused their claims, concluding that “the parties were 
not unlawfully restrained of their liberty, but were lawfully in custody of the officer of 
the Confederate States, under the authority of the acts of Congress, according to their 
proper construction.”598
Similarly, in Virginia, in the case of Mann v. Parke,599 the state supreme court 
took up the issue of whether the secondary legislative delegation to the War Department 
598 Ibid., 42. Associate Justice Battle concurred in Pearson's decision (on its 
merits) that Bryan should be discharged since those individuals conscripted under the 
April 16, 1862 act and discharged for providing a substitute could not be liable under 
the provisions of the September conscription act. However, he  also raised the important 
question about congressional power to remedy such a discrepancy. It was perhaps this 
question, addressing the intent and purpose of the amendatory act of September, 1862, 
which helped to erode the acceptance by brother justices of Pearson's strict, positivistic 
interpretation of the conscription acts. Hamilton, “The North Carolina Courts and the 
Confederacy,” 374-75.
599 Mann v. Parke 16 Va. (Gratt.) 443 (1864).
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included its ability to render final decisions upon appeal.  In Mann, the Virginia court 
further clarified the application of this principle, explaining the circumstances under 
which a claimant could raise a claim in the courts and when he was supposed to do so 
before officials from the War Department.600 Mann had joined a volunteer company in 
April of 1862 and was mustered into military service.  One month later, Mann hired a 
substitute, who at that time was forty years old and not subject to conscription, and four 
months later returned to his regular trade as a millwright.  Later that year, when his 
substitute became liable to military service, Mann attempted to secure a statutory 
exemption since millers and millwrights working at their vocations were exempted
under the same statute.  The issue before the court was  whether Mann could be 
exempted from military service on the basis of a statutory exemption as a miller after 
having become a miller subsequent to his having enlisted in a company of volunteers 
and hiring a substitute, who then himself became liable to military conscription?601
Associate Justice Moncure held that the writ of habeas corpus could not be 
issued to a claimant seeking an exemption under the Exemption Act or due to 
substitution, “until he has failed to obtain the relief to which he is entitled by pursuing 
the regulations on the subject prescribed by act of Congress or the War department.”602
Moncure distinguished between those who were within the ages of the conscription 
legislation (ages 18 to 45) and therefore were compelled to seek relief through a 





therefore, seek discharge and release from a circuit court or a circuit court judge sitting 
in vacation.603 The court held that an individual whose age placed them within the age 
group of the statute was required to seek remedies before the military; only after a 
reasonable time could the complainant raise a claim of unlawful detention and seek a 
writ of habeas corpus.604  Alternatively, an individual whose age was over 45 and 
clearly not contemplated within the conscription statute, was not obligated to seek a 
remedy before military authorities, but could petition for a writ of habeas corpus before 
a court of the Confederate States, a circuit court judge or a judge in vacation, and after 
proving his case, could be discharged from duty.605
By February of 1864 the Confederate Congress enacted new conscription 
legislation that expanded the age range of men now liable to military service and 
restricted the statutory exemptions over previous legislation and this in response to the 
demands and needs of the nation.606  Yet, even despite a worsening military situation, 
603 Ibid. In Smith v. Cloud and Stillwell v. Cloud, an unreported decision, the
court decided that a man older than 45 at the time of the amended statute who was 
conscripted into service, was not bound to seek discharge and release from Confederate 
authorities but could go to state authorities, specifically the state courts to seek a writ of 
habeas corpus.
604 16 Va. 443, 454.
605 Ibid., 453. Moncure also raised a pleadings issue, stating that upon appeal, 
the party or parties for whom the regulations of the War Department had some impact 
were to include these regulations in their appeals as a matter of record; the objective 
here was to raise the awareness of controversies that could be resolved without 
litigation. 16 Va. 443, 455.
606 On the new legislation, see Official Records of the War of the Rebellion,
series IV, vol. III, 178; J.B. Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States 
Capital, (Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott, 1866), 2:127-129, 138, 152; Richmond 
Examiner, February 20, 1864 (and contra in Richmond Whig, February 29, 1864); 
Albert Burton Moore, Conscription and Conflict in the Confederacy (New York, NY: 
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especially in northern Alabama, in Ex Parte Mitchell,607 the Alabama supreme court 
continued its commitment to render decisions in accord with the legislative intent of 
Congress.  Even though the court affirmed the delegable secondary legislative function 
that had been assigned to the War Department by the February 17, 1864 legislation, it 
resisted permitting a broad exercise of executive powers because of the expressed 
military need addressed by Congress and it preserved the separation of powers doctrine 
as a substantive constitutional doctrine.608  In the case, Mitchell applied for an 
exemption from service as an agriculturalist and submitted a bond.  His application and 
bond were both approved by the country enrolling officer on May 20, 1864 and 
subsequently approved by the district enrolling officer.  However, the state commandant
sent the application and bond back to the district enrolling officer for revisions on July 
20, 1864 with the instruction that the bond had to be made in accordance with the 
circulars issued by the commandant on June 20 and July 8, 1864.  On appeal, the court 
The MacMillan Company, 1924), 311. See opinions of generals in the field in Official 
Records of the War of the Rebellion, series II, vol. XXXII, Pt. II, 511, series II, vol. 
XXXIII, 1087; Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, Vol. 2, 126; Savannah Republican, 
February 1, 1864; Richmond Examiner, January 12, 1864; Jacksonville Republican, 
January 23, 1864.
607 39 Ala. 442 (1864).
608 The act (entitled “An Act supplemental to an act entitled ‘An act to organize 
forces to serve during the war’”) provided that “That nothing...shall be construed to 
discharge from military service persons over the age of forty-five or under eighteen 
years, who are now in the Army of the Confederate States.” Charles W. Ramsdell, ed., 
Laws and Joint Resolutions of the Last Session of the Confederate Congress (November 
7, 1864-March 18, 1865), Together With the Secret Acts of Previous Congresses
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1941), 171; Official Records of the War of the 
Rebellion, Vol. IV, Part III, 488. While the act retained those already conscripted who 
were eighteen to forty-five years of age, it also expanded the class of conscripts to those 
ages seventeen to fifty years of age. The new class of conscripts were to be formed into 
reserve units for the defense of their respective states and for detail duty. Moore, 
Conscription and Conflict in the Confederacy, 308.
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took up the issue of whether all the requirements had been met under the Conscription 
Act of February 17, 1864 and so provided Mitchell with immunity from service in the 
Confederate Army.609
Walker determined that there were the three specific conditions provided for in 
the February 17th Act for individuals claiming exemption from service as an 
agriculturalist and concluded that Mitchell did not comply with the regulations provided 
by the War Department for executing the bond, even though his sureties “were good 
and sufficient.”610 Since Mitchell did not complete the requisite tasks to exempt him 
from Confederate service, he was “prima facie” an enrolled conscript in the service of 
the Confederate States” and therefore “The onus was upon the State to show his 
exemption from that service.  This the State has failed to do, as far as we can discover 
from the record.”611  In addition to the emphasis on preserving liberty by maintaining a 
rigid separation of branches and their respective powers and functions, the state 
supreme courts were also obliged to rule in furtherance of the other constitutional goal 
for which the separation of powers doctrine had been created, that of establishing and 
maintaining effective national government, particularly during wartime.
609 Ibid., 445. The three statutory requirements were “15 able-bodied hands must 
have been on plantation; There was no white male on plantation liable to military 
service;  Person claiming exemption was, on January 1, 1864 wither owner, manager, or 
overseer on plantation.”
610 Ibid., 445-446. Walker focused on the provisions that spelled out the bond 
requirements, that the form and security of the bond had to comply with the 
requirements set forth by the Secretary of War, that the bond had to comply with the 
condition of the bond, as set forth in the statute, and that the bond also had to require the 




Effective and Energetic Government
One of the chief questions raised by the separation of powers doctrine was how to 
best preserve individual liberty while also creating and maintaining effective and energetic 
government.  In a nation with identifiable goals and purposes, “the exercise of 
governmental power, which is essential to the realization of the values of…societies” 
should be accompanied by the control of governmental power “in order that it should 
not itself be destructive of the values it was intended to promote.”612  In the Confederate 
Constitution the system of checks and balances upon government branches was
provided for very specifically yet government efficacy and efficiency were also major 
goals and the separation of powers doctrine was never intended to interfere with or 
restrict the achievement of these goals.
The separation of powers in Confederate constitutionalism, with its emphasis upon 
efficiency, a strong executive, and cooperation appeared to be more of a parliamentary 
form than in the U.S. Constitution.  This was an interesting innovation that actually 
provided for the inclusion rather than separation of the Executive in congressional affairs.  
The framers had included in the Constitution a provision allowing cabinet members to sit 
in Congress and debate on issues relevant to their portfolios.613  This “non-separation of 
branches” was implemented to promote greater efficiency, cooperation, and “the smooth 
612 Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers, 2.
613 Confederate Constitution, Article I, section 6 provided that “Congress may, 
by law, grant to the principal officer in each of the Executive Departments a seat upon 
the floor of either House, with the privilege of discussing any measures appertaining to 
his department.”
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operation of the system.”614 As Associate Justice Jenkins of the Georgia Supreme Court 
made clear in James L. Mims and James D. Burdett v. John K. Wimberly, the separation of 
powers was a foundational idea in the Confederate government and the government was 
not a mixed constitutional system in the British model.615  Jenkins refuted any analogy 
to the British system of government (mixed government) or the power of Parliament to 
interpret statutes.  Rather, the judiciary was to be the expositor of constitutional 
principles; Jenkins stated that “There must be power lodged somewhere to assert lack of 
authority in the former [Congress], and to enforce restraints upon the latter [state 
legislatures], and of this power…the judiciary is the depository.”616
When the first conscription act was passed by the Confederate Congress on 
April 16, 1862,617 its preamble referred to the necessity of instituting conscription, 
stated that the legislation was passed “in view of the exigencies of the country, and the 
absolute necessity of keeping in the service our gallant army, and of placing in the field 
a large additional force to meet the advancing columns of the enemy now invading our 
614 Alexander Stephens to Linton Stephens, February 17 and March 10, 1861, in 
the Alexander Stephens Papers, op cit. Nieman, “Republicanism, The Confederate 
Constitution, and the American Constitutional Tradition,” 214-215.
615 33 Ga. 587 (1863).
616 Ibid., 594. Alexander Stephens referred to this development as more honest 
and straightforward for the public benefit since “’Our heads of department can speak for 
themselves and the administration…without resorting to the indirect and highly 
objectionable medium of a newspaper…It is to be greatly hoped that under our system we 
shall never have what is known as a Government organ.’” Milledgeville Southern Federal 
Union, April 2, 1861, op cit. Ibid., 215. 
617 Chapter XXXI, section 1 in Public Laws of the Confederate States, 1 Cong., 
1 Sess., 1862 (Richmond: R.M. Smith, 1862).
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soil....”618  The act gave the president the authority to call into the service of the 
Confederate States for three years all resident white males between the ages of eighteen 
and thirty-five years at the time the call was made, except for those legally exempted 
under section 9 of the act.  The April act also extended for an additional three years the 
service of those already serving in Confederate military forces.619
In the hands of the state supreme court justices, the vigorous preservation of the 
separation of powers worked to promote government efficiency by preserving 
Congressional War Powers and its ability to create a national army.  In Burroughs v. 
Peyton,620 the Virginia court was compelled to consider the extent of national 
government war powers and the ability of the national government to extend its reach to 
individual citizens within each state.  Here the court looked to the national goals and 
purposes for which the Confederacy had been created and the intent within the 
Confederate Constitution.  The Virginia high court refused to hold that the exercise of 
executive war powers specifically entrusted to the president constituted usurpation since 
his responsibilities included safeguarding the nation from harm or destruction.  Here, 
Virginia’s high court, looking to national purposes, held that “no government can have 
the right to endanger the life of the nation it represents, by contracting that it will not 
exercise the powers confided to it.”621 Associate Justice Robertson, writing for the 
court, held that while the conscription acts “delegated no authority to the President to 
618 Ibid.
619 Mitchell, Legal Aspects of Conscription and Exemption, 11.
620 Burroughs v. Peyton 16 Va. (Gratt.) 470 (1864).
621 16 Va. 470, 489.
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raise an army,” the Congress had authorized the President “to call out and place in the 
field the army raised under and by the laws…as commander in chief, he should be 
invested with such discretion.”622
By the fall of 1862 there was tremendous public interest in the passage and 
implementation of amendatory conscription legislation.  As September ended, no new 
conscription legislation had been passed and the Confederate Congress increasingly was 
severely criticized for its inaction on behalf of the people.  In Richmond, an editor 
declared that “it is the imperative duty of Congress to act without delay upon the 
various measures before it for the public defence [sic]...We had hoped that not a week 
would have be permitted to pass without the extension of the Conscription law…If this 
were the great age of miracles, the value of a jawbone might be as great as it was in 
Samson's time.”623  The paper went on to state that “while everybody outside is 
painfully anxious for the safety of the country and the cause, they seem to be intent on 
nothing but securing their own popularity at home...Our armies want recruits...They 
622 Ibid., 485. In July, the Wilmington Journal declared that more Confederate 
troops must be recruited if the southern cause was to succeed: “The thinned ranks of our 
gallant regiments must be recruited...The invaded must have them to defend the country 
against the worst horrors of ruin and subjugation.” It went on to add that “cheerful 
compliance with the Conscription law and a full and complete enforcement of its 
provisions becomes a necessity of our national existence....[emphasis added].” 
Wilmington Journal, July 18, 1862; W. Buck Yearns and John G. Barrett, North 
Carolina Civil War Documentary (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 
1980), 133-34.
623 “Congress,” Richmond Daily Dispatch, September 23, 1862. The Raleigh 
North Carolina Whig contended that the enlistments into Union armies at this time were 
primarily Irish and Italian immigrants, “the scum of all the earth.” Raleigh North 
Carolina Whig, May 27, 1862.
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must be recruited.”624  The newspaper warned that "upon the heads of those to whom a 
confiding people have entrusted the destinies of their country will rest the responsibility 
of any disaster that may ensue.”  The newspaper also spoke of the number of civilians 
who were “so disgusted with the course of Congress upon the Conscription law that 
they begin to lose faith in the usefulness of representative bodies”625
While there was some initial concern over whether the conscription legislation 
would threaten liberties in the South, but there seemed to be some willingness to 
surrender some liberty for the sake of maintaining a military capability necessary to 
meet the needs of modern war.  The Salisbury Carolina Watchman reported that it 
feared that the Confederate Constitution had, “by the conscription, been set aside or 
over-ridden on the plea of a war necessity.”  But, the newspaper did not indicate that 
North Carolinians reacted negatively or protested the measure.  Rather, “the people 
seemed disposed to yield this inch--they will do it because they believe in the 
necessity.”626
In Jeffers v. Fair,627 the Georgia Supreme Court addressed the degree to which 
congressional war powers included the power to conscript or whether this was an 
unconstitutional extension of its powers.   Associate Justice Jenkins wrote that the court 
was “impressed with the importance of the question, and the responsibility involved in 
624 “Congress and the Army,” Richmond Daily Dispatch, September 24, 1862.
625 “Congress and the Conscription Law,” Richmond Daily Dispatch, September 
26, 1862.
626 Salisbury Carolina Watchman, April 28, 1862.
627 33 Ga. 347 (1862).
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its decision, and have not failed to give it careful and anxious consideration.”628  Jenkins 
took up the claim that the power provided to the Congress under Article I, Section 8 
was vague but stated that the Article I grant, “The Congress shall have power to raise 
armies, etc.” [italics in original] was very clear and that “language [italics in original] 
could not express a broader, more general grant of a specific power. We look in vain for 
the limitation to voluntary enlistment as a means. Is there any difference between a 
grant of "power to raise armies?" We think not.”  Here, the  court held that  the grant of 
power was fully within the legislative powers and functions and expressed “a grant of 
power--of power commensurate with the object” to legislate on behalf of the nation.  
Because the purposes to be fulfilled were national in scope, the grant also gave the 
Congress “power over the populations of the several States, entering into and becoming 
component parts of the Confederate States of America.”629  Jenkins held that “States 
adopted, quoad these powers, the same Constitution. Our conclusion is, that the power 
of raising armies by compulsory enrollment, was necessary to the attainment of the end, 
that it was seen by them to be so; that they intended by the terms used to grant it, and 
consequently that it is no violation of the spirit of the Constitution.”630
 The Georgia court here was prioritizing constitutional powers, balancing 
several competing interests and duties, and demonstrating the flexibility of the 
separation of powers doctrine.  Here, Congress would not only receive the grant of 
power provided for under Article I, but there were national interests and purposes, such 
628 Ibid., 348.
629 33 Ga. 347, 351.
630 Ibid., 364.
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as preserving the nation, that could shape that specific grant.  Jenkins conceded that the 
war powers “claimed by the Congress, and conceded by this Court, ‘is incompatible 
with original unabridged State sovereignty, is a self-evident truth, for it is a very high 
political power.’”631  However, to ignore the national interests would result in the loss 
of the nation and its failure to maintain a republican form of government, and “that act 
[would] violate the constitutional guaranty [sic].”632
In North Carolina, the supreme court’s rigid enforcement of the statutory 
language, as per the constitutional responsibility of the judiciary, eventually began to 
result in more effective military operations as congressional legislation and War 
Department regulations became better drafted.  Elias Ritter 633 was drafted by North 
Carolina on February 25, 1862, hired a substitute over 18 years of age, and received a 
discharge.  While under the Conscription Act of April, 1862, he was not liable to 
conscription, he did become so after the passage of the next Conscription Act in 
September of 1862, and he was conscripted and held in the Raleigh camp of instruction.  
Upon review, the court addressed the exercise of a delegated legislative function and 
took up a detailed question of timing and intent, whether the War Department regulations 
of October 20, 1861, which allowed substitutes to be received after companies were 
formed and in service, applied to companies in the process of being formed or organized or 
631 33 Ga. 347, 364.
632 Ibid., 368. Jenkins added, “Thus sustained by contemporary and subsequent 
expositions of the Constitution, we rest upon our conclusions undisturbed by any 
lingering doubt. And it is a high gratification, that in the crisis of our fate as a nation, 
when flagitious war is desolating our country, we are enabled, in perfect consistency 
with the obligations of official duty, to ‘stay up the hands’ of our Confederate 
authorities in the wise and timely exercise of a power expressly granted.” Ibid., 371.
633 In Re Ritter, 60 N.C. 34 (1863).
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recruited.  The court was trying to determine whether a person who had been drafted and 
put in a substitute who was accepted, would be held not liable to conscription under the act 
of September, 1862.  The court looked to regulation #3 of the October 20, 1861
Regulations of the War Department which stated that when an NCO or soldier is entitled 
to discharge, by reason of a substitute, the captain of his company and the commander of 
his regiment or corps, shall give him a certificate to that effect, and the holder of the 
certificate is in no wise indebted to the Confederate States.   Pearson, writing for the court,
initially applied this regulation liberally in his analysis so as to include units in the process 
of being formed, adding that this was a legitimate reading of the regulation since in an 
unorganized unit, the administrative considerations of releasing the principal providing the 
substitute are much less and that by simply providing the able-bodied man as the 
substitute, the purpose of the War Department regulation is met.634 Pearson, writing for 
the court, identified a substantial reason when such a liberal construction might not 
work—when too many might be exempted from service through substitution as to cause 
confusion and to disorganize the company.  Here he distinguished the act of Ritter’s 
company at the time his substitution was completed as a time when “the companies were 
in the act of being organized and no considerations of that nature were presented”635
Likewise, in In Re Grantham636 and In Re Dollahite,637 the court preserved the 
specific legislative function of Congress and its intent to exempt only those skilled workers 
634 60 N.C. 34, 35.
635 Ibid., 36
636 60 N.C. 32 (1863).
637 60 N.C. 33 (1863).
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who could best contribute to the war effort.  Barfield Grantham claimed exemption under 
the conscription act because he was a shoemaker during the fall and winter but farmed 
during the summer and spring.  Although he claimed he made more shoes than previously, 
he did not make shoes as his exclusive means of income.  Associate Justice Battle, writing 
for the court, took up the issue of whether the Conscription Act required that the trade 
upon which a statutory exemption was granted was supposed to be the regular occupation 
and employment of the claimant.  Here, the legislation embodied the national goals and 
purposes of maintaining an effective military operation, including the production of war 
materials and supplies.  The court preserved the public policy intent of the legislation and 
refused to allow any broad interpretation of the exemption provisions, holding that “the 
mechanic is excused...for the benefit of the public, whom, it is supposed, he can serve 
better by working at his trade than in any other way.”  Because Grantham did not prove he 
was regularly employed as a shoemaker, his application for discharge was rejected.638
Moore W. Dollahite sought exemption as a teacher under the October 11, 1862
Exemption Act, filed his affidavit, and was referred to the Bureau of Conscription in 
Richmond, where his petition was rejected.639 Here the court again applied the statute 
strictly, preserving the legislative function of Congress and its intent from the legislation 
that the exemptions had reference to the status of the claimant at the time of the passage of 
the Act.  Here, the court stated the public policy concerns which had given rise to the act, 
that “the object of the law of 11 October, 1862, in defining certain classes to be exempt 
638 60 N.C. 32.
639 Exemption Act of October 11, 1862 was: all presidents and teachers of colleges, 
academies, schools, and theological seminaries who have been regularly engaged as such 
for two years previous to the passage of this act.” 60 N.C. 33.
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from the operation of the conscript acts, was not to attach privileges to those classes, but to 
abstain from breaking up the existing civil and industrial organizations of the country.”
Battle went on to cite directly from and concur with the decision of the Bureau of 
Conscription in Dollahite’s case and remanded him back to the custody of the Confederate 
military.640
The state courts addressed the constitutionality of the conscription acts primarily 
as they related to the war powers granted to the central government in the Confederate 
Constitution.641  In Bridgman v. Mallett,642 Justice Battle wrote that “in the distribution 
of the powers of sovereignty it is conceded that the States have conferred upon the 
Confederate Government the war power” and that “the Constitution declares that 
Congress shall have power ‘to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper’ for 
carrying them into execution.”643
Justice Battle, construing the Act of February 17, 1864 in Wood v. Bradshaw,644
attempted to ascertain whether Congress could, under the Constitution, conscript a 
bonded exempt for non-military services.  He stated that congressional war powers were 
640 Ibid.
641 The war powers granted to the Confederate government are contained in 
Article I, section 8, paragraphs 11-16 of the Permanent Confederate Constitution.
642 60 N.C. 321 (1864).
643 Ibid., 324. The “necessary and proper” clause was contained in Article I, 
section 8, paragraph 18 of the Confederate Constitution.
644 60 N.C. 269 (1864). Thomas Wood was an owner and manager of more than 
15 able-bodied slaves.  He met the statutory qualifications of the Act of February 17, 
1864. Wood had also applied for exemption as a farmer employing 10 field hands but 
his application had not been acted on by the War Department by November when he 
was ordered to enrollment camp.
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“conferred in unlimited terms, except that no appropriation of money to that use shall be 
for a longer time than two years...The Supremacy of the war power of the Confederate 
over that of the State Government cannot be disputed.”645  Chief Justice Pearson, in a 
concurring opinion, stated that “in case of necessity, the power of the Confederate 
States is unlimited so far as the citizens are concerned.  It is my duty to conform to that 
decision.”646  Pearson's concurring opinion affirmed a commitment to the separation of 
powers doctrine and discerning that the legislative powers Congress had been granted 
included those by which it could exercise direct authority over individual citizens.  
Pearson's interpretation of the scope of legislative powers under Article I not only 
maintained the separation between legislative and executive powers but facilitated the 
maintenance of government action during wartime.
When southern supreme court justices issued their decisions on the separation of 
powers doctrine, the pressures under which they rendered were substantial.  Because the 
separation of powers proved to be a meaningful doctrine in Confederate constitutionalism 
and wartime jurisprudence, these separation of powers cases prove to be important in 
understanding Confederate political philosophy in a much larger context.  While this 
doctrine could have been shaped by wartime necessity and provided the executive branch, 
specifically the War Department, with expansive powers, perhaps sanctioned usurpation of 
the legislative and judicial powers and functions, in actuality, it was the decisions 




and explaining boundaries that shaped the Confederate separation of powers.647 M.J.C. 
Vile argued that “the doctrine of the separation of powers has, in modern times, been 
the most significant, both intellectually and in terms of its influence upon institutional 
structures.  It stands alongside the other great pillar of Western political thought—the 
concept of representative government—as the major support for systems of government 
which are labelled [sic] ‘constitutional,’”648  The states courts’ enunciation of the 
separation of powers doctrine preserved Congress’ legislative powers and functions, 
even during wartime, maintaining representative government.  The preservation by these 
state supreme court justices of an important normative feature of the Confederate 
constitutional order is significant for the doctrine prescribes “certain governmental 
arrangements which should be created or perpetuated in order to achieve certain 
desirable ends.”649
The separation of powers was a means to facilitate a more national “ends,” that 
is, national purposes and goals identified in the Confederate Constitution.  In order to 
“secure the blessings of liberty” to the people of the Confederacy and their progeny, the 
state supreme courts of Virginia, North Carolina, Alabama, Georgia, and Texas ensured 
647 The opposite has been argued by several historians: see Amlund, Federalism 
in the Southern Confederacy on how wartime exigency displaced Confederate 
constitutional principles, especially federalism; Bensel, Yankee Leviathan on how military 
mobilization and the centralizing tendencies of modern war and a modern administrative 
state precluded Confederate constitutional principles; and Neely, Southern Rights: 
Political Prisoners and the Myth of Confederate Constitutionalism, who has argued that 
Confederate constitutionalism was “a myth.”
648 Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers, 2.
649 Gwyn, W.B., The Meaning of the Separation of Powers: An Analysis of the 
Doctrine From its Origin to the Adoption of the United States Constitution (New 
Orleans, LA: Tulane University, 1965), 5.
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that political liberty would be preserved by vigorously enforcing the separation of powers 
doctrine as a bar against usurpation of governmental powers.  M.J.C. Vile, in his reading of
Montesquieu, stated that to guard against the abuse of power, the people must establish 
government so that power is opposed by power.650  This requires the establishment of 
three strong branches of government and a fidelity to the principle of keeping these 
branches separate and strong.  Montesquieu’s ideas and the preservation of political
liberty were achieved admirably in a nation that existed only as a nation at war, amidst 
tremendous pressures to compromise constitutional principles for military exigency.
Yet there were other purposes and goals declared in the Confederate 
Constitution with respect to the safety and well-being of the people and the nation.  The 
general government was charged in the Confederate Preamble with the duty “to form a 
permanent federal government” as well as to “insure domestic tranquility,” the 
Confederate Congress had been vested with war powers under Article I, Section 8, 
clauses 11 through 16, and, under Article II, Section 2, the President was to assume the 
duties of commander-in-chief of the military.  Yet, the doctrine was applied in a flexible 
manner in order to fulfill national goals for effective and energetic government.  The state 
supreme courts restricted usurpation but their enunciation of the doctrine of the separation 
of powers was not so rigid as to prevent the kind of flexibility that would allow for more 
effective and energetic national government to address military operations, conscription, 
and exemption.  The Executive branch maintained its role in regulating, but only when it 
had been delegated secondary legislative functions by the Congress, preserving separation 
and political liberty even while allowing for maintenance of purposeful government.
650 Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers, 407.
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Preserving the separation of powers doctrine in the Confederacy was not an easy 
task nor the most expedient for justices tied to local politics and interests.  However, their 
fidelity to the principles of the Confederate Constitution and to national goals and purposes 
underscores their fidelity to the principles of the Confederate political community.  Vile 
wrote that one measure of a “’constitutional regime’” or a “constitutional State” is that 
“there must be a set of rules which effectively restrains the exercise of governmental 
power.”651  The state supreme court justices restrained the national government under 
the separation of powers doctrine, but not to restrict or weaken national government or 
serve the philosophy of states’ rights.  Rather, their task seems to have been to assist 





“the most trustworthy and authoritative exposition”
Attempting to understand the constitutional order of the Confederacy begins 
with the study of the Confederate Constitution and its interpretation at the hands of the 
state supreme courts.  Jabez Lamar Monroe Curry, a member of the Confederate 
Constitutional Convention, said of the Confederate Constitution, “as the instrument of 
government, [it] is the most certain and decisive expression of the views and principles 
of those who formed it, and is entitled to credence and acceptance as the most 
trustworthy and authoritative exposition of the principles and purposes of those who 
established the Confederate Government.”652  The Permanent Confederate Constitution 
is an interesting historical artifact, a “significant” document which can “offer insight 
into the critical events of 1861-1865” and which could be considered as a “milestone in 
the constitutional development of the United States.”653  But, it was more than that.
When southerners left the Union in 1860-1861, they did so with a specific 
constitutional agenda and they followed in the American tradition by which a constitution 
is “a single document that established or reorganized a government, prescribing its 
structure and endowing it with power, while at the same time restricting that power in the 
interest of personal liberty.”654  That Permanent Constitution of the Confederate States of 
America articulated national governmental forms, national goals, and national purposes.  
652 Curry, The Southern States of the American Union Considered in their 
Relations to the Constitution of the United States, 91.
653 Lee, The Confederate Constitutions, 150.
654 Fehrenbacher, Constitutions and Constitutionalism in the Slave-Holding South, 
1.
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But these concepts had to be explained and their principles carefully enunciated.  The 
resulting interpretation of the Confederate Constitution by the southern state supreme 
courts becomes important to understanding the nature of Confederate constitutionalism 
and the larger national goals and purposes it was intended to serve.  This authoritative 
document received its most extensive explication by state supreme courts that had to 
overcome several significant challenges and look beyond their local jurisdictions and the 
many political influences in order to articulate truly national concepts.  This required state 
supreme court justices to think much more in terms of the principles that shaped the 
creation of the Confederacy and of the Constitution as a document of national origination.
The act of national origination in the Confederate Constitution reveals the 
importance of constitutions and the concept of the nation-state to southerners of that time 
who saw in it the opportunity to create and structure their society.  Fehrenbacher argued 
that “there is ample evidence that constitutionalism remained a vital force throughout the 
short life of the Confederacy…it also gave expression to a basic cultural outlook that 
significantly influenced southern judgment and southern behavior.”  The predominance of 
states’ rights and localistic politics in 1860-1861 made a distinctly nationally-oriented 
constitutional order essential for the Confederate nation.  “A constitutional system, if 
working properly, is conducive to orderliness and stability in human affairs.  At the same 
time, it lays salutary restraint upon the will of the majority and “the slaveholding South, a 
minority section much in need of social stability, was distinctively and emphatically 
constitutional-minded.”655 Constitutions are also essential to understanding the ideas, 
vision, and goals of a political community; while constitutions may be “descriptive” and 
655 Ibid., 80.
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provide for specific “arrangements of the parts and mechanisms of government,” on a 
more substantial level, they become “an important measure of the purposes for which the 
government was created.”  In this sense, they are “normative” and they prescribe particular 
courses of action, “to guide and control political and governmental action—to state what 
ought to be rather than what is.”656
In interpreting and applying constitutional provisions to the cases contesting 
wartime measures, state supreme courts assumed a significant responsibility for 
sustaining and preserving the normative constitutional principles of the Confederate 
nation, explaining constitutional forms and functions as well as critical ideas.  
Fehrenbacher argued that Confederate convention delegates and founders completed two 
tasks simultaneously: “The innovations in the Confederate Constitution therefore reflect 
not only the principles of republicanism but the aspirations of nationhood.”  Fehrenbacher 
went on to add that these reform efforts “nourish the old republican ideals of civic virtue 
and chaste government, while discouraging the excesses of partisanship and patronage.”657
In the process of enunciating and implementing constitutional principles during 
war, the justices enunciated national purposes and the vitality of a distinctly national 
political community, signifying a momentous break with the states’ rights philosophy of 
the South’s past.  According to the state supreme courts, the constitutional order in the 
Confederacy was configured to facilitate the national welfare of a Confederate people, 
not just citizens of individual states, by creating and maintaining limited but effective
656 Kelly, Harbison, and Belz, The American Constitution: Its Origins and 
Development, 7th ed., vol. 1, xix, xx.
657 See Fehrenbacher, Constitutions and Constitutionalism in the Slave-Holding 
South, 66.
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national government.  State supreme courts, despite their status as state institutions, 
articulated a shared collective identification with and commitment to the national 
“imagined political community” of the Confederacy, explaining that under the 
Confederate Constitution there was a duty by the courts not only to protect the interests 
of individual citizens,658 but also to assert the duties owed by individual Confederate 
citizens to their national political community and the national government representing 
these citizens.659
State supreme courts, in their judicial review, accomplished three important and 
related tasks: articulating the Confederacy’s national purposes, principles, and 
constitutional framework established by the national political community; protecting 
national government authority and powers from usurpation due to states’ rights, and 
preserving the separation of governmental branches and not allowing the blurring of 
these boundaries because of wartime needs.  Especially important for the courts was 
their interest in preserving the judiciary’s role as principal expositor of constitutional 
law (and thereby their responsibility for judicial review) from influence or usurpation 
by the executive or legislative branches of the Confederate or state governments.
In accomplishing these tasks, however, they had to overcome several political and 
jurisprudential challenges.  Defining the Confederate constitutional order required that 
state supreme court justices resist the influence of localistic politics and focus on the text 
and the spirit of the Confederate Constitution.  Constitutional enunciation in the 
658 See Ex Parte Turman, 26 Tex. 708 (1863).
659 See In Ex Parte Mayer, 27 Tex. 715 (1864); Thomas Barber v. William A. 
Irwin; E. T. Jones v. Nathaniel F. Mercer; E. T. Jones v. Issac B. Brinson; Issac Dennis, et 
al. V. Willis B. Scott; E. T. Jones v. William Warren, 34 Ga. 27 (1864).
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Confederacy was made difficult by the war and national circumstances that made support 
critical for a national government busy with mobilization and the business of a war for 
existence.  Wartime necessity could configure decision-making so that grants of 
governmental power would be interpreted broadly and expansively, giving the national 
government sweeping powers over individuals and material.  Constitutional boundaries to 
conscription, exemption, and impressments could have been removed easily under the 
theory that war for national existence required that limitations and restrictions be 
removed; desperation could demand the dismantling of Confederate constitutionalism.  If 
the enunciation of constitutional principles was to be purposeful for the Confederacy, the 
states had to render their decisions with some consistency across jurisdictions.  This 
would require justices to break out of provincial or parochial perspectives and to think in 
terms of the national goals and purposes for which the Confederate constitutional order 
had been created.  Southern supreme court justices would have to think about the impact 
of their decisions upon the people of t other states across the Confederacy and the 
development they would contribute to the constitutional doctrines of the nation.  That 
these state jurists were capable of thinking in national terms when enunciating provisions 
and principles highlights their dedication to preserving the normative principles of the 
Confederate nation.
In the clash between state and national governments, particularly over the 
constitutionality of the conscription statutes, the state courts played a crucial role as the 
enunciators of the fundamental law of the Confederate nation and could even facilitate 
political cooperation on constitutional matters.  In October of 1862, when Georgia 
Governor Joseph E. Brown refused to enforce the Confederate Conscription Act passed 
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just six months previously, he claimed that the act “utterly destroys all State military 
organizations, and encroaches upon the reserved rights of the State, but strikes down her 
sovereignty at a single blow.”660 Brown would not allow Confederate enrollment officers 
to complete their jobs until after the Georgia General Assembly could meet the following 
month to determine the constitutionality of the act and the propriety of Georgia’s 
participation in it.  President Jefferson Davis, exercising patience and tact, informed 
Governor Brown that “nothing could be more unfortunate...than any conflict between the 
authorities of that State [Georgia] and the Confederate Government on this question.”
Davis stated that it was to the Supreme Court of Georgia that he looked for a 
definitive decision on the constitutionality of the act and the resolution of the 
confrontation, “having full confidence on the constitutionality of the law, I rely on the 
decision of the supreme court of Georgia to remove the difficulties that at present 
embarrass the action of the State authorities.”661  Shortly thereafter, during its November 
1862 term, the Georgia court, analyzing the language and intent of Article I, Sections 8, 
12, 15, and 18 of the Confederate Constitution, held that the acts were constitutional 
under the war powers afforded the national government.  The court held that the 
Confederate Constitution was fundamental law to be upheld for the good of the nation, 
and that the specific grants of power in the Constitution, especially the Necessary and 
Proper clause, were vital, purposeful, and consistent with the constitutive principles of the 
new nation.662  This was significant for it underscored the respect (and patience of the 
660 Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, series IV, volume II, 130-131.
661 Ibid., 141.
662 Asa O. Jeffers v. Fair, 32 Ga. 347, 348-366 (1862)
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Confederate officials) for process and principle as well as the high regard for the courts 
and the judicial function.
For the state supreme court justices, constitutional enunciation would be difficult 
also because of the importance of states’ rights as a political theory that had supported 
secession and disunion as a means of ultimate protest and resistance against the 
expanding reach and power of the national government.  Yet, while the Confederate 
constitutional order was based upon constitutionalism, that is, limited government, this 
limited government was never intended to be powerless or weakened to the point that it 
was incapable of fulfilling the constitutional responsibilities and duties for which it had 
been formed.  Consequently, justices were quick to dismiss the importance of states’ 
rights as a constitutive principle.
Preserving limited government would also be difficult during the war when 
wartime needs created pressures and tensions that militated towards providing the 
national government with broad, expansive powers for the purposes of prosecuting 
modern war effectively.  However, the state supreme court justices made very clear that 
wartime exigencies were insufficient to overcome constitutional principles.  With 
conscription, the states were bypassed so that the national government could operate 
directly upon the individual citizen, de-emphasizing the importance of the state as the 
intermediary between national government and the individual.  The supremacy of the 
national government was a constitutional priority, based upon the needs and goals of the 
national population and the national government’s specific charge to provide for the 
protection and well-being of the national citizenry.
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Conscription raised significant challenges for the justices since the experience of 
national conscription was new and involved articulating national priorities and goals 
against those of the states and individual citizens.  While litigants used the writ of habeas 
corpus to get their cases before the state supreme courts, the justices refused to allow 
individual rights to eliminate or mitigate the responsibilities and duties of the national 
government to protecting the nation or of the individual citizen of the Confederacy to 
fulfill their responsibilities to the nation.  Moreover, the state courts upheld procedural 
rules regarding the writ, remanded back to lower courts or Confederate custody a 
significant number of appellants whose interest was really avoiding military service, and 
sought to preserve the substantive integrity of the writ practice.
The Confederate Constitution was more than a conservative reform document.  It 
also contained innovative forms designed by the Confederate framers to correct what they 
considered as longstanding defects in the American constitutional order.  Their efforts 
produced a document that emphasized efficacious national government, a stronger 
executive branch, and greater coordination between the President and the Congress.  
These innovations were specifically designed to serve the national interests and make 
national government more effective, limited by specific provisions to enumerated powers 
but within its sphere and in order to perform the duties and responsibilities it had been 
authorized to perform, the national government was provided with sufficient powers 
under the Necessary and Proper clause and assured of minimal interference by the state 
governments through the vigorous assertion of the Supremacy clause.
One of the most significant challenges that the justices encountered was defining 
the nature of the federal relationship between the state and national governments and “the 
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most significant constitutional expression or definition of the South’s answer to the 
enigmatic question on the nature of the Union is embodied in the Confederate 
Constitutions.”663  As enunciated by the state supreme courts, the Constitution provided 
for a truly federal union in which both national and state governments were charged with 
specific responsibilities within their respective spheres.  Each had to operate and be fully 
effective within its sphere and, within its respective sphere, it possessed complete 
authority.  The courts were consistent in rejecting states’ rights as a configurative political 
philosophy in the Confederacy.  While states possessed important roles and 
responsibilities, the national government was not made powerless or weakened for their 
benefit.  The national government was never to be the agent of the states, though the state 
and national governments were to work collaboratively, each within its own sphere, for 
the improvement of Confederate society and the attainment of national goals and 
purposes.
Charles Lee argued that “the greatest constitutional question in the United States 
between 1787 and 1861 was: ‘What was the nature of the Union under the Constitution?’” 
and in response to this, Lee also argued that “Basic to this question was the location of 
sovereignty in the Federal Union.”664  The state supreme courts denied that sovereignty 
emanated form the states; sovereignty emanated form the people and it was vested in the 
national government by the people for specific purposes provided for in the Confederate 
Constitution.  This direct linkage between the people of the nation and the national 
government suggested a more nationalistic understanding of sovereignty.
663 Lee, The Confederate Constitutions, 145.
664 Ibid., 141.
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In their wartime decisions, state supreme court justices enunciated national 
constitutive principles and ideas with remarkable consistency, fashioning a vital and 
vibrant Supremacy Clause, and revealing a dedication to shared values and the assertion 
of a judicial nationalism that established the primacy of Confederate authority over that 
of the states.  Their assertion of judicial nationalism preserved Confederate 
constitutional authority and supremacy from state attempts to deny it and the reduction of 
the Confederate nation into a confederation of states.  In any conflict between 
Confederate law and state law, the Supremacy Clause established that Confederate law 
“shall be the supreme law of the land” and justices even referred to the opinions of John 
Marshall in support of this principle’s opinions.665
In exercising the power of judicial review, the state high courts would adhere to 
the supremacy of the national government as a matter of constitutional orthodoxy, not 
expedient emergency government.  As North Carolina’s Chief Justice Pearson has 
stated in In Re Bryan, the supremacy of national law was foundational in the 
Confederacy and facilitated national purposes and goals by furthering “the purpose of 
forming a new and distinct government.”  The Confederate government was distinctive; 
Pearson observed that sovereignty was not vested solely with the state and that 
philosophical principles about federalism had been given specific form: “all these states 
were compelled to give up a portion of their former respective sovereignties, and to 
invest the newly created government with them.”666 This assertion of judicial 
665 Many of Marshall’s opinions were cited, including his opinions in McCulloch 
v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819), Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122 (1819), and 
Osborne, et al. v. U.S. Bank [sic], 9 Wheat. 738 (1824).
666 See In Re Bryan, 60 N.C. 1, 7, 10 (1863).
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nationalism by state supreme courts calls into question the ascendancy of states’ rights 
as the dominant political ideology in the Confederacy.  These state supreme court 
decisions contradict an understanding of the Confederacy as a loose confederation of 
states, each acting independently, because they articulated these principles as 
constitutional doctrines, which, presumably, could not have been easily disregarded 
after the war.
Not only did the state supreme courts draw upon the Supremacy Clause of the 
Confederate Constitution to preserve the national government’s authority, but they also 
drew upon the common national purpose to create a nation and emphasized that states 
rights would interfere with rather than facilitate the common purposes of the national 
citizenry.  In places like Georgia, justices pointed out the fallacy inherent in allowing 
the states to interfere with the exercise of national governmental authority, that such 
state action would interfere with “the unobstructed operation of the machinery of their 
common Government, established by [the] consent of all.”667  Confederate supremacy 
was affirmed, with justices concluding that any assertion that the states were supreme 
over the national government would be “‘absolutely and totally contradictory and 
repugnant’ to the provisions of the constitution referred to, and would render the war-
powers granted in the constitution nugatory…[and] paralyze the war-power of the 
Confederate Government at the discretion of the States.668
667 In Thomas W. Cobb v. William B. Stallings & B.A. Baldwin v. John West, 34 
Ga. 72, 76 (1864). Despite the desperate military situation in Georgia and the emergency 
Georgians faced along the Atlanta front, Associate Justice Jenkins refused to elevate 
state authority above that of the national government.
668 David Simmons v. J.H. Miller, Enrolling Officer, 40 Miss. 19, 21, 26 (1864).
269
Orestes Brownson argued that the “mission” of the American republic was “not 
so much the realization of liberty as the realization of the true idea of the state, which 
secures at once the authority of the public and the freedom of the individual—the 
sovereignty of the people without social despotism, and individual freedom without 
anarchy.”669 Measured against Brownson’s standard, Confederate constitutionalism 
may not be quite the myth for which Mark Neely argued.  The Confederate Constitution 
was fashioned to create a government that would facilitate the “true ends of the 
Confederacy” but identifying those ends is difficult without some sense of the framers’ 
purposes and goals.670
In the wartime decisions of the state supreme courts, the purposes of the 
Confederacy become much clearer.  The constitutional purposes and goals of the 
Confederacy were national- rather than state-oriented and provided for limited but 
effective national government, a truly federal union in which states rights was rejected 
and the state and national governments were to both operate effectively and 
energetically, and within the national government, the powers of the national 
government were to be separated to promote efficiency and prevent usurpation.
As ironic as this development may be, the state supreme courts rendered judicial 
review of the Confederate Constitution and explained the Confederate “constitutional 
order” in a manner that underscores their adherence and devotion to enunciating 
provisions and principles accurately and honestly.  When state supreme courts 
669 Oreste Brownson, The American Republic: Its Constitution, Tendencies, and 
Destiny, new ed. (New York, NY: P. O’Shea, 1866), 5; op cit. Rights and Duties, xix.
670 J.L.M. Curry, Civil History of the Government of the Confederate States, as 
cited in Amlund, Federalism in the Southern Confederacy, 17.
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enunciated and implemented constitutional principles during war, the justices also 
enunciated national purposes and goals.  The constitutional order in the Confederacy 
seems to have been configured to facilitate the national welfare of a Confederate 
people, not just citizens of individual states.  The national government was vested with 
sovereignty to fulfill its responsibilities to the people of the nation, rather than to the 
states.  State jurists understood the Confederate Constitution as something substantive.  
Operating as a de facto supreme court, they considered its text and principles seriously.  
They upheld the exercise of constitutional Confederate war powers, within a system of 
federalism, to facilitate distinctly national purposes.  And, in their decisions on the 
meaning and significance of the Confederate Constitution, we may have, as Jefferson 
Davis had described, our light “to reveal its true meaning.
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Appendix: Constitution of the Confederate States of America
March 11, 1861
Preamble
We, the people of the Confederate States, each State acting in its sovereign and 
independent character, in order to form a permanent federal government, establish 
justice, insure domestic tranquillity, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and 
our posterity invoking the favor and guidance of Almighty God do ordain and establish 
this Constitution for the Confederate States of America. 
Article I
Section I. All legislative powers herein delegated shall be vested in a Congress of the 
Confederate States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives. 
Sec. 2. (I) The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every 
second year by the people of the several States; and the electors in each State shall be 
citizens of the Confederate States, and have the qualifications requisite for electors of 
the most numerous branch of the State Legislature; but no person of foreign birth, not a 
citizen of the Confederate States, shall be allowed to vote for any officer, civil or 
political, State or Federal. 
(2) No person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained the age of twenty-
five years, and be a citizen of the Confederate States, and who shall not when elected, 
be an inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen. 
(3) Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States, 
which may be included within this Confederacy, according to their respective numbers, 
which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including 
those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths 
of all slaves. ,The actual enumeration shall be made within three years after the first 
meeting of the Congress of the Confederate States, and within every subsequent term of 
ten years, in such manner as they shall by law direct. The number of Representatives 
shall not exceed one for every fifty thousand, but each State shall have at least one 
Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of South Carolina 
shall be entitled to choose six; the State of Georgia ten; the State of Alabama nine; the 
State of Florida two; the State of Mississippi seven; the State of Louisiana six; and the 
State of Texas six. 
(4) When vacancies happen in the representation from any State the executive authority 
thereof shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies. 
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(5) The House of Representatives shall choose their Speaker and other officers; and 
shall have the sole power of impeachment; except that any judicial or other Federal 
officer, resident and acting solely within the limits of any State, may be impeached by a 
vote of two-thirds of both branches of the Legislature thereof. 
Sec. 3. (I) The Senate of the Confederate States shall be composed of two Senators from 
each State, chosen for six years by the Legislature thereof, at the regular session next 
immediately preceding the commencement of the term of service; and each Senator 
shall have one vote. 
(2) Immediately after they shall be assembled, in consequence of the first election, they 
shall be divided as equally as may be into three classes. The seats of the Senators of the 
first class shall be vacated at the expiration of the second year; of the second class at the 
expiration of the fourth year; and of the third class at the expiration of the sixth year; so 
that one-third may be chosen every second year; and if vacancies happen by resignation, 
or other wise, during the recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof 
may make temporary appointments until the next meeting of the Legislature, which 
shall then fill such vacancies. 
(3) No person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained the age of thirty years, and 
be a citizen of the Confederate States; and who shall not, then elected, be an inhabitant 
of the State for which he shall be chosen. 
(4) The Vice President of the Confederate States shall be president of the Senate, but 
shall have no vote unless they be equally divided. 
(5) The Senate shall choose their other officers; and also a president pro tempore in the 
absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the office of President of the 
Confederate states. 
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments. When sitting for that 
purpose, they shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Confederate 
States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside; and no person shall be convicted without 
the concurrence of two-thirds of the members present. 
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from 
office, and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust, or profit under the 
Confederate States; but the party convicted shall, nevertheless, be liable and subject to 
indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment according to law. 
Sec. 4. (I) The times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators and 
Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof, subject to 
the provisions of this Constitution; but the Congress may, at any time, by law, make or 
alter such regulations, except as to the times and places of choosing Senators. 
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(2) The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year; and such meeting shall be 
on the first Monday in December, unless they shall, by law, appoint a different day. 
Sec. 5. (I) Each House shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of 
its own members, and a majority of each shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a 
smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the 
attendance of absent members, in such manner and under such penalties as each House 
may provide. 
(2) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for 
disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of the whole number, expel 
a member. 
(3) Each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish 
the same, excepting such parts as may in their judgment require secrecy; and the yeas 
and nays of the members of either House, on any question, shall, at the desire of one-
fifth of those present, be entered on the journal. 
(4) Neither House, during the session of Congress, shall, without the consent of the 
other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the 
two Houses shall be sitting. 
Sec. 6. (I) The Senators and Representatives shall receive a compensation for their 
services, to be ascertained by law, and paid out of the Treasury of the Confederate 
States. They shall, in all cases, except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be 
privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session of their respective Houses, 
and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate in either 
House, they shall not be questioned in any other place. 'o Senator or Representative 
shall, during the time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under 
the authority of the Confederate States, which shall have been created, or the 
emoluments whereof shall have been increased during such time; and no person holding 
any office under the Confederate States shall be a member of either House during his 
continuance in office. But Congress may, by law, grant to the principal officer in each 
of the Executive Departments a seat upon the floor of either House, with the privilege of 
discussing any measures appertaining to his department. 
Sec. 7. (I) All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; 
but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments, as on other bills. 
(2) Every bill which shall have passed both Houses, shall, before it becomes a law, be 
presented to the President of the Confederate States; if he approve, he shall sign it; but 
if not, he shall return it, with his objections, to that House in which it shall have 
originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to 
reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of that House shall agree to pass 
the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House, by which it 
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shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of that House, it shall 
become a law. But in all such cases, the votes of both Houses shall be determined by 
yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting for and against the bill shall be 
entered on the journal of each House respective}y. If any bill shall not be returned by 
the President within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to 
him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress, 
by their adjournment, prevent its return; in which case it shall not be a law. The 
President may approve any appropriation and disapprove any other appropriation in the 
same bill. In such case he shall, in signing the bill, designate the appropriations 
disapproved; and shall return a copy of such appropriations, with his objections, to the 
House in which the bill shall have originated; and the same proceedings shall then be 
had as in case of other bills disapproved by the President. 
(3) Every order, resolution, or vote, to which the concurrence of both Houses may be 
necessary (except on a question of adjournment) shall be presented to the President of 
the Confederate States; and before the same shall take effect, shall be approved by him; 
or, being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two-thirds of both Houses, according 
to the rules and limitations prescribed in case of a bill. 
Sec. 8. The Congress shall have power-
(I) To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises for revenue, necessary to pay 
the debts, provide for the common defense, and carry on the Government of the 
Confederate States; but no bounties shall be granted from the Treasury; nor shall any 
duties or taxes on importations from foreign nations be laid to promote or foster any 
branch of industry; and all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the 
Confederate States. 
(2) To borrow money on the credit of the Confederate States. 
(3) To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with 
the Indian tribes; but neither this, nor any other clause contained in the Constitution, 
shall ever be construed to delegate the power to Congress to appropriate money for any 
internal improvement intended to facilitate commerce; except for the purpose of 
furnishing lights, beacons, and buoys, and other aids to navigation upon the coasts, and 
the improvement of harbors and the removing of obstructions in river navigation; in all 
which cases such duties shall be laid on the navigation facilitated thereby as may be 
necessary to pay the costs and expenses thereof. 
(4) To establish uniform laws of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of 
bankruptcies, throughout the Confederate States; but no law of Congress shall discharge 
any debt contracted before the passage of the same. 
(5) To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard 
of weights and measures. 
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(6) To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the 
Confederate States. 
(7) To establish post offices and post routes; but the expenses of the Post Office 
Department, after the 1st day of March in the year of our Lord eighteen hundred and 
sixty-three, shall be paid out of its own revenues. 
(8) To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to 
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries. 
(9) To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court. 
(10) To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and 
offenses against the law of nations. 
(11) To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning 
captures on land and water. 
(12) To raise and support armies; but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for 
a longer term than two years. 
(13) To provide and maintain a navy. 
(14) To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces. 
(15) To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Confederate 
States, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions. 
(16) To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing 
such part of them as may be employed in the service of the Confederate States; 
reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of 
training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress. 
(17) To exercise exclusive legislation, in all cases whatsoever, over such district (not 
exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of one or more States and the 
acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the Government of the Confederate States; 
and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the Legislature 
of the State in which the same shall be, for the . erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, 
dockyards, and other needful buildings; and 
(18) To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution 
the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the 
Government of the Confederate States, or in any department or officer thereof. 
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Sec. 9. (I) The importation of negroes of the African race from any foreign country 
other than the slaveholding States or Territories of the United States of America, is 
hereby forbidden; and Congress is required to pass such laws as shall effectually 
prevent the same. 
(2) Congress shall also have power to prohibit the introduction of slaves from any State 
not a member of, or Territory not belonging to, this Confederacy. 
(3) The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in 
cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it. 
(4) No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law denying or impairing the right of 
property in negro slaves shall be passed. 
(5) No capitation or other direct tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or 
enumeration hereinbefore directed to be taken. 
(6) No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State, except by a vote of 
two-thirds of both Houses. 
(7) No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports 
of one State over those of another. 
(8) No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations 
made by law; and a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all 
public money shall be published from time to time. 
(9) Congress shall appropriate no money from the Treasury except by a vote of two-
thirds of both Houses, taken by yeas and nays, unless it be asked and estimated for by 
some one of the heads of departments and submitted to Congress by the President; or 
for the purpose of paying its own expenses and contingencies; or for the payment of 
claims against the Confederate States, the justice of which shall have been judicially 
declared by a tribunal for the investigation of claims against the Government, which it 
is hereby made the duty of Congress to establish. 
(10) All bills appropriating money shall specify in Federal currency the exact amount of 
each appropriation and the purposes for which it is made; and Congress shall grant no 
extra compensation to any public contractor, officer, agent, or servant, after such 
contract shall have been made or such service rendered. 
(11) No title of nobility shall be granted by the Confederate States; and no person 
holding any office of profit or trust under them shall, without the consent of the 
Congress, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind whatever, from 
any king, prince, or foreign state. 
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(12) Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right 
of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances. 
(13) A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of 
the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. 
(14) No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house without the consent of 
the owner; nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law. 
(15) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrants shall 
issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 
(16) No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless 
on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or 
naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; 
nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life 
or limb; nor be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself; nor be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
(17) In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and to 
have the assistance of counsel for his defense. 
(18) In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty 
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved; and no fact so tried by a jury shall 
be otherwise reexamined in any court of the Confederacy, than according to the rules of 
common law. 
(19) Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and 
unusual punishments inflicted. 
(20) Every law, or resolution having the force of law, shall relate to but one subject, and 
that shall be expressed in the title. 
Sec. 10. (I) No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters 
of marque and reprisal; coin money; make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in 
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payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, or ex post facto law, or law impairing the 
obligation of contracts; or grant any title of nobility. 
(2) No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any imposts or duties on 
imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its 
inspection laws; and the net produce of all duties and imposts, laid by any State on 
imports, or exports, shall be for the use of the Treasury of the Confederate States; and 
all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of Congress. 
(3) No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty on tonnage, except on 
seagoing vessels, for the improvement of its rivers and harbors navigated by the said 
vessels; but such duties shall not conflict with any treaties of the Confederate States 
with foreign nations; and any surplus revenue thus derived shall, after making such 
improvement, be paid into the common treasury. Nor shall any State keep troops or 
ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another State, 
or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent 
danger as will not admit of delay. But when any river divides or flows through two or 
more States they may enter into compacts with each other to improve the navigation 
thereof. 
ARTICLE II
Section I. (I) The executive power shall be vested in a President of the Confederate 
States of America. He and the Vice President shall hold their offices for the term of six 
years; but the President shall not be reeligible. The President and Vice President shall 
be elected as follows: 
(2) Each State shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a 
number of electors equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which 
the State may be entitled in the Congress; but no Senator or Representative or person 
holding an office of trust or profit under the Confederate States shall be appointed an 
elector. 
(3) The electors shall meet in their respective States and vote by ballot for President and 
Vice President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with 
themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in
distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice President, and they shall make distinct lists 
of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice President, and 
of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit, 
sealed, to the seat of the Government of. the Confederate States, directed to the 
President of the Senate; the President of the Senate shall,in the presence of the Senate 
and House of Representatives, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be 
counted; the person having the greatest number of votes for President shall be the 
President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and 
if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers, not 
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exceeding three, on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives 
shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President the 
votes shall be taken by States, the representation from each State having one vote; a 
quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the 
States, and a majority of all the States shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House 
of Representatives shall not choose a President, whenever the right of choice shall 
devolve upon them, before the 4th day of March next following, then the Vice President 
shall act as President, as in case of the death, or other constitutional disability of the 
President. 
(4) The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice President shall be the Vice 
President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and 
if no person have a majority, then, from the two highest numbers on the list, the Senate 
shall choose the Vice President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of 
the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to 
a choice. 
(5) But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to 
that of Vice President of the Confederate States. 
(6) The Congress may determine the time of choosing the electors, and the day on 
which they shall give their votes; which day shall be the same throughout the 
Confederate States. 
(7) No person except a natural-born citizen of the Confederate; States, or a citizen 
thereof at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, or a citizen thereof born in the 
United States prior to the 20th of December, 1860, shall be eligible to the office of 
President; neither shall any person be eligible to that office who shall not have attained 
the age of thirty-five years, and been fourteen years a resident within the limits of the 
Confederate States, as they may exist at the time of his election. 
(8) In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or 
inability to discharge the powers and duties of said office, the same shall devolve on the 
Vice President; and the Congress may, by law, provide for the case of removal, death, 
resignation, or inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what officer 
shall then act as President; and such officer shall act accordingly until the disability be 
removed or a President shall be elected. 
(9) The President shall, at stated times, receive for his services a compensation, which 
shall neither be increased nor diminished during the period for which he shall have been 
elected; and he shall not receive within that period any other emolument from the 
Confederate States, or any of them. 
(10) Before he enters on the execution of his office he shall take the following oath or 
affirmation: “ I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of 
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President of the Confederate States, and will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, 
and defend the Constitution thereof.”
Sec. 2. (I) The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the 
Confederate States, and of the militia of the several States, when called into the actual 
service of the Confederate States; he may require the opinion, in writing, of the 
principal officer in each of the Executive Departments, upon any subject relating to the 
duties of their respective offices; and he shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons 
for offenses against the Confederate States, except in cases of impeachment. 
(2) He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make 
treaties; provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and 
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate shall appoint, ambassadors, other 
public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the 
Confederate States whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and 
which shall be established by law; but the Congress may, by law, vest the appointment 
of such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of 
law, or in the heads of departments. 
(3) The principal officer in each of the Executive Departments, and all persons 
connected with the diplomatic service, may be removed from office at the pleasure of 
the President. All other civil officers of the Executive Departments may be removed at 
any time by the President, or other appointing power, when their services are 
unnecessary, or for dishonesty, incapacity. inefficiency, misconduct, or neglect of duty; 
and when so removed, the removal shall be reported to the Senate, together with the 
reasons therefor. 
(4) The President shall have power to fill all vacancies that may happen during the 
recess of the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their next 
session; but no person rejected by the Senate shall be reappointed to the same office 
during their ensuing recess. 
Sec. 3. (I) The President shall, from time to time, give to the Congress information of 
the state of the Confederacy, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he 
shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary occasions, convene both 
Houses, or either of them; and in case of disagreement between them, with respect to 
the time of adjournment, he may adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper; he 
shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers; he shall take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed, and shall commission all the officers of the Confederate States. 
Sec. 4. (I) The President, Vice President, and all civil officers of the Confederate States, 
shall be removed from office on impeachment for and conviction of treason, bribery, or 
other high crimes and misdemeanors. 
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ARTICLE III
Section I. (I) The judicial power of the Confederate States shall be vested in one 
Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may, from time to time, 
ordain and establish. The judges, both of the Supreme and inferior courts, shall hold 
their offices during good behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services a 
compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. 
Sec. 2. (I) The judicial power shall extend to all cases arising under this Constitution, 
the laws of the Confederate States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; to 
all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the 
Confederate States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more States; 
between a State and citizens of another State, where the State is plaintiff; between 
citizens claiming lands under grants of different States; and between a State or the 
citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens, or subjects; but no State shall be sued by a 
citizen or subject of any foreign state. 
(2) In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in 
which a State shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all 
the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction 
both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the
Congress shall make. 
(3) The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury, and such 
trial shall be held in the State where the said crimes shall have been committed; but 
when not committed within any State, the trial shall be at such place or places as the 
Congress may by law have directed. 
Sec. 3. (I) Treason against the Confederate States shall consist only in levying war 
against.them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person 
shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt 
act, or on confession in open court. 
(2) The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason; but no 
attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except during the life 
of the person attainted. 
ARTICLE IV
Section I. (I) Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, 
and judicial proceedings of every other State; and the Congress may, by general laws, 
prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and 
the effect thereof. 
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Sec. 2. (I) The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and 
immunities of citizens in the several States; and shall have the right of transit and 
sojourn in any State of this Confederacy, with their slaves and other property; and the 
right of property in said slaves shall not be thereby impaired. 
(2) A person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime against the laws 
of such State, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another State, shall, on 
demand of the executive authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to 
be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime. 
(3) No slave or other person held to service or labor in any State or Territory of the 
Confederate States, under the laws thereof, escaping or lawfully carried into another, 
shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service 
or labor; but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such slave belongs,. or 
to whom such service or labor may be due. 
Sec. 3. (I) Other States may be admitted into this Confederacy by a vote of two-thirds of 
the whole House of Representatives and two-thirds of the Senate, the Senate voting by 
States; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other 
State, nor any State be formed by the junction of two or more States, or parts of States, 
without the consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned, as well as of the 
Congress. 
(2) The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make allneedful rules and 
regulations concerning the property of the Confederate States, including the lands 
thereof. 
(3) The Confederate States may acquire new territory; and Congress shall have power to 
legislate and provide governments for the inhabitants of all territory belonging to the 
Confederate States, lying without the limits of the several Sates; and may permit them, 
at such times, and in such manner as it may by law provide, to form States to be 
admitted into the Confederacy. In all such territory the institution of negro slavery, as it 
now exists in the Confederate States, shall be recognized and protected be Congress and 
by the Territorial government; and the inhabitants of the several Confederate States and 
Territories shall have the right to take to such Territory any slaves lawfully held by 
them in any of the States or Territories of the Confederate States. 
(4) The Confederate States shall guarantee to every State that now is, or hereafter may 
become, a member of this Confederacy, a republican form of government; and shall 
protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the Legislature or of the 
Executive when the Legislature is not in session) against domestic violence. 
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ARTICLE V
Section I. (I) Upon the demand of any three States, legally assembled in their several 
conventions, the Congress shall summon a convention of all the States, to take into 
consideration such amendments to the Constitution as the said States shall concur in 
suggesting at the time when the said demand is made; and should any of the proposed 
amendments to the Constitution be agreed on by the said convention, voting by States, 
and the same be ratified by the Legislatures of two- thirds of the several States, or by 
conventions in two-thirds thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be 
proposed by the general convention, they shall thenceforward form a part of this 
Constitution. But no State shall, without its consent, be deprived of its equal 
representation in the Senate. 
ARTICLE VI
I. The Government established by this Constitution is the successor of the Provisional 
Government of the Confederate States of America, and all the laws passed by the latter 
shall continue in force until the same shall be repealed or modified; and all the officers 
appointed by the same shall remain in office until their successors are appointed and 
qualified, or the offices abolished. 
2. All debts contracted and engagements entered into before the adoption of this 
Constitution shall be as valid against the Confederate States under this Constitution, as 
under the Provisional Government. 
3. This Constitution, and the laws of the Confederate States made in pursuance thereof, 
and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the Confederate 
States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary 
notwithstanding. 
4. The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the members of the several 
State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the Confederate States 
and of the several States, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support this 
Constitution; but no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office 
or public trust under the Confederate States. 
5. The enumeration, in the Constitution, of certain rights shall not be construed to deny 
or disparage others retained by the people of the several States. 
6. The powers not delegated to the Confederate States by the Constitution, nor 




I. The ratification of the conventions of five States shall be sufficient for the 
establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the same. 
2. When five States shall have ratified this Constitution, in the manner before specified, 
the Congress under the Provisional Constitution shall prescribe the time for holding the 
election of President and Vice President; and for the meeting of the Electoral College; 
and for counting the votes, and inaugurating the President. They shall, also, prescribe 
the time for holding the first election of members of Congress under this Constitution, 
and the time for assembling the same. Until the assembling of such Congress, the 
Congress under the Provisional Constitution shall continue to exercise the legislative 
powers granted them; not extending beyond the time limited by the Constitution of the 
Provisional Government. 
Adopted unanimously by the Congress of the Confederate States of South Carolina, 
Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, sitting in convention at 
the capitol, the city of Montgomery, Ala., on the eleventh day of March, in the year 
eighteen hundred and Sixty-one. 
HOWELL COBB, President of the Congress. 
South Carolina: R. Barnwell Rhett, C. G. Memminger, Wm. Porcher Miles, James 
Chesnut, Jr., R. W. Barnwell, William W. Boyce, Lawrence M. Keitt, T. J. Withers. 
Georgia: Francis S. Bartow, Martin J. Crawford, Benjamin H. Hill, Thos. R. R. Cobb. 
Florida: Jackson Morton, J. Patton Anderson, Jas. B. Owens. 
Alabama: Richard W. Walker, Robt. H. Smith, Colin J. McRae, William P. Chilton, 
Stephen F. Hale, David P. Lewis, Tho. Fearn, Jno. Gill Shorter, J. L. M. Curry. 
Mississippi: Alex. M. Clayton, James T. Harrison, William S. Barry, W. S. Wilson, 
Walker Brooke, W. P. Harris, J. A. P. Campbell. 
Louisiana: Alex. de Clouet, C. M. Conrad, Duncan F. Kenner, Henry Marshall. 
Texas: John Hemphill, Thomas N. Waul, John H. Reagan, Williamson S. Oldham, 
Louis T. Wigfall, John Gregg, William Beck Ochiltree.
Source: Richardson, James D. A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Confederacy 
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